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Various studies have examined the relationship between competition and 
efficiency in the banking sector, and others have looked at how this relates to 
broader economic growth. Goldsmith (1969) and King and Levine (1993), 
among others, found that financial reform in the banking sector has led to 
improved efficiency and competition and, thus, led to economic growth. 
Financial reform in Africa came about because of financial liberalisation that 
took place during the late 1980s. This reform process was structured to 
increase competition and efficiency of the financial sector. This has motivated 
academic inquiry into the assessment and measurement of bank efficiency, 
bank competition and the impact on economic growth. The literature available 
indicates a myriad of factors that impact upon bank efficiency and bank 
competition. A determinant that is scarcely addressed in the literature on 
Africa, however, is the quality of institutions. Bearing this in mind, the thesis 
is a group of empirical papers on competition, efficiency and economic growth 
of the banking sector in Africa. Explicitly, annual firm level data on banks 
from ten frontier African countries is employed to study different economic 
theories using various panel data econometric methodologies. 
The results highlight that banks in frontier Africa are distinguished by 
monopolistic competition. Further, the results propose that banking 
competition can be advantageous to economic growth. In addition, as bank 
competition rises through the efficiency conduit, this could in due course 
increase economic growth. Furthermore, we also study the relationship 
between bank competition and efficiency. We observe a positive relationship 
between bank competition and both profit and cost efficiency, consequently 
these findings reject the Quiet Life Hypothesis. We also observe low levels of 
bank efficiency and competition across the sample. However, the study finds 
that bank diversification into non-interest producing activities allows frontier 
African banks to increase their revenue. The study also looks at the quality of 
institutions and the impact on bank competition. The results indicate that 
regulatory quality has a positive impact on banking competition. The findings 
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recommend that to improve economic growth, policy makers should aim at 
improving competitive and efficient conditions in the banking sector because 
competitive banking allocates resources in a more efficient way thus spuring 
economic growth. The focus of these policies should therefore be on bolstering 
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1.1  Background to the study 
The banking sector is the cornerstone of any well-functioning modern 
economy. A competitive and efficient banking sector is vital for the growth and 
development of any economy. If commercial banks are functioning in an 
efficient and competitive manner, then monetary policies are likely to be 
effective (Aikaeli, 2008). Ngalande (2003) states that efficiency in the banking 
sector is regarded as a key contributor to macroeconomic stability among 
central bankers in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Banking efficiency is also a precondition for economic growth and important 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy (Hartmann, 2004; Kiyota, 2009).  
This study focuses on the banking sub-sector because it is a vital service 
industry in any economy, and where it is competitive and efficient, it can spur 
innovation and growth. A competitive and efficient banking sector is vital for 
the proper functioning of any economy for a myriad of reasons, for instance 
at a micro level, banks sell financial products to customers. At a macro level, 
banks provide credit or loan facilities to both firms and consumers. Most 
importantly, however, banks raise, disburse, and invest much of society’s 
savings, so bank performance has significant consequences on allocation of 
capital, firm growth, industrial expansion, and economic development 
(Berger, 1995). However, banking sector that is not competitive will lead to 
under-provision of such credit or loans which may negatively impact the 
overall economic performance of the country (Claessens & Laeven, 2005). 
These are some of the reasons why establishing the level of competition in the 
commercial banking sector has been of utmost importance to policy makers, 
academics as well as the public (Greenberg & Simbanegavi, 2009). A 
competitive financial sector in Africa is very important for economic 
development, especially looking at the indication of the positive relation 
between finance and growth (Kasekende et al., 2009). 
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The banking sectors in Frontier African Countries have experienced 
fundamental changes over the last decade following financial institution 
reform that started in the early 1990s (Aikaeli, 2008). The Frontier African 
economies are countires that have over the past two decades displayed high 
economic growth rates, improved financial systems including a deepened 
banking sector as well as developed capital markets. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, several African countries began to restructure their financial 
sectors to boost banking competitiveness and efficiency (Brownbridge & 
Harvey, 1998). This was in line with the Structural Adjustment Programs set 
in place by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The structural 
adjustment programs were set out to promote liberalisation of the African 
economies through among other things wide ranging financial reforms. 
These financial reforms have been a way of stimulating competition and 
efficiency in the financial sector with varying degrees of success. Financial 
reform has mainly led to increased competition and efficiency in the banking 
sector through the removal of entry barriers, liberalisation of product 
restrictions and elimination of intra-sectoral controls (Claessens, 2009). The 
banking systems in most African countries have improved because of 
financial reform, for instance, the Nigerian banking sector has witnessed 
stronger balance sheets and a greater capital base since undertaking the 
reforms (Kasekende et al., 2009). However according to Senbet and Otchere 
(2005), following the reform, some Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies 
continue to face severe inefficiency and illiquidity. This study builds on earlier 
research that has been carried out on competition and efficiency in the 
commercial banking sector and the relationship they have on economic 
growth (Poshakwale & Qian, 2011). The study also examines the effect of 
institutional quality on banking competition and to the best of my knowledge 
is the first study to examine the interactions between bank competition, bank 
efficiency and economic growth in the Frontier market countries of Africa. 
When we consider the implications of financial reform on economic growth in 
the academic literature, the results we get are imprecise. Several studies have 
shown that financial reforms are expected to result in a higher competitive 
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banking sector, better saving mobilisation and efficient allocation of resources 
to enhance economic growth (see Besanko & Thakor, 1992; Levine, 1997; 
Classens & Laeven, 2004). On the other hand, some papers develop a link 
between the implementation of financial reform and the vulnerability of 
financial systems which result in financial and economic crisis (Rajan, 1992; 
Allen & Gale, 2000). This study will investigate this relationship in more detail 
using competitiveness in the commercial banking sector as a proxy for 
financial development and the relationship that it has with economic growth. 
It has been further established that more competition and efficiency in the 
banking sector can contribute to greater financial stability, product 
innovation, and access by households and firms to financial services, which 
in turn can improve the prospects for economic growth (Hauner & Peiris, 
2005). The studies predominantly point to the fact that development in the 
financial sector improves the banking sector’s competitiveness, increases 
efficiency and leads to overall growth in the economy (Levine, 1997; Besanko 
& Thakor, 1992; Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Poshakwale & Qian, 2009). On 
the other hand, however, some studies conclude that financial reforms are 
unsettling and increase the vulnerability of the financial system to financial 
and economic crises (Rajan, 1992; Allen & Gale, 2000; Poshakwale & Qian, 
2009). 
Further, while some of these relationships between competition and efficiency 
in the commercial banking system and economic growth have been analysed 
in theoretical literature, empirical research on bank competition and 
efficiency, particularly in Africa, is still at an early stage. A hindrance for this 
research used to be insufficient data, as limited bank-level data were available 
outside developed countries, but recently established databases are allowing 
for better empirical work.  
The extant literature also attempts to explain the determinants of banking 
efficiency and competition primarily focusing on a number of banks, markets 
and regulatory characteristics. However recent literature emphasises the role 
of institutions in explaining economic transitions and growth (Henisz, 2000), 
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institutional factors as potential sources of determinants of banking efficiency 
have largely been ignored (see Berger & Mester, 1997). 
Growth and development of economies cannot occur in a vacuum, growth and 
expansion of banks likewise requires an institutional framework that allows 
for transactions to occur and agents to know that the decisions and contracts 
they make are protected and enforced by law. Lin and Nugent (1995) refer to 
institutions as a set of humanly devised behavioural rules that govern and 
shape the interaction of human beings. At a formal level, institutions can be 
defined in regard to the extent of property rights’ protection; the degree to 
which laws and regulations are fairly enforced; extent of political corruption 
and the ability of the government to protect its citizens against economic 
shocks and provide social protection. Weak legal systems and poor 
institutions impede market development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). Issues like private contracting 
conflicts and information asymmetries in the banking sector can be resolved 
by well-functioning institutions.  
Competition in the banking sector is weakened by lack of strong institutions. 
According to Delis et al (2009), relatively weak legal systems in developing and 
transition countries, as well as high levels of corruption in the financial 
system, may limit the strength of competitive forces. On the other hand, Chen 
(2008) highlights that quality of regulations impacts positively on bank 
competition. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2002) broadly find that a broad set of 
research suggests that better institutions will provide greater competition in 
the economy.  
This occurs because, on the one hand, improvements in the institutional 
environment, for instance encompassing better property rights, stronger 
contract enforcement and a higher level judicial efficiency, increase the value 
of collateral for bank loans and therefore reduce the cost of financial 
intermediation for existing borrowers. On the other hand, such improvements 
can extend the credit market to low-grade borrowers and thereby raise the 
average interest rate paid on loans (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2003). This study 
looks at the quality of institutions accounted for in measures of banking 
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competition. Do strong institutions foster or hinder competitiveness in the 
commercial banking sector in Africa, or are weak institutions an enabling 
factor for competitiveness? 
Relatively few studies around banking competitiveness and efficiency have 
come from the African continent. This had been in part due to a low level of 
financial development, limited market activities, and lack of quality data. 
However, it is worth noting that in recent years these frontier African 
countries have developed their financial systems, with commercial banks as 
the core financial intermediaries. The availability of data for these countries 
has also made it possible to understand how banks operate, and to investigate 
the major factors that can improve both their competitiveness and their 
efficiency (Chen, 2009). 
With that context, this thesis is a group of connected research papers on the 
efficiency and competition of the banking sector in a selection of Frontier 
market African countries. The thesis looks at the subsequent research 
questions: First, what is the level of bank competition in Frontier African 
countries? Does banking competition empirically effect the level of economic 
growth? Second, what is the degree of bank efficiency in these countries? 
Third, does the degree of competitiveness impact on bank efficiency in the 
banking industry? Fourth, does income diversification impact the magnitude 
of bank competition? Fifth, does institutional quality impact on bank 
competition of the banking sector? The study examines the fundamental 
hypothesis that institutional quality improves the degree of bank competition. 
1.2  Research problem 
Pre-independence, commercial banks in Africa consisted primarily of foreign-
owned or expatriate banks. At the attainment of independence, to remedy 
several unfair practices that had been carried out by these foreign-owned 
banks, such as uncompetitive lending policies, African governments 
restructured their respective banking sectors. State banks were established, 
and the private sector was encouraged to set up local banks. Most 
governments held the belief that predominant government intervention was 
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necessary to ensure that the banking system played a more supportive role in 
developing the local economy (Brownbridge, 1996). Consequently, successive 
governments in Africa adopted interventionist policies in the banking sector. 
Interest rates were controlled, public sector banks were set up, and the 
government bought equity in the foreign banks, and in addition a variety of 
administered lending programmes were established.  
However, the impact of government controls on financial markets and 
intervention in the banking sector failed to achieve the intended results. There 
was a steep decline in financial depth of the economy, and a marked 
deterioration in the institutional strength of the banking system 
(Brownbridge, 1996). It is for these, among many other reasons, that financial 
reforms in the financial sector with focus on commercial banks were deemed 
necessary.  
Financial reform in Africa started to take place in earnest in the late 1980s. 
This was in reaction to financial sector repression that had been widespread 
on the continent, mostly because of government mismanagement of the 
sector. It was carried out to increase efficiency and competitiveness of the 
sector. The seminal works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) attributed 
financial repression as the cause of the unsatisfactory growth performance in 
developing countries. They advocated financial liberalisation as a remedy to 
the issues caused by financially repressive policies of developing countries 
(Fowowe, 2011). The financial reforms that were carried out were a pre-
condition laid out as part of the structural adjustment programs of the World 
Bank and the IMF in line with the ideals of financial liberalisation. 
Accordingly, the process led to removal of barriers to entry, entry of foreign 
banks, and reduction in interest rates to mention but a few.  
According to Kablan (2010), numerous studies have been done on banking 
efficiency and competitiveness of commercial banks to assess the impact of 
those reforms. The impact of this reform on bank competitiveness and 
efficiency in literature is imprecise: some studies claim that to a significant 
extent the financial reform improved competitiveness as well as efficiency of 
commercial banks (Claessens & Laeven, 2004). These studies have usually 
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been carried out on groups of emerging countries (Grigorian & Manole, 2002; 
Bonin, Hasan & Wachtel, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2005; Fries & Taci, 2005). 
However, fewer studies have been carried out on Africa. Greenberg and 
Simbanegavi (2009) for instance, study competitiveness in South African 
banks and find that the banking sector faces a high level of monopolistic 
competition. Poshakwale and Qian (2011) find that the Egyptian banking 
sector is also monopolistically competitive. Further, their findings suggest a 
significant relationship between productive efficiency and economic growth in 
the short run which is not consistent in the long run.  
This study analyses the level of competition as well as the level of efficiency in 
the commercial banking sector. We shall also study the relationship between 
competitiveness in the banking sector and efficiency in the banking sector. 
Whereas a positive relationship between competition and efficiency is often 
assumed, the specific characteristics of banking markets (i.e. entry barriers, 
sunk costs, information asymmetries) may lead to excessive market power of 
efficient banks, therefore reducing competition (Casu and Giradone, 2009). 
They further suggest a negative causation between efficiency and competition, 
whereas the causality running from competition to efficiency, although 
positive, is relatively weak (Casu and Giradone, 2009). Hauner and Peiris 
(2005) find that an increased level of bank competition as a outcome of 
financial reform is associated with a rise in efficiency.  
This study will also highlight the relationship that competitiveness in the 
commercial banking sector has with economic growth in the economy. There 
is a paradigm that improved competitiveness will lead to higher economic 
growth. Numerous studies have examined the link between financial 
development and economic growth. Levine (1997) built on earlier works by 
Goldsmith (1969) to investigate this finance development–growth nexus; he 
argues that there is a positive first order relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in the short run. However, he concludes 
that further study of financial systems is necessary to understand the long-
run relationship between financial development and economic growth. Fewer 
studies have focused on competitiveness and the relationship with economic 
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growth on the African continent. Poshakwale and Qian (2011) looked at 
competitiveness and productive efficiency in commercial banks in Egypt and 
the short- and long-term effects these have on economic growth. Their study 
further indicates that there is a significant relationship between 
competitiveness and productive efficiency in the banking sector and economic 
growth in the short run which is not significant in the long run. This study 
analyses the relationship between competitiveness in commercial banks and 
economic growth in Frontier African countries.  
The studies on banking competitiveness have also tended to overlook the role 
played by institutions in banking competition models. By so doing, the link 
between these concepts seems neglected in the literature. There is therefore a 
need for a methodological process that delves into the relationships between 
the quality of institutions and competitiveness in commercial banking. The 
banking system requires institutions to provide a framework that will allow 
transactions to take place effectively. Further to this, institutions provide 
rules under which rational, optimising decisions can be made. Do strong 
institutions foster competitiveness in banking or do they hamper it? We shall 
account for the quality of institutions in several banking competition models. 
To the best of my knowledge, no study has measured the impact of quality of 
institutions on bank competition especially in the context of developing 
countries and the study will fill this gap. The main contribution of the 
research will be to account for the impact of quality of institutions in 
measures of banking competition.  
With this background, the study explores the resulting research questions:  
1. How will accounting for the quality of institutions affect competition 
measures in commercial banks.  
2. How competitive is the commercial banking industry in these Frontier 
African economies?  
3. How efficient is the banking industry in the Frontier African economies? 
This question attempts to find out whether there are unique 
characteristics within these African economies that affect the level of 
efficiency in the banking sector.  
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4. The relationship between competitiveness and efficiency in the 
commercial banking sector?  
5. The relationship between competitiveness in the commercial banking 
sector and economic growth?  
1.3  Justification and motivation for the study 
The banking sector is usually the largest single component of the financial 
system, which also includes securities firms and insurers. Within the 
financial system banks need special treatment for several reasons. Their 
functions interrupt all aspects of the economy and are central to the overall 
performance of the economy. The effectiveness of the financial system in the 
execution these functions is a major ingredient of the efficacy of the economy.  
In well-functioning economies, banks tend to act as quality controllers for 
capital seeking successful projects, ensuring higher returns and accelerating 
output growth. Further, a competitive banking system is required to ensure 
that banks are effective forces for financial intermediation, channelling 
savings into investment fostering higher economic growth (Mugume, 2007). If 
commercial banks are functioning efficiently and in a competitive manner, 
monetary policies are likely to be effective. Similarly, the banking system is a 
vital service industry and where it is competitive and efficient, it can spur 
efficiency and innovation elsewhere in the economy. The converse is also true: 
there may be a transfer of welfare from individuals and non-bank businesses 
to the financial sector if the banking system is not competitive or efficient. It 
is for this reason that competitiveness and efficiency in the banking sector are 
of utmost value to the operation of the sector in Africa. 
This study provides a valuable insight into the extent of competitiveness and 
efficiency of commercial banks in a sample of frontier African countries. The 
results are important for policy makers and academics alike and justify the 
need for continued reform in the financial sector. The study of efficiency and 
competitiveness in commercial banks and their relationship with economic 
growth in Africa is an area that has not been widely investigated on the African 
continent. In addition, the impact of quality of institutions on banking 
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competition is also an area that has not been investigated in frontier African 
countries. The available empirical evidence is that well-functioning financial 
markets, along with well-designed institutions and regulatory systems, foster 
economic development (Senbet & Otchere, 2005). 
Poshakwale and Qian (2011) studied competitiveness, efficiency in the 
banking sector and the relationship with economic growth, using the Egyptian 
economy as a case study. Their findings indicate that financial reform seems 
to have had a positive and significant effect on improving competitiveness and 
productive efficiency in the commercial banking sector. The study also does 
not find evidence of a long-run association between increased bank 
competition and economic growth. Buchs and Mathisen (2005) looked at 
competition and efficiency in the economy of Ghana and found that banks 
behave in a non-competitive manner that possibly hampers financial 
intermediation. The findings from these studies indicate a high degree of 
monopolistic competition in the countries studied. Kiyota (2009) argues that 
foreign banks in Africa are more profit-efficient than domestic banks and their 
entry tends to have an impact on improving the performance of domestic 
banks. 
The quality of institutions in an economy cannot be understated. Institutions 
provide a framework under which markets operate. The law and finance 
literature has found that financial markets are better developed in countries 
with strong institutions and frameworks (La Porta et al., 1998, Martin et al, 
2015). The quality of institutions refers to how strong or weak they are. Many 
countries in Africa have been shown to have weak institutions over the years. 
In recent years, this has changed as institutional development has been 
entrenched in these countries. The frontier market economies in Africa 
provide a nice case study because these countries have developed their 
institutional environment.  
 
1.4  Objectives of the study 
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The key objective of this study is to measure the effect of accounting for the 
quality of institutions in the measurement of banking industry 
competitiveness. Explicitly, the study seeks to realize the following objectives: 
• To formulate a measure of commercial banking competition which 
accounts for the quality of institutions.  
• To estimate the level of competitiveness in the commercial bank sector in 
Africa.  
• To analyse the efficiency level of commercial banks in Africa. Efficiency is 
often the desired outcome of any financial reform that is undertaken in an 
economy. Have reforms in the financial sector increased banking efficiency 
in Africa?  
• To examine the relationship between competitiveness in the commercial 
banking sector and economic growth in these economies.  
• To examine the relationship between banking efficiency in the commercial 
banking sector and economic growth.  
• To investigate the relationship between competitiveness and efficiency in 
the commercial banking sector. A positive relationship is always assumed 
between competitiveness and efficiency in the banking sector. This study 
will investigate whether increased competition in the banking sectors of 
these African economies has led to an increase in efficiency. 
1.5  Organisation of the study 
This chapter is followed by an overview of the main facets of the financial 
system in the Frontier African Market region focussing on two principal 
issues: financial reforms and performance of the banking system. The 
financial reform section looks at regulatory and supervisory functions as well 
as payment and settlement reforms that were carried out in Africa. The 
performance section looks at issues around profitability, solvency, asset 
quality and liquidity. The attributes of the individual countries show a fairly 
heterogeneous system with fairly lower levels of development, and South 
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Africa which boosts a bigger more developed economy having a more 
developed financial system. 
The proceeding chapters may be conceptualised by Figure 1.1 that outlines 
the associations between the three concepts, namely; banking 
competitiveness, banking efficiency and economic growth. The following 
chapters are linked to the interrelationships between these concepts. Chapter 
Three employs a panel data approach to measure competition in the banking 
systems of ten frontier African countries and looks at the impact bank 
competition has on economic growth. The findings indicate presence of 
monopolistic competition and finds that bank competitiveness enhances 
economic growth in the region.  
Chapter Four measures bank efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), and the results indicate that banks in the countries studied have 
efficient banking sectors. The results of truncated regression indicate that 
bank size is negatively related to banking sector efficiency while the degree of 
risk is positively related to bank efficiency.  
Chapter Five tests the hypothesis that there is a relationship between bank 
competition and bank efficiency and uses a random effects approach. The 
results indicate the existence of a positive and significant relationship 
between market power and both cost and profit efficiency, thus rejecting the 
Quiet Life Hypothesis.  
Chapter Six seeks to test the hypothesis that the relationship between bank 
activity diversification and efficiency is non-linear among a sample of frontier 
African banks. The results indicate high revenue inefficiency, and that was 
indicated by a high cost efficiency as opposed to profit efficiency. The results 
observe a reversed U-shaped relationship between cost efficiency and income 
diversification, and this indicates that income diversification is efficiency-
enhancing up to a point and after, the benefits are diminished. 
Using the simultaneous quantile regression (SQR) approach, Chapter Seven 
seeks to test the hypothesis that institutional quality enhances bank 
competition by providing an enabling structure for the financial systems in 
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the various countries. The findings indicate that overall there is a positive 
relationship between regulatory quality and bank competition across the 
frontier African countries. The results authenticate the hypothesis and reveal 
the importance of effective institutional quality policies to curb financial 
instability and achieve bank competition. Chapter Eight summarizes the 
study and provides some policy recommendations. The theoretical 
connections amongst the central themes of the thesis are presented in Figure 
1.1 below. 
Figure 1.1: Linkages between bank competition, bank efficiency, quality 
of institutions and economic growth 
 
Source: Authors design 
 
1.6  Measurements of concepts and caveats 
For the study to measure the relationships outlined in Fig 1.1 above, it is 
necessary to find suitable measurement variables. Table 1.1 defines all the 
variables that were used in this thesis.  








Concept  Variable Description 
Bank competitiveness H-Statistic Calculated as the total of gross 
revenue input price elasticities  
 
Boone indicator The degree of competition based 
on profit efficiency in the 
banking market. It is estimated 
as the elasticity of profits to 
marginal costs. 
 
HHI Measured as the sum of the 
squared deposit market shares 
of all the banks in the market, 
where market share may be 
based on either deposits or 
assets. 
Bank efficiency DEA This is a non-parametric 
approach using a linear 
programming algorithm. 
 
SFA The SFA adjusts a standard cost 
(production) function to allow 
inefficiencies to be included in 
the error term. 
Institutional quality Control of corruption Index for the control of 
corruption, for 2005- 2012 
 
Regulatory quality Index for regulatory quality, for 
2005-2012 
 
Voice and accountability Index for voice and 
accountability, for 2005-2012 
 
Source: Author 
The study employs the H-statistic, the HHI and the Boone indicator to 
measure bank competition. The H-statistic approach has two advantages: first, 
it does not need a lot of data to estimate, and second, it produces robust 
results irrespective of the market description (Shaffer, 2004). On the other 
hand, the determining the market structure. In addition, though the sign of 
the H statistic is very useful, Shaffer (2004) contends that its value, for H not 
equal to one, has an uncertain explanation in theory.  
The Boone indicator has benefits such as the ability to measure competition 
on specific and distinct product markets or on particular types of banks. This 
indicator requires small datasets to compute and is theoretically robust. 
Nevertheless, the indicator has a disadvantage if banks pass their efficiency 
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gains to their customers and ignores the differences in product quality (Van 
Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). 
The Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) is a simple but powerful tool for the 
measurement of concentration within an industry. It is calculated as the sum 
of the squared deposit market shares of all the banks in the market, where 
market share may be based on either deposits or assets. Market shares are 
derived from deposits, because it is assumed that the level of a bank’s deposits 
in a market is an indication of the level of its other banking services in that 
same market. 
Bank efficiency is measured by two variables: The Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) technique which is deterministic and non-parametric, and the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) that is stochastic and parametric. DEA is 
the most commonly used non-parametric approach and is a linear 
programming algorithm developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
This approach offers the advantage of simple application and restrictive 
assumptions regarding the functional form are not required in advance. The 
SFA, on the other hand, specifies a functional form for the cost, profit or 
production frontier and allows for a random error. The SFA adjusts a standard 
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APPENDIX 1.A: Description of Frontier African countries 
Frontier Market African countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
possess similar economic characteristics. These are countries with fairly 
developed financial sectors, positive macroeconomic performance, and 
increased flow of foreign direct investment. A consequence of this has been 
increased integration of Frontier African countries with international capital 
markets.1 
Frontier markets can also be referred to as pre-emerging markets and are a 
subset of emerging markets. They are markets that are investable but have 
less capitalisation and whose equity markets do not meet the diversity, 
stability or liquidity standard to be considered emerging markets. In addition, 
frontier markets provide investors with strong macroeconomic fundamentals 
combined with favourable demographics. 
Over the past decade, frontier markets have become more accessible to foreign 
investors through lowering of restrictions on foreign ownership, reductions in 
capital gains tax and increased liquidity in local markets. Another rationale 
for increased investment in these markets is the high returns that these 
markets have been proven to provide.  
FM countries have also been classified by indices established by four major 
providers: Standard & Poor (S&P), MSCI, Russell and FTSE. These providers 
use different selection criteria and construction methodologies, which lead to 
diverse constituents and the choice of countries is not homogenous. For 
instance, the FTSE Frontier Index includes 21 countries, whereas the Russell 
Frontier Index represents a broader opportunity set of 39 countries. In total, 
44 countries are included in at least one of the frontier markets indices from 
MSCI, FTSE, S&P, or Russell, and 15 countries overlap across all four 
                                                          
1 Frontier African countries used in the study are Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Tunisia, 
Morocco, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Kenya and Nigeria. In South Africa, 22 
banking institutions were used. Tanzania and Uganda each comprises 15 licensed banking 





providers. The sample in this thesis consists of countries that are identified 
across all the four providers: availability of data guides our choice of countries 
(see Appendix 1.C). 
Appendix 1.B: Classification of Frontier African Countries by provider 
Country Classification by Provider 
Botswana S&P, FTSE, Russell 
Ghana S&P, Russell 
Kenya S&P, MSCI, FTSE, Russell 
Mauritius S&P, MSCI, FTSE, Russell 
Morocco MSCI 
Nigeria S&P, MSCI, FTSE, Russell 
South Africa MSCI 
Tanzania MSCI, Russell 
Tunisia MSCI, FTSE, Russell 
Uganda MSCI 
 
As highlighted above, frontier African countries have comparable 
characteristics among which are a high level of banking concentration. South 
Africa and Botswana, for instance, are seen to have the highest levels of 
banking concentration in the sample and this is also evidenced in a study by 
Okeahalam (2001). The high level of bank concentration allows for very limited 
deposit and lending competition. Another salient characteristic of these 
countries is oligopolistic nature of the banking sector. In Uganda for instance, 
four foreign-owned banks account for 75% of deposits and assets. Similarly, 
four banks account for 65% of market share in Ghana. In Tanzania, four 
foreign banks account for 49% and three local banks account for 49% market 
share (Senbet and Otchere, 2005).  
To develop the banking sector on the continent, a most of the countries in the 
study have carried out financial reform over the last thirty years. The reform 
process covered restructuring of poorly run state-owned banks, financial 
regulatory and supervisory framework, monetary policy framework, removal 
of interest rate controls and credit ceilings, as well as capital account 
liberalisation (Motelle & Biekpe, 2014). South Africa removed the financial 
rand system of exchange control over non-residents in 1995. The reform in 
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Ghana began with the partial liberalisation of interest rates in 1987 and 
removal of sectoral credit ceilings the following year. This was accompanied 
by liberalisation of access to foreign exchange and the licensing of foreign 
exchange bureaux (Brownbridge & Gockel, 1997). These patterns have been 
similar across all the ten frontier African countries. This overview considers 
three indicators of financial development in the Frontier Market African 
countries: the interest rate spread, bank capital to asset ratio, and bank 
deposit to GDP. 
The spread between deposit and lending rates is taken as an indicator of the 
health of the financial sector. A persistent and wide financial intermediation 
interest rate spread can symbolise lack of competition, perceived market risk, 
bank unsoundness, scale diseconomies, distortionary regulatory constraints, 
and the underdevelopment of the financial sector (Randall, 1998). Table A1.2 
shows that among the Frontier Market African countries for 2012, South 
Africa is the most efficient economy because it has the narrowest spread 
between lending and deposit rates. Uganda was the least efficient in this 
regard with the highest interest rate spread. 
The bank capital to asset ratio measures the ratio of bank capital and reserves 
to total assets. Capital and reserves comprise funds contributed by owners, 
retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation 
adjustments. Total assets here include all nonfinancial and financial assets. 
Uganda has the highest ratio in the sample: this indicates that in the sample, 
this banking sector has higher levels of capital. This is important as capital 
can serve as a cushion against credit risks. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Botswana has the lowest ratio and that means it has the lowest levels of 
capital in its banking sector. 
The rate of bank deposits to GDP is another good indicator of the health of 
the banking sector. This reflects the depth and spread as well as reach of 
banking in an economy. Table A1.2 shows the rate of bank deposits to GDP 
in Frontier African countries. South Africa, Mauritius and Morocco have the 
highest percentage of bank deposits to GDP, and Uganda has the lowest 
percentage of bank deposits to GDP. 
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Appendix 1.C: Some stylised facts for the banking sectors in Frontier 
African Countries for 20122 
Country  Interest rate 
spread 
Bank capital to 
assets ratio (%) 
Bank deposits to 
GDP (%) 
Botswana 7.39 7.06 14.63 
Ghana .. 14.77 31.34 
Kenya 8.15 13.55 42.24 
Morocco .. 8.50 113.69 
Mauritius 2.43 8.47 112.68 
Nigeria 8.39 10.82 20.80 
South Africa 3.31 7.79 180.70 
Tanzania 5.95 10.06 17.98 
Tunisia .. 7.80 83.22 
Uganda 10.08 16.66 13.75 
 
Source: World Bank Financial Database (2016) 
  
                                                          




OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN FRONTIER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter gives an overview of the historic, financial as well as regulatory 
background in the banking sector for selection of frontier African market 
countries. This chapter sets the context for the chapters that follow by 
analysing the similar historical country overviews as well as performance 
indicators. The analysis also covers two important themes, namely; 
performance indicators as well as financial reforms. The reforms included 
interest rate liberalisation bank restructuring as well as enhancement of bank 
regulation and supervisory policies. However, the characteristics of the 
individual Frontier economies indicate fairly low to moderate levels of 
development in the financial systems, with the exception of South Africa as 
Africa’s leading economy boasting of highly developed financial markets. 
2.2 Historical overview 
The banking systems and subsequent financial regulation for the sample of 
frontier African countries were established during the period of colonisation 
by various European countries. Prior to the advent of colonialism, trade in 
these countries was dominated by foreign merchants: Arabs and Dutch 
amongst others. The currency used for transactions during this period 
consisted of Indian rupees, silver and gold coins. After the advent of 
colonialism, the various colonial powers established currency boards in the 
countries under their sphere of influence. For instance, a currency board was 
established in 1919 in the British colonies of East Africa, just after the 
acquisition of Tanganyika, a colony previously under German rule. The area 
of the board’s operations, i.e. the East African shilling monetary area, 
consisted of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. With this came the introduction 
of a common currency, the East African shilling. This common currency 
remained in place until 1965 when the liquidation of East African Currency 
Board was decided, and the three East African countries established their 
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own independent currencies. With this came the establishment and 
regulation of banks in the various colonies, for instance the 1952 Banking 
Ordinance, and the Banking Amendment Act in Nigeria (Oluduro, 2015). The 
core business of the banks was to offer trade finance, and mainly served the 
expatriate community. The oldest bank to be established in Uganda was 
Stanchart in 1912 and it has maintained a continuous presence in the 
country to date. In Kenya, the Kenya Commercial Bank was the first 
commercial bank to be set up in 1896.  
In South Africa in 1782, the Dutch Governor Van Plettenberg was the first to 
introduce paper money, owing to his inability to procure from the 
Netherlands a sufficient quantity of coinage for the requirements of the 
settlement. This earliest paper money was issued in rixdollar and silver 
denominations, the currency of the Cape at that time. The first bank to be 
established in the Cape was the Lombaard Bank, which was a State bank and 
opened its doors in Cape Town in 1793, with the view of bringing additional 
money into circulation, and thus assisting those who suffered from lack of 
currency (SARB, 2017). This bank was entrusted with the issuing of 
government notes. The first private bank in South Africa was the Cape of 
Good Hope Bank which opened in 1837. South Africa later formed the Rand 
Monetary Area (RMA) which comprised countries in Southern Africa that were 
under its sphere of influence. At the time of independence in 1966, Botswana 
was a member of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) and the South African rand 
served as the national currency. However, in 1974, the country decided to 
withdraw from the RMA, and the country introduced a new currency known 
as the Pula. Standard Chartered Bank Botswana was the first commercial 
bank to set up business in Botswana as early as 1897. 
Like what had been done in East Africa, in 1912 the British colonial 
government set up the West African Currency Board (WACB) oversee the 
banks in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Léone. This was disbanded in 
1965 after most of these countries had attained independence. Standard 
Chartered Bank was also the first bank to set up operations in Ghana in 1896. 
In 1953, the first indigenous bank, Ghana Commercial Bank, was opened to 
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offer credit services to the native Ghanaians. In Nigeria, the history of banking 
in Nigeria dates to 1892 when Standard Chartered Bank started the activities 
of banking in Lagos.  
Banks in North Africa operated under the supervision of the French 
authorities who ruled Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia as colonies. Banks such 
as Société Générale and Société Marseillaise de Crédit were granted 
permission to operate in these countries from 1900. The Banque de Algérie 
was first established in 1853 and spread its influence to most of North Africa. 
A decree was granted in 1904 authorising the bank to issue banknotes and 
discount bills in Tunisia. The same arrangement was put in place in 1907 for 
Morocco. The arrangement did not fare as well in Morocco because of the 
existence of the Banque d’Etat du Maroc which had been formed to carry out 
the same role. 
For most of these countries, the formalised banking system was initially set 
up and supervised by the various colonial powers in the different territories. 
Most of the banks however were set up as branches of banks in the European 
countries. After gaining independence from the colonial powers, most of the 
African countries formed independent central banks with their own 
independence and autonomy. This independence and autonomy led most 
countries to pursue policies that led to lack of competitiveness and efficiency 
in their banking sectors, and inevitably to a need for reform in the financial 
sector. 
2.3 Banking reforms 
Most countries in SSA underwent extensive financial sector reforms over the 
past 20 years. These reforms included liberalisation of interest rates, removal 
of credit ceilings, restructuring and privatisation of government-owned banks, 
introduction of a variety of measures to promote development of financial 
markets, including capital markets, along with bank supervisory and 
regulatory schemes. A particularly interesting outgrowth of these financial 
sector reforms has been a surge of interest in the establishment of stock 
exchanges and their rapid proliferation in recent years (Senbet and Otchere, 
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2006). This increase in growth has been evidenced in a particular subset of 
countries of which this sample of countries is drawn from. The frontier market 
countries in Africa have shown high growth rates in the banking sector, with 
increased bank penetration and increased levels of innovation for instance 
mobile banking. These countries have also established capital markets albeit 
in various stages of development and exhibited strong signs of sustainable 
private sector led growth. For this to take place, there has been the need to 
ensure that macroeconomic policy and capital account prudential policies are 
tailored to avoid the traps of volatile short-term flows, and that policies 
promote financial sector stability (Nellor, 2008). 
This reform that was carried out was in response to various challenges that 
had been faced by the financial systems in Africa. The financial reforms in 
Africa were a turnaround of policies from the post-independence era where 
African governments intervened in the financial sector (Senbet and Otchere, 
2006). The menu of intervention was quite extensive and included 
nationalisation of private banks, establishment of entirely new state banks 
and non-bank financial institutions, imposition of quantitative restrictions on 
the allocation of credit, and restriction of external capital flows. Although the 
intentions of government intervention in the financial sector might have been 
benevolent in the sense of mobilising capital needed for investments and 
allocating capital to priority sectors, the actions were counterproductive and 
produced utterly dysfunctional financial systems. Moreover, the intended 
goals of capital mobilisation and allocation of capital to growth areas were not 
realised. In fact, the repressive era produced a lost decade (the 1980s) for 
Sub-Saharan Africa when the region marched backwards while the rest of the 
world, particularly emerging countries in East Asia and Latin America, moved 
forward (Senbet and Otchere, 2006). Prior to the reforms, frontier African 
countries were characterised by narrow financial systems which were not 
equipped to sustain a comprehensive banking sector reform process over a 
brief period. Most of the frontier African countries exhibit heterogeneity in 
terms of characteristics of their financial systems in terms of the depth of 
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their financial markets and sophistication of their financial markets (Moyo et 
al., 2014). 
The reforms in the financial sector encompassed the liberalisation of interest 
rates, as well as exchange rates, withdrawal of ceilings pertaining to credits, 
privatisation of banks (which were owned by the state), and restructuring of 
banks owned by the state. The discussion of the banking reforms in the 
frontier African countries under study has been categorised broadly into 
regulatory and supervisory reforms and payment and settlement system 
reforms. 
2.4 Regulatory and supervisory reforms 
The regulatory and supervisory framework in the frontier market countries 
was strengthened with regulatory policies. The process was undertaken in a 
similar pattern across Africa, though what differed was the time of 
implementation. The reforms were carried out over a wide range of areas as 
articulated below. 
As a first step, these countries passed banking laws that provided a 
foundation for the regulatory structure to take shape. These laws provided for 
minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios, prudential lending 
ratios, exposure limits, and accounting and auditing regulations 
(International Monetary Fund, 1999; Barth et al., 2013). These laws were set 
up because financial liberalisation placed a strong demand on prudential 
regulation and supervision, and insufficient regulatory and supervisory 
framework would hamper effective financial liberalisation.3 
Reforms included the liberalisation of interest rates as well as abolishment of 
credit controls in these frontier African countries. This was done to increase 
the interest rate in the different countries which was thought would increase 
the volume of financial savings through financial intermediaries and thereby 
raise investment funds (McKinnon, 1973). There were also reforms in priority 
sector lending stipulations that were removed, for instance, that banks could 
                                                          
3 Table 2A.1 indicates the timeline in which the various regulatory and supervisory reforms 
were carried out in the countries in the sample. 
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no longer lend to the agriculture sector. The reforms also relaxed the entrance 
requirements for foreign banks into the banking sectors of the various 
countries.  
The different countries in the sample also passed laws that strengthened their 
various central banks (See Appendix 2A for breakdown of the different laws 
passed in the sample of Frontier African markets). The intention of these laws 
was to restructure the banking sector to offer stronger supervisory and 
regulatory powers to the different central banks. These laws gave the central 
banks independence in the formulation of monetary and financial policies. 
They also enabled the financial system to be more transparent and 
accountable. These changes were aimed at ensuring price and financial 
stability and providing a favourable economic environment for sustainable 
economic growth. In addition, most of the governments sold the shares that 
they held in commercial banks in the different countries to bolster 
competition and efficiency in the different banking systems. For instance, the 
government of Uganda sold its equity in Uganda Commercial Bank in 1997, 
and the Ghanaian government did the same with Ghana Commercial Bank in 
1996 (IMF, 1999). 
To further enhance bank competition in these markets, the universal banking 
model was introduced as one of the financial reforms. This permitted 
commercial banks to move into investment or merchant banking and 
insurance with no requirement for separate licences. Prior to these reforms, 
banks were only allowed to undertake retail banking, corporate banking, etc. 
Universal banking was intended to give banks the ability to take on the higher 
level of intermediation needed to support growth in an expanding economy. 
Linked to this the reforms also looked at minimum capital requirements that 
could be held. The aim was to strengthen the capital base of the banks to 
enable them to assume greater levels of risk, particularly, at a time when 
banks could engage in universal banking. 
Further to this, most of the countries in the sample introduced Foreign 
Exchange Acts into their financial systems. The purpose of this was to offer a 
new statutory structure for foreign exchange payments and transactions. 
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With this act in place, instead of controlling forex as occurred before the 
reform era, the central banks focused on monitoring foreign exchange 
transactions for balance of payments and other purposes in line with 
international best practice. The banks would then submit reports on all 
foreign exchange transactions to various central banks. The purpose of this 
was to entice inflows of foreign exchange into the various economies for 
foreign direct investment purposes. An exception to this is South Africa, which 
has still maintained firm control on foreign exchange through its National 
Treasury (SARB, 2016). 
As part of the financial reforms, some countries in the sample introduced a 
Credit Reporting Act. The banks in these countries were supposed to provide 
credit details to the various bureaux that had been set up. The purpose for 
this was to reduce the information asymmetry that had characterised the 
lending function in most countries in Africa. This is because no borrowers 
(individuals or firms) will willingly submit unfavourable information relating 
to themselves or their businesses. The problem of information asymmetry 
puts the financial system at greater risk. Credit reporting would ensure better 
and faster credit evaluation which could improve transparency and reduce 
lending risks (Mehran et al, 2012). Having credible information about bank 
borrowers will help the banking industry to improve its credit risk 
management. This law also protects and enforces creditor rights and helps to 
establish confidence in the banking system (Mehran et al, 2012). 
Many of the countries in the sample also instituted an anti-money laundering 
act within their financial systems. This was put in place to offer a system that 
would criminalise money laundering in the various African countries. In 
relation to this, these countries also set up Financial Intelligence centres, the 
sole purpose of which was identify and monitor money-laundering activities 
and report to the investigating authorities any information obtained. The Anti-
Money Laundering law stipulates that a person commits the offence of money 
laundering if they knowingly convert, conceal, disguise, transfer, take 




Furthermore, the central banks in various countries started risk-based 
supervision (RBS) as one of the financial reforms. The banks complied by 
setting up risk management departments with well-trained personnel. The 
RBS process involves critical identification, measurement, continuous 
monitoring, management of risks associated with the operations of banks 
such as modern technologies, branch expansion, product innovation, size, 
linkages and interdependence of banks. The importance of risk management 
systems is that they are intended to improve the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of the supervision process. 
Many of countries in the sample also instituted the Borrowers and Lenders 
Act (see Appendix 2A). The importance of this reform was to ensure full 
disclosure of information by borrowers and lenders and disallow certain credit 
practices. It indicated the role of collateral in granting credit and set up a 
collateral registry for charges and collateral credited by borrowers. It gave 
lenders the authority to take ownership of collateral security after a borrower 
was given 30-day notice of default without appealing to the court 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011). Thus, the Borrowers and Lenders Act 
provides the lending conditions and rights and obligations of lenders and 
borrowers (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). 
Lastly, a key reform that was carried out was the adhering to the International 
Financial Reporting standards (IFRS). All banks in these countries were to 
report their financial position and performance in line with IFRS. The 
relevance of this was to improve transparency and facilitate comparison of 
reported financial results with banks operating in these frontier African 
countries and international banks. 
2.5 Payment and settlement reforms 
The different African countries also set out to reform the payment and 
settlement structures within their financial systems. This process is still 
ongoing, with some countries in the sample having more developed payment 
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and settlement systems than others.4 The infrastructure put in place has 
created an environment for safe, efficient, secure and timely payments. The 
central banks of the countries in the study implemented the necessary 
infrastructure to bring their banking sectors up to international standards 
and to ensure the efficiency of the payment and settlement system. They 
intended that this infrastructure would lower the overdependence on cash-
based transactions. This system was carried out in a series of steps in no 
order across the countries in the sample. 
The central banks in the various countries set up a common electronic 
platform, or national Switch, for all payment transactions within their 
financial systems. This common platform links all banking institutions at 
significantly reduced costs. It also connects all ATMs and the settlement of 
payments transactions by customers of different banks at Points of Sale 
(POS). The National Switches enable transactions to be undertaken both 
online and offline. In addition, other countries, for instance Ghana, went a 
step further and introduced a biometric smartcard (e-zwich smartcard). This 
smartcard is mainly used for cash deposits and withdrawals, transfer of e-
money, POS purchases, card to bank, loading and withdrawal of wages and 
salaries (Breckenridge, 2010).  
The different central banks also introduced Cheque Codeline Clearing (CCC) 
with cheque truncation system. CCC has reduced the clearing cycle from 5-8 
days to 2 days throughout the different country bank systems (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). This has led to an increase in the efficiency of bank 
settlements.  
The various central banks also implemented Real Time Gross Settlement 
(RTGS) for high-value payments. The system provided a good environment for 
safe, sound, secure, and timely payments. It has also reduced systemic 
payments and settlement risks because transactions are settled almost 
                                                          
4 Table 2.B looks at selected indicators for Availability of Information & Payments Systems 
in Frontier African countries 
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instantaneously. To ensure the settlement of low-value payments, the various 
central banks also introduced a paper-based credit clearing system. 
These countries also introduced an electronic direct credits transfer system. 
This retail payment system operates on the Automated Clearing House (ACH) 
platform and facilitates large electronic credit transfer of funds into the 
accounts of bank customers. Thus, it accelerates the clearing of funds into 
the accounts of bank customers. 
Lastly, some of the central banks introduced branchless banking that allowed 
mobile phones to be used to provide financial services. It is a fast, convenient 
and secure method that mobile phone users use to transact. The services 
allow users to deposit and withdraw funds, make account balance enquiries, 
bill payments and funds transfer. The mobile money service providers aim to 
offer mobile phone users the chance to use banking services without having 
bank accounts. Therefore, it would assist both the banked and unbanked to 
transfer money. 
2.6  Performance of the banking industry in Frontier African countries  
The analysis of the performance of the banking industry in frontier African 
countries focused on the following indicators: profitability, solvency, loan 
portfolio quality and liquidity. To a significant extent, these indicators are 
positive for most of the indicators across the sample. 
2.6.1 Profitability indicators 
Two profitability ratios were used to study the profitability of the banking 
sector in frontier African countries. 
2.6.1.1 Return on Equity (ROE) 
ROE refers to the amount of net income that is retained as returns on 
shareholder’s equity. Over the sample, we observe that Botswana has the 
highest average over the 10 years of study (43%). Tunisia has the lowest 
average (8%). Figure 2.1 shows the ROE averages across the sample in ROE 
from 2005 to 2014. We also observe a slight gradual decline in the ROE has 
across most of the African countries with the biggest downward trend 
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observed in Botswana. Appendix 2C shows the year trend per country over 
the time period. This shows the gradual decline across most countries with 
the exception of Tunisia. The overall industry’s ROE over the 10-year period 
was 20.2%. 
Figure 2.1: Return on Equity (2005-2014 average) 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database 
 
2.6.1.2 Return on Assets (ROA) 
The study observes a declining trend in the ROA across the years of study for 
most countries. The reason for this could be increased competition because 
of new banks entry into the banking sector. We observe that Ghana has the 
highest ROA (3.7%), with Tunisia having the lowest average (0.8%) across the 
sample. Figure 2.2 shows the ROA averages for 2005-2014. Appendix 2.B 
reflects the downward trend. Further Appendix 2D indicates the downward 




























Figure 2.2: Return on Assets (2005-2014 average) 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database 
 
2.6.1.3 Solvency indicator 
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) measures banks’ solvency. The industry’s 
CAR is defined as the ratio of risk-weighted capital to risk-weighted assets. 
CAR determines the capacity of the banking system to absorb losses or risks. 
The aim is to protect depositors and other lenders and promote the stability 
and efficiency of the financial systems. Figure 2.3 shows the averages of the 
banking industry’s capital adequacy ratio across the sample between 2005 
and 2014. We observe the highest averages in Uganda (13.07%) and the lowest 































Figure 2.3: Capital Adequacy Ratio (2005-2014 average) 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database 
 
2.6.1.4 Asset Quality Indicator 
Non-performing loans (NPL) ratio is used as asset quality indicator. NPLs in 
Frontier Africa comprise loans that are 90 days or more past due. On average, 
we observe low percentages of NPL ratios across the banking industry in the 
Frontier African countries. We observe the highest ratios in Tunisia (15.91) 
and Ghana (11.94), and the lowest ratios are observed in Mauritius (3.23) and 
Uganda (3.34). High ratios usually reduce bank profitability and tie up bank 
capital, which inevitably impacts on credit supply. On average, however, the 
banking industry in frontier African countries has experienced low NPL ratios 





























Figure 2.4: Non-Performing Loans Ratio (2005-2014 average) 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database 
 
2.6.1.5 Liquidity Indicator 
Liquidity is defined as assets that can be transformed into cash quickly 
without much loss in value. It is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets. Fig 2.5 shows the average values of liquidity across the sample 
between 2005 and 2014, we notice a declining trend across the sample, a 
plausible reason for this could be because banks held more funds in less risky 
assets and the various governments reduced their domestic borrowing to 
reduce interest rates. The aim of the government was to reduce inflationary 
pressures. However, the liquidity position of the banking industry appeared 
to be satisfactory. The rising trend in liquidity starting from 2006 was due to 
the abolition of the secondary reserves requirement in August 2006 which 
increased banks’ liquidity (Mehran et al, 2012). Figure 2.5 illustrates the trend 
of liquidity in the banking industry between 2005 and 2014. We observe that 
Botswana has the highest average (56.35%) across the sample and Tunisia 

























Figure 2.5: Liquid to Total Assets Ratio (2005-2014 average) 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
As discussed previously, the financial reform that was carried out in Frontier 
African countries was meant to redress the structural challenges that had 
been created in the different financial systems of the various countries post-
independence. However, as the various performance indicators presented 
above have shown, in spite of the reform carried out, financial markets in the 
majority of the frontier market countries are relatively shallow and continue 
to display low levels of development.  
The chapter that follows in this study measures the level of banking 
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Appendix 2.A: Implementation of major bank regulatory reforms  
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Appendix 2.B: Payment and settlement systems 
 











Tanzania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ghana Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kenya Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tunisia 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Morocco Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uganda Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Botswana Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nigeria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mauritius Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Appendix 2.C: Return on Equity, Year Trend per Country 
   






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2.D: Return on Assets, Year Trend per Country 
   
   
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































BANK COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM 
SELECTED FRONTIER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The banking sector in Africa has undergone significant reforms over the last 
three decades following a period of mediocre performance. The reforms in the 
sector have looked at among other areas the liberalisation of credit markets, 
as well as interest rates. For example, interest rate controls in several African 
countries have been substituted with open market operations. There has also 
been privatisation of government run banks as a step to minimising 
inefficiencies in the sector (Fosu, 2013a). Evidence has highlighted that in 
developing countries with transparent financial regimes and where financial 
sector reforms have been carried out, competition in the banking industry has 
generally improved. In East Africa, some studies have indicated that financial 
sector reforms have motivated competitive pressures in the banking industry 
(Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007; Berger, Klapper & Turk-Ariss, 2009; Mugume, 
2007). Bank competition has, therefore, been a subject of great academic 
interest and stays occupying a large body of empirical research. However, 
limited emphasis has been shed on the study of the impact of banking 
competition on economic growth. This is in spite of the fact that banking 
competition can significantly influence efficiency, innovation and quality 
services (Coccorese, 2008). The impact of banking competitiveness on 
economic growth is therefore a major thrust of this research.  
The main objective of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that banking 
competition is linked to economic growth. In the banking sector, the level of 
competition has implications for access to finance, allocation of capital funds, 
levels of economic growth and the extent of financial stability (Amidu & 
Wilson, 2014). Competition stimulates innovation, lowers prices and 
increases the quality of products and services produced, which in turn 
enhances choice and welfare and accelerates growth (Amidu & Wilson, 2014). 
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On the other hand, when banking systems are less competitive, borrowers will 
be less willing to engage with them, and in so doing lowering the demand for 
external backing from loans provided (Asante et al, 2011). Further, a less 
competitive banking system usually is costlier and also exhibits a lower 
quality of services, thus lowering the effective demand for external financing 
and therefore encouraging less growth (Claessens, 2005).  
Extant literature on the association between banking competition and 
economic growth gives us imprecise results. On the one hand, conventional 
economic theory contends that the exercise of market power leads to an 
equilibrium position that is categorised by a higher rate of interest and a lower 
quantity of financing (Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara, 2006). As a result, 
the social inefficiency of monopoly adjusts into financing of a lesser number 
of investment projects, and thus into lower economic growth. Therefore, given 
investment opportunities in sectors of a country, the fact that some banks 
enjoy market power will reduce their incentive to invest in the most financially 
dependent sectors, therefore reducing their potential growth (Maudos et al., 
2005). However, although market power results in higher costs of financing, 
there is no consensus as to its effects on the quantity of lendable funds. 
Therefore, it is argued that where market power exists, banks may have more 
motivation to invest in the acquisition of soft information by instituting close 
relationships with borrowers (relationship banking), thus allowing the 
availability of credit and then reducing firms’ financial limits (Dell’Ariccia & 
Marquez, 2004; Maudos et al., 2005). 
This study employs a two-stage approach to achieve its main objective. In the 
first stage, the Boone (2008) indicator was used to estimate competition of ten 
Frontier African countries between 2005 and 2012. In the second stage, the 
estimated Boone Indicator (BI) is used as the explanatory variable in a growth 
model using gross domestic product (GDP) growth as the dependent variable. 
Trade openness and gross fixed capital formation were employed as controls. 




The chapter also discusses the relationship between bank competition and 
economic growth in two ways. First, BI is used to measure competion in the 
banking sector (Boone, 2008). The BI makes the assumption that in a 
competitive environment, more efficient firms gain a larger market share than 
in a non-competitive enviroment (Fosu, 2013). This implies that there is more 
efficient allocation of resources which leads to economic growth. Second, the 
study examines the association between banking competitiveness and 
economic growth on a larger sample size of select frontier market economies 
of Africa 
The subsequent sections of the chapter are organised as follows. Section 3.2 
reviews the literature on the impact of banking competition as well as the 
relationship with economic growth. Section 3.3 outlines the source of data 
used, as well as provies explanations on the approaches used. Section 3.4 
discusses the results of the study and Section 3.5 provides the conclusion of 
the study. 
3.2 Review of the literature 
3.2.1 Banking competition 
Competition in the banking sector is of significant value because it impacts 
on the efficacy of production of financial services, the quality of financial 
products as well as the degree of financial innovation (Claessens, 2009). A 
study by Claessens & Laeven (2004) argues that the degree of banking 
competition can impact the access of households and firms to banking 
services, which in turn influences overall economic growth. The measures of 
competition can be classified into two main categories: the traditional 
structural measures of competition and the new empirical industrial 
organisation (NEIO) models (i.e. the non-structural approach). The Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, was initially developed by Mason 
(1939) and Bain (1956) and seeks to describe aspects of the conduct and 
performance of firms in terms of the structural characteristics of the markets 
in which they operate. The structural characteristics of a market cover the 
number of firms and their absolute and relative size as well as the entry and 
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exit conditions and the extent of product differentiation (Léon, 2014). The 
traditional measures use concentration indices under the SCP paradigm or 
the efficient-structure hypothesis. Among the SCP measures commonly used 
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
However, inadequacies in the structural approach have led to several 
attempts to collect empirical evidence on the nature of competition by 
observing the conduct directly. The NEIO makes inferences about competitive 
pressure by directly observing the conduct of firms in the market. The NEIO 
employs a variety of different methodologies requiring different data and 
assumptions (Léon, 2014). In addition, a study by Carbó-Valverde et al. (2009) 
highlights that the first generation of non-structural measures is based on 
the oligopoly theory (neoclassical conception of competition). These models 
include the Lerner Index, the conjectural variation models (Iwata, 1974; 
Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982) and the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model. One of 
the common non-structural indicators used to assess competitive behaviour 
is based on a model introduced by Panzar and Rosse (1987). This is derived 
from a reduced-form revenue function using bank-level data. The H-statistic 
measures the extent to which changes in factor prices are reflected in 
revenues. Panzar and Rosse show that this statistic can reflect the structure 
and conduct of the market to which the firm belongs. The H-statistic also 
measures the degree of bank-competition over a specific period, however it 
does not capture the evolution of bank competition. In addition, Bikker and 
Haaf (2002) and Jeon et al. (2011) set out to account for this by estimating 
the time-varying version of Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic to account for the 
market dynamic of a banking system. However, this approach also has 
limitations. For instance, use of the time-varying H-statistic implies that 
either bank competition is increasing or decreasing over time, and this is not 
in accordance with the real world, since if competition increases in one year, 
it may decease or be constant in the next year.  
Another method to estimate competition is the Lerner model that was 
developed by Lerner (1934). It develops from the (static) theory of firm models 
under equilibrium conditions and characteristically uses some form of price 
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mark-up against a competitive benchmark. Lerner index is calculated as the 
mark-up of price (average revenue) over marginal cost: the higher the mark-
up, the greater is the realised market power.  
This study uses the Boone indicator (BI), which is a more recent NEIO 
methodology for the measurement of competition. Boone (2000, 2004) and 
Boone et al. (2005) formulated the Boone indicator, which measures the 
impact of efficiency on performance in terms of profits or market-share. The 
underlying concept behind the indicator is that competition improves the 
performance of efficient banks and impairs the performance of inefficient 
banks. This is reflected in their respective profits or market share. The BI 
approach is closely associated with the well-known efficiency hypothesis, 
which also explains banks’ performances by differences in efficiency (Goldberg 
& Rai, 1996). The hypothesis of the BI model takes two steps. First, efficient 
banks with lower marginal costs, gain higher market-share or profits. Second, 
this is translated into the fact that, if the stronger this effect is, the higher the 
degree of competition in that market (Mirzaei & Moore, 2014). 
In a model where a bank decides to enter a market with prior knowledge that 
other banks have already entered, all competitors strategically decide to 
maximise their after-entry profits. Further, a subgame perfect equilibrium can 
be identified in which the firm’s profits are related to its efficiency and are 
conditional on a measure of the aggressiveness of the firms’ conduct in the 
market (Duygun et al., 2013). Therefore, comparing the relative profits 
between a randomly selected efficient bank and a bank with greater efficiency 
contains information about the level of competition in the industry, given that 
the more competitive the market is, the stronger the relationship between 
efficiency differences and performance differences.  
The BI (2008) is measured using firm-level data as a percentage change in 
profits (π) due to 1% change in marginal costs (MC). In practical terms, the 
Boone approach has advantages for studies on developing countries that often 
have a challenge of lack of data. The fact that it requires relatively little data 
makes the BI a very practical methodology. This is contrary to the other bank 
competition methodologies such as the Bresnahan model, which are very data 
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intensive (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2007). The BI approach requires only 
information on profits (or market shares) and costs. If costs are assessed 
using average costs, the computation of the BI does not require information 
on prices. Further, the Boone estimation is obtained using a simple linear 
econometric specification (only one equation with one exogenous variable) 
(Léon, 2014). 
The literature on bank competition in Africa has been scant. However, many 
studies have provided some insight into work done thus far. For instance, 
Sanya and Gaertner (2012) offer evidence on countries in East African 
community and the results show that competition in the four countries was 
low. Turk Ariss (2010) further measures banking competition in a sample of 
61 countries including 14 Sub-Saharan African countries over the 1999-2005 
period. The study shows that banks tend to extract larger rents in Africa than 
in other regions (Léon, 2014). A study by Biekpe (2011) establishes that 
Ghanaian banks are monopolistically competitive. Chen (2009) also provides 
evidence using a more comprehensive sample of Sub Saharan African 
countries. The study finds that the degree of competitiveness varied across 
countries. Buchs and Mathisen (2005) carry out a study on banks in Ghana 
and note that financial reforms did not adequately foster banking competition, 
while Hauner and Peiris (2008) find contrasting evidence for Uganda 
(Simpasa, 2013). Delis (2012) used the Boone (2008) indicator on a large 
sample of developing and developed countries, including 11 African 
economies, and the study found that the degree of competition is higher than 
the global average for just three countries; Kenya, Cameroon and Senegal 
(Léon, 2014). Clerides et al. (2015) further carry out a study on banking 
competition to estimate the degree of competition in banks of 148 countries 
over the period 1997-2010 using three methods: the Lerner index, the 
adjusted Lerner index, and the profit elasticity. The results from countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa seem to be the least competitive across all indices. 
3.2.2 Banking competition and economic growth 
Economic growth can be caused by the activity of banks, provided that they 
act as intermediaries between providing loans and taking deposits, the former 
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coming from those use them as productive capital. A generally accepted result 
of this statement is that competitive financial markets can improve the 
intermediation process and spur economic growth. Banks would pay higher 
returns on deposits and ask for lower loan rates, thus inducing an increase 
of both savings and investments, with the result that countries would 
experience higher rates of economic growth (Carbó Valverde, et al, 2003; 
Cetorelli & Gambera, 2001). This could also explain why governments focus 
on promoting a higher degree of financial efficiency and competitiveness.  
In the literature, the resounding view is that financial development is central 
to the needs of any economy (see Cameron, 1967; Goldsmith, 1969; 
McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). The studies emphasize that well-developed 
financial markets are critical to economic development and thus 
foreshadowing a causality running from financial development to economic 
growth.  
There are two areas of research in which the direct or indirect effect of banking 
competition on economic growth have been analysed. First, studies on the 
importance of relationship banking, analysing the consequence of the 
intensity and duration of banking relationships on firms’ conditions of 
finance. These studies have measured the impact of competition in the 
banking markets on the terms of the finance given, i.e. both on the cost of 
financing as well as the availability of credit, which has an effect on 
investment and economic growth. In the second case, several studies have 
measured directly the effect of banking competition on economic growth using 
aggregate sector information samples of countries. 
The literature that examines the relationship between bank structure and 
macroeconomic performance is further defined by two distinct models: partial 
equilibrium models and general equilibrium models. Partial equilibrium 
models focus on aspects of the bank–borrower relationship and is not 
disturbed by the overall economic impact of the assumed banking industry 
structure. General equilibrium models consider the deposit side of banking 
as well as the influence of the banking structure on the economy, however the 
model leaves out many details in the analysis of the relationship between 
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banks and borrowers. In relation to the overall economic impact, the partial 
equilibrium models find the influence of a monopolistic structure of the 
banking industry on the whole economy is beneficial, or at worst ambiguous, 
given that it ensures the stability of industry (Caminal & Matutes, 2002; 
Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995; Schnitzer, 1999). In the general equilibrium 
models, this influence is harmful, or at best ambiguous, because only a 
competitive banking system grows economic activity and reduces the severity 
of the business cycle (Cetorelli, 1997; Guzman, 2000; Smith, 1998). 
A study by Pagano (1993) shows that that imperfect competition in credit 
markets introduces inefficiencies that can limit a firms’ access to credit, and 
in so doing hinder growth. Some other studies indicate that, in the presence 
of monopolistic power, banks are better motivated to establish lending 
relationships with firms, and thus facilitating the access to credit lines: Mayer 
(1988, 1990) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue this position. Primarily, 
when analysing credit availability for a cross-section of U.S. small businesses 
located in markets where different degrees of bank concentration exist, 
Petersen and Rajan find that firms are less credit-constrained in more 
concentrated banking markets, and younger firms are charged lower loan 
rates.  
A study by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) uses an extension of the Petersen 
and Rajan data set, with both cross-industry and cross-country 
characteristics, to examine whether the market structure of the banking 
sector has empirical relevance for economic growth. The study finds that the 
concentration in the banking sector determines a general deadweight loss 
which in turn depresses growth, impacting all sectors and all firms 
indiscriminately.  
A focus on literature from Africa finds that while studying Egypt’s financial 
structure and its relation to total factor productivity, Bolbol, Fatheldin and 
Omran (2005) establish that the banking system has a positive influence on 
growth only when related with higher per capita GDP. A study by Allen and 
Ndikumana (2000) used several indicators of financial development to 
measure the role of financial intermediation in stimulating economic growth 
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in southern Africa. Their results indicate a positive relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, lending support to the finance-
led growth hypothesis. 
Further studies by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Claessens and Laeven 
(2005) also examine the relationship between banking competition and 
economic growth. The former empirically analyses the effect of the 
concentration of banking markets on the economic growth of sectors in the 
1980s, using a sample of 41 countries and 36 manufacturing sectors. The 
results indicate that bank concentration promotes the growth of the youngest 
firms in the sectors most dependent on external finance, facilitating access to 
credit for the youngest firms (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2011). 
However, the study also finds a negative effect of concentration on growth and 
this affects all sectors and firms broadly. As such, if we use market 
concentration as a measure of competition, greater market power would 
favour the economic growth of the youngest firms, precisely those in which 
asymmetries of information and uncertainty are most intense (Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2011). 
There are few studies on banking competition in Africa primarily because of 
lack of adequate data. However, despite this some studies on Africa have been 
carried out, for instance Fosu (2013) examines the extent of banking 
competition in African sub-regional markets. This study uses a dynamic 
version of the Panzar–Rosse model that is adopted beside the static model, to 
assess the overall extent of banking competition in each sub-regional banking 
market over the period 2002 to 2009. The study results submit that African 
banks generally demonstrate monopolistic competitive behaviour. Simpasa 
(2011) examined the nature of competitive conditions in the Tanzanian 
banking sector between 2004 and 2008 using the Panzar–Rosse methodology. 
This study indicates that banks in Tanzania operate under monopolistic 
competition. 
Poshakwale and Qian (2011) analyse the impact of increased competition and 
efficiency in commercial banking on the Egyptian economy. Their results 
indicate that the Egyptian banking sector has become more competitive over 
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the years. Their results also indicate a positive relationship between 
competition and economic growth in the short run. There is no evidence of a 
long-run relationship between banking competition and economic growth.  
Economic growth is also influenced by several variables aside from banking 
competition. Several studies have attempted to analyse varying factors that 
influence economic growth. Barro (1997) investigated factors affecting 
economic growth in developing countries using a sample of 18 developing 
countries and using the growth rate of real per capita GDP as a proxy for 
economic growth. He finds that economic growth is influenced by 
maintenance of rule of law, longer life expectancy, smaller government 
consumption, higher levels of schooling, lower fertility rates, elevated level of 
investment, openness to trade, lower inflation and improved democracy.  
Foreign direct investment has been cited as having either a positive or 
negative impact on economic growth (see Caves, 1971; Rappaport, 2000; 
Hanson, 2001; Aitekn & Harrison, 1999). International trade is also seen as 
a factor influencing economic growth: Kavoussi (1984) established that higher 
rates of economic growth were strongly correlated with higher rates of export 
growth. In addition to the factors outlined above, Upreti (2015) further 
identifies natural resource yield, government debt and net foreign aid received 
as other factors influencing economic growth. 
Governance has also been found to have an impact on economic growth as a 
study carried out for 71 developed, developing and transition countries 
between 1996 and 2003 has shown. Arusha (2009) highlights in this study 
that countries with high governance grow faster compared with those with 
weak governance.  
In addition, Murphy et al. (1993), Mauro (1995) state that corruption tends to 
have a negative effect on economic growth. These studies demonstrate that 
corruption has a negative influence on economic growth. Institutional 
framework has also been found to have an impact on economic growth. Rodrik 
(2000) states that five kinds of institutional frameworks (property rights, 
regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, 
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institutions for social insurance and institutions of conflict management) can 
have a direct outcome on growth and on other determinants of economic 
growth.  
Further, political factors like political regimes, political instability, civil 
freedom, the perception of politics play also an important role in fostering 
economic growth and (Lensink et al., 1999). Socio-cultural factors also have 
an important role on economic growth. For instance, ethnic diversity and 
fragmentation, language, religion, civic norms, beliefs are among the 
sociocultural determinants that may have an effect on economic growth 
(Acemoglu, 2009). 
Lastly Acemoglu (2009) also highlights that geography can affect economic 
growth. For instance, soil quality can have an influence on agricultural 
productivity, and natural resources directly contribute to the industrialization 
of a country by essential components for production (Boldeanu and 
Constantinescu, 2015). 
 
3.3 Data and estimation methodology 
The data used in the study was obtained from the Bankscope database. The 
sample is drawn from ten African frontier market countries over the period 
2005-2012. The study employs the growth rate of the per capita real GDP is 
as a dependant variable. This is in line with a study by Claessens et al. (2003) 
which uses the logarithm of per capita GDP as a proxy for the level of 
development of the country. This study borrows this as a control for the 
countries’ economic development and macro-economic stability as these can 
be expected to affect banking system performance. However, Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2003) find that banking system structure indicators have a less close 
relationship with competitiveness indicators in more developed countries 
(Claessens et al. 2003). 
The independent variable is the BI indicator (Boone, 2008) (see Appendix 3.A 
for details of the technique) for the aggregate of banks operating in each 
country. A negative value of the indicator indicates greater competition in the 
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banking sector. A random effects test was then employed to test the 
relationship between the banking competition and economic growth in the 
sample. To ascertain the ‘most optimal panel data estimation approach 
between fixed and random effects, we use the Hausman specification test. 
Further and in line with Hoechle (2007) and Green (2003), all the regression 
equations are estimated with robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation in the panels (Simpasa, 
2011). 
3.3.1 Estimating banking competition: the Boone Indicator 
Boone (2008) formulated an innovative method of estimating competition. The 
Boone indicator (β), as it is called, stipulates that competition improves the 
performance of efficient firms and weakens the performance of inefficient 
ones. The BI is based on the efficiency structure hypothesis by Demsetz 
(1973). The indicator measures the impact of efficiency on performance, in 
terms of profits and market shares. The stronger this effect is, the larger in 
absolute values β will be. This factor makes Boone indicator the ideal model 
to use to capture the dynamics of the market rather than focusing on static 
analysis. The equation to identify the BI bank i is defined as follows: 
𝐿𝑛𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                    … (3.1) 
Where α is the firm fixed effect, π measures the percentage change in profit, 
λ is a time dummy and ε measures the idiosyncratic shock. In addition, since 
theoretically profits and marginal costs have a negative relationship, the 
elasticity β should be negative. Further, a larger β in absolute value reflects a 
more competitive industry and can be interpreted as a reduction in the ability 
of the bank to affect its losses due to an increase in competition (Gaffeo & 
Mazzochi, 2014; pp:3). 
Two main tenets make the BI an appealing approach. First, it has a robust 
theoretical underpinning as a measure of competition. Explicitly, it can 
accurately depict the when level of competition becomes more intense through 
more aggressive interactions between firms and when entry barriers are 
reduced. The BI (2008) models the change in competition using two 
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parameters: the conduct parameter, which mirrors the aggressiveness of 
firms, and the change in entry costs (Schiersch & Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010). 
Second, it has similar data requirements as measures of competition 
grounded on price-cost margins (Boone, 2008). Gaffeo and Mazzochi (2014) 
further confirm that an increase in the efficiency of banks driven by greater 
competition contributes positively to economic growth. 
Under the efficiency hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973), more efficient firms attain 
greater performance in regard to higher profits at the expense of their less 
efficient rivals and also attract greater market share. The model exploits this 
reallocation effect from inefficient to efficient firms. In the most extreme case, 
the reallocation effect is combined with a selection effect insofar as the least 
efficient firms leave the market (Léon, 2014). Boone (2008) shows that the 
reallocation effect rises monotonically with the degree of competition. While 
an intensification of competition can decrease the output of firms, this 
decrease will be smaller for more efficient firms. As a consequence, the market 
share and profits for more efficient firms rise while those the less efficient 
firms decline. Said differently, the relative profit difference is sensitive to the 
degree of competition (Léon, 2014). 
The fact that the relationship between costs and profits is continuous and 
monotonic is the main advantage of the Boone approach. In most cases, 
higher competition infers that the value of β is greater in absolute terms (more 
negative), and consequently, β serves as a continuous indicator of competition 
(Léon, 2014).  
The BI requires only information on profits (or market shares) and costs. If 
costs are assessed by average costs, the computation of the BI does not 
require information on prices. Furthermore, the Boone estimation is obtained 
by a simple linear econometric specification (that is only one equation with 
one exogenous variable) (Léon, 2014). 
The main advantage of the BI is that it can both capture market dynamics 
and be easily implemented for a limited number of observations (by employing 
average costs as measure of efficiency). However, one should note that the BI 
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is a comparatively new tool and therefore has not yet been thoroughly 
scrutinised by the literature. 
3.3.2 Empirical model: banking competition and economic growth 
The key objective of this study is to evaluate the level of bank competition and 
its relationship with economic growth in a sample of frontier African 
countries. The study uses the BI to test for bank competition and then runs 
a random effects regression to analyse the relation between banking 
competition and economic growth. Both of these approaches have sound 
theoretical underpinnings as well as empirical appeal. The analysis also 
allows comparison of the estimated results with those obtained from previous 
studies, especially in developing countries. 
The model used to analyse the effect of banking competition on economic 
growth is the random effects model of regression. The study builds on a model 
of specification adopted in Beck and Levine (2004). The model uses the annual 
growth rate of real per capita GDP as the dependent variable and a variable 
representing bank competition as the independent variable. The benchmark 
econometric model takes the following form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜔βi + γi Xi, t + εi,t                                                                                            …(3.2) 
Where  
yi,t is real per capita GDP growth, 
 βi is the Boone Indicator,  
Xi,t represents a set of control variables,  
i and t represents country and time. 
The control variables used are: 
Trade Openness: Empirical studies describe trade openness in several ways 
and various approaches have been used in the attempt to capture, via a 
summary measure, the multifaceted nature of trade openess. David (2007) 
contends that as a result of this, a plethora of measures of trade openness 
have been created. Examples of these studies include Leamer (1988), Sachs 
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and Warner (1995), and Harrison (1996). This study uses the trade ratio 
approach.  
Log of gross fixed capital formation (LGCF) is an additional variable used in the 
study. The variable is a measure of the sum value of a producer’s acquisition, 
minus disposals of fixed assets during the accounting period plus certain 
additions to the value of non-produced assets realised by the productive 
activity of institutional units (Saleh, 1997). Uremadu (2007) further defines 
gross fixed capital formation as an addition in stock of capital assets. It is a 
part of the stock of capital assets set that is used for future productive 
activities in the real sector. It gains from savings accumulation which gives a 
positive effect to private savings accumulation, in other word contributes 
more savings (Hussin & Saidin, 2012). 
The inflation variable is used to control for macroeconomic stability. The study 
proxies the inflation rate by using the annual growth rate of the CPI index. In 
line with the literature (see Barro, 1995; Ghosh & Phillips, 1998; Quartey, 
2010), we can expect a negative coefficient sign between inflation rate and 
economic growth. 
3.3.3 Estimation technique 
This study uses the random effects model to analyse the effect of bank-
competition on economic growth across the sample.  
The advantage of using the random effects panel estimator is that it allows us 
to estimate the effect of variables which are constant across banks (in each 
country) and over time. Another advantage is its robustness as the total 
residual is partitioned into two groups within and between groups, and its 
ability to accommodate distinct characteristics compared to the fixed effects 
model. Also, because of a short time series, the random effects model is often 
used to address this limitation.  
The random effects case model is defined as follows: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + εi,t                                                                                                             … (3.3) 
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where 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡  reflect the error component instabilities. The individual 
effects are random but distributed normally(𝜇𝑖 → 𝐼𝐼𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)). They are also 
independent of the residual term υit which is also normally distributed. 
The estimation results in Table 3.4 show that, despite the conditioning 
information set employed, an increase in bank competition exerts a highly 
significant positive effect on real growth, and that this effect turns out to be 
considerably stable as the set of controls is varied. Point estimates are also 
economically significant. 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Estimation of bank competition  
This section presents the results from the BI estimation. To get the marginal 
costs, the study estimates a translog cost function for each country in the 
sample. I then regress these marginal costs on the market share in the loans 
market. The coefficient of this last variable (β) is the BI. From the initial 
sample of 123 banks, the benchmark model is estimated on a sample of 107 
frontier African banks. The sample size reduces because of missing data of 
some variables from certain periods in the sample. The more negative this 
indicator is, the more competitive the banking sector. The negative sign at the 
1% level for the BI also confirms that banking competition increases via the 
efficiency channel.  
The results of the BI by country for the period under study are presented in 
Table 3.4. These show that the BI scores vary across the sample of frontier 
African countries over the study period. From the results, we can also observe 
that competition has evolved differently across the frontier African countries. 
In some countries, where bank competition has decreased (Tanzania, Kenya, 
Tunisia and Mauritius), in others bank competition has increased (Ghana). 
For other countries, there are even years where the BI is not statistically 
different from 0 (zero) or significantly positive (Botswana and South Africa). 
The positive values for The BI may indicate perfect collusion. There is however 
a challenge of missing data in the samples which explains the missing data 
for some countries. 
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From the results of the study, Tunisia, Tanzania and Mauritius are observed 
to have the most competitive banking sectors in the sample. This result is 
consistent with the concentration results presented in Table 3.2. The rest of 
the countries experience varying levels of competition over the eight-year 
study period. The Wald test shows that the BI is significantly different from 
zero. 
From Table 3.4, we also observe from the estimated results that the structure 
of the banking industry in South Africa, which is Africa’s biggest economy, is 
characterised by monopolistic competition. This is indicated by the positive 
values of the BI estimates. This may reflect domination of the South African 
banking sector by five large banks, which together account for over 85% of 
total banking assets. The evidence is consistent with a 2008 Report by the 
Competition Commission on Banking, which found that the largest banks in 






Table 3.4: Boone Indicator scores (2005–2012) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Botswana -.3395*** -.1847*** -.0187*** -0.012 -0.0075 0.00077 0.00491 0.00804 
South Africa 0.55254 .45980* .65622*** .62098** .53973*** .43797** 0.1095 0.57651 
Uganda - - - -.1870** -0.191 -0.2094 -0.116 -0.18 
Tanzania -.0649*** -.0436*** -.0445*** -.0512*** -.0522*** -.0459*** -.0492*** -.0648*** 
Tunisia -.1244*** -.1131*** -.0563*** -.0194* -0.0129 -.0141* -0.0159 - 
Nigeria -0.069 -.0671* .00237* -0.0405 -.1901* -.1430* -.0108* -.0544* 
Mauritius -.0210* -.0315* -.0329** -.0449* -0.0232 -.0177* -0.0115 -.0176* 
Morocco - -1.47 -2.027 -0.6121 -0.4684 -0.4144 -0.2097 0.06498 
Kenya -0.8114 -1.152* -0.5611 0.20946 0.40191 -0.0588 0.00982 -0.1432 
Ghana - 1.5266 .67179* 1.0976** - - -0.1815 - 
 
Source:  Own calculations  
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%
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3.4.2 Estimating relation between banking competition and economic 
growth 
This section gives a detailed discussion of the regression estimates and 
examines the relationship between banking competition and economic growth 
using the random effects model of regression.  
Table 3.5: Competition and economic growth: random effects results 
 
SYSTEM GMM DIFFERENCE GMM 
 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Constant 1.179*** 0.363 0.001 -1.076 0.703 0.126 
EG.L 0.986*** 0.013 0.000 0.715*** 0.025 0.000 
BOONE 0.062* 0.032 0.053 0.033* 0.018 0.069 
TRADE -0.130* 0.074 0.081 0.016 0.025 0.520 









Hansen J:p-value 0.315 
     
Sargan:p-value 














Source:  Own calculations 
Note:  ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
The estimation results presented in Table 3.5 show both results of the random 
effects and fixed effects regression. the fixed effects model results are included 
as a check for robustness. These results indicate that the banking competition 
measure proxied by the BI has a positive and significant effect on economic 
growth at the 5% level. This specifies that an increase of 1 percentage point 
in banking competition could cause a 0.013 percentage point rise in per capita 
real GDP growth over an 8-year period. Thus, an increase in competitiveness 
of the banking sector exerts a significant positive effect on real growth. This 
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effect turns out to be noticeably stable as the set of controls vary. Point 
estimates as well are statistically significant. 
The trade openness variable is significant but has a negative coefficient in 
relation with the real GDP growth over the eight-year period for the sample of 
frontier African banking sectors. This could in part be because the real 
exchange rate volatility has a significant negative impact on investment, and 
volatility in the terms of trade having a negative impact on economic growth 
(Bleaney & Greenaway, 2001). The study result is consistent with Wong (2009) 
who finds a significant negative relationship between terms of trade and GDP 
per capita using annual time series data of Japan and Korea from 1996 to 
2003 and 1971 to 2006 respectively (Maudos & Guevara, 2006).  
The study finds the gross fixed capital formation variable significant and with 
a positive coefficient in relation to the real GDP growth of the African 
countries. This is an expected sign and is consistent with the literature as 
gross fixed capital formation is one of the prime determinants of economic 
growth, because it either increases the physical capital stock in domestic 
economy directly (Plossner, 1992). 
In addition, the study observes a positive coefficient for the inflation variable. 
This intuitively means that an increase of 1 point in real GDP growth could 
cause a 0.173 percentage point rise in inflation over the 8-year period. This 
goes against several studies that indicate an increase in economic growth 
leads to a decrease in inflation (Ghosh & Phillips, 1998; Quartey, 2010; 
Bittencourt, 2012; Seleteng et al., 2013). However, the study result is in line 
with Mallik and Chowdhury (2001) and Umaru and Zubairu (2012) who find 
that an increase in per capita GDP leads to a rise in inflation. However, this 
coefficient was observed to be insignificant across both estimations. 
3.5  Conclusion 
We studied the impact of bank competition on economic growth in a sample 
of 10 Frontier African countries. The study used data from 107 banks from 
these countries over the years from 2005–2012 and employed a two-step 
approach. First, we used the Boone Indicator estimates as a measure of bank 
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competition: this measure assumes that competition drives efficiency. The BI 
results vary across the sample. For instance, bank competition has increased 
in some countries (Tanzania, Tunisia and Mauritius) over the years of study 
but in others (e.g. Kenya and Ghana), bank competition has decreased. For 
others like South Africa, banks have experienced years where the BI is not 
statistically different from 0 (zero) or significantly positive. Overall, Tunisia, 
Tanzania and Mauritius have the most competitive banking sectors in the 
study. Second, I used the random effects model of regression to examine the 
effect of bank competition on economic growth. The estimation results show 
that banking competition measures, proxied by the Boone Indicator, appear 
significant with a correct sign in our preferred specification. An increase of 1 
point in banking competition, as proxied by the BI, results in an 0.013 
percentage point raise in per-capita real GDP growth over an 8-year period. 
An increase of competitiveness in the banking sector applies a significant 
positive effect on real growth, and the effect turns out to be significantly stable 
as the set of controls varies. In addition, the control variables used for 
inflation and trade openness are positive and negative respectively and both 
insignificant. However, we observe a positive and significant co-efficient for 
gross fixed capital formation. 
Based on the empirical findings, the estimates from the study suggest that 
bank competition could be beneficial for economic growth. As bank 
competition increases via the efficiency channel, this ultimately increases 
economic growth. Our results are consistent with the literature, Gaffeo & 
Mazzocchi (2014), for instance, confirm that an increase in the efficiency of 
banks, driven by fiercer competition, contributes positively to economic 
growth. These outcomes are important from a policymaker’s point of view, 
first because a competitive banking system will allocate resources more 
efficiently and economic growth is likely to improve as a result. In addition, 
policies that sustains a higher growth of GDP could be put in place. These 
would create a vicious cycle with benefits on the efficiency of the banking 
sector, which in turn would lead to real growth. To this end, it would be in 
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the best interest of the central bankers from the frontier African countries to 
establish policies that favour competition in their individual banking sectors. 
The study has not been without limitations. The sample period is short, and 
this may affect the robustness of some of the estimates as well as the choice 
of methodology used to measure the relationship between per capita GDP 
growth and bank competition. The inability to cover a longer sample period is 
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Appendix 3.A: Calculation of Boone Indicator (BI) 
The BI captures the link between competition and efficiency in a direct 
manner. It is based on the efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis in the sense 
that more efficient firms are more profitable (or attain higher market shares), 
and this relation increases with the degree of market power. More formally 
(and following closely Boone, Griffith & Harrison 2005), assume that each 
bank i produces one symmetrically differentiated product q at time t and faces 
a demand curve of the form (Brissimis et al., 2014). 
p (qi, q−i) = a − bqi − d ∑j≠i qj,  
where p is the price of the product q, a corresponds to the size of the market, 
b corresponds to the market elasticity of demand, d captures the extent to 
which consumers view the different products in a market as close substitutes, 
and j is a competitor. Each bank chooses q to solve 
max {(a − bq − d ∑ ≠ji qj )q − mciq},  
where a > mc > 0 and 0 < d ≤ b. For a Cournot-Nash game, the first-order 
condition is 
a − 2bqi − d ∑j≠i qj − mci = 0.  
If N banks are present in the banking system, one obtains N first order 
conditions of the form 
q (mci) = [(2b/d − 1) a − (2b/d + N − 2) mci  
+ ∑ j=1 mcj]/[(2b + d (N − 1))(2b/d − 1)]. 
A bank’s variable profits are defined as 
π(mci)= (a − bq(mci) − d ∑j≠i q (mcj ))q(mci) − mciq(mci)=0.  
These profits are variable in the sense that they do not include the entry cost 
γ of a bank in the market. In other words, a bank with marginal cost mci 
enters the industry if and only if π(mci) ≥ γ. Given the above equations, Boone, 
Griffith, and Harrison (2005) verify that variable profits can be written as 
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π(mci) = b[q(mci)]2 
Two ways can be considered in which competition can change within this 
model. Competition increases (i) when goods become more substitutable (that 
is, d increases) and (ii) when entry costs γ are lower. Now define the relative 
profits measure of market power as 
RP (mci, mcj ) = π(mci)/π(mcj ). 
The following lemma shows the output reallocation effect that is important in 
understanding why this measure is a robust indicator of competition.  








The effect of a fall in γ, which permits bank N + 1 to come in the industry on 







The lemma shows that an increase in competition, either through a rise in d 
or a fall in γ, reallocates output from relatively inefficient to more efficient 
banks. Because of equation (11), the lemma also implies that an increase in 
competition raises profits of relatively more efficient banks (or reduces the 
profits of the relatively more efficient banks by less). Hence, relative profits 
are a robust measure of competition, because any change in competition 
intensity that reallocates output from less efficient to more efficient banks 
increases the profits of the more efficient banks relative to the less efficient. 
So, if, for example, a bank wants to keep its inputs higher than its efficient 
level of employment, output will be reallocated to other banks in the industry. 
This holds as long as there exists one bank in the industry that maximises 
profits. In the empirical analysis, we are using a world sample of banks with 
all banks pooled together under a technique that allows this (i.e., pooling 
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together all banks) irrespective of the different technologies faced by banks. 
Thus, clearly profit-maximising banks are present in our sample. The only 
way this would not hold would have been if a banking industry is completely 
fragmented—as, for example, in previously centrally planned economies. 
However, our samples on these countries start after the initiation of reforms 
(e.g., competition from foreign-owned banks has started). Now how can the 
relative profits measure of market power, as represented by equation (12), be 
approximated empirically? Instead of investigating the relation between 
relative profits of bank i and some reference bank πi/π1 and marginal costs, 
one can estimate log profits as a function of marginal cost (i.e., as in equation 
(2)).8 This is equivalent to estimating the relation using the log of profits 
relative to some reference profit π1 (e.g., the profits of the most efficient bank), 
since ln (πi/π1) = ln πi − ln π1. In practice, it can be problematic to specify 
this reference profit, and so in equation (2) the parameter ln π1 is absorbed 
into the constant term a. Therefore, the relative profits measure of competition 
is captured by the estimated coefficient β of equation (2), which measures the 
extent to which less efficient banks are punished with lower relative profits 
(Brissimis et al. 2014). 
Appendix 3.B: Number of banks per country 
 
  
Countries Number of Banks  
Botswana  13 
Ghana  10 
Kenya  12 
Mauritius  8 
Morocco  7 
Nigeria  7 
South Africa  22 
Tanzania  15 
Tunisia  14 
Uganda  15 




BANKING EFFICIENCY AND ITS DETERMINANTS IN SELECTED 
FRONTIER AFRICAN MARKETS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Financial reform in Africa over the past thirty years has led to many policy 
improvements, technological changes as well as an increased level of 
deregulation in the financial sector. This has led to an increase in productivity 
in the banking sector. With this increase, there has been an emphasis on 
improving efficiency in the banking sector as a means of getting the sector to 
the most efficient production frontier. It is for this reason that studies on 
banking efficiency on the African continent are very significant. They inform 
financial institutions and policy makers on how to improve their policies and 
enhance the performance of the sector. 
Efficiency can be defined as a firm’s ability to produce a result with minimum 
effort or resources. It is also a measure of how close a production unit gets to 
its production possibility frontier, which is composed of sets of points that 
optimally combine inputs to produce one unit of output (Kablan, 2010). 
Farrell (1957) proposed an approach to estimate the efficiency of observed 
units by decomposing efficiency into two elements: technical efficiency, which 
measures the firm’s realisation in producing maximal output using a given 
set of inputs, and allocative (price) efficiency, which estimates the firm’s 
success in choosing an optimum combination of inputs, given their respective 
prices. These two elements then combine to become the total economic 
efficiency (Segun & Ajugam, 2013).  
Banking efficiency is of key importance because banks act as a conduit for 
the overall financial development in an economy (Andersen & Tarp, 2003; 
Khan & Senhadji, 2000; Levine, 2002; Chan & Karim, 2010). Ngalande (2003) 
in his study on banking efficiency in Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) countries recognises that efficiency in the banking sector 
is a key contributor to macroeconomic stability. In addition, the study of bank 
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efficiency is important from both a microeconomic and a macroeconomic 
standpoint (Berger & Mester, 1997). At a microeconomic level, banking 
efficiency is important as it enhances the level of competition for instance the 
increasing presence of foreign banks in the SSA region. From a macro 
perspective, the efficiency of the banking industry influences the cost of 
financial intermediation and the overall stability of financial systems.  
Banking efficiency is therefore of great interest to policy makers and 
regulators in Africa, as well as academics studying trends in bank 
performance in Frontier African countries. This paper contributes to extant 
literature by analysing banking efficiency using DEA in a selection of ten 
Frontier African countries. Frontier African countries are countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa with similar economic characteristics: they are countries with 
fairly developed financial sectors, positive macroeconomic performance, and 
increased flow of foreign direct investment. Specifically, we compute the 
technical, pure technical and scale efficiency and analyse the banking 
efficiency evolution in this selection of countries from 2008 to 2012. In 
addition, we also examine the determinants of banking efficiency in the 
sample countries. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on 
banking efficiency and its determinants using a cross-section of frontier 
African countries. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review 
of the existing literature. Section 4.3 describes the sources of data and the 
variables as well as the specification and methodology used for the 
measurement of banking efficiency and its determinants. Section 4.4 
discusses the empirical results and Section 4.5 concludes the chapter, 
drawing several practical implications based on the findings for policy makers. 
4.2 Review of literature 
This section reviews the relevant literature on bank efficiency, with emphasis 
on studies on Africa. The ability for a banking institution to produce on the 
best practice frontier is one way of considering how efficient the institution is. 
The concept of measuring a firm’s performance against best practice frontier 
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dates to the 1950s. Efficiency is defined by Koopmans (1951) as the ability of 
a firm to maximise output for several given inputs (Sena, 2003). The 
maximisation of these various input/output combinations makes up the best 
practice frontier. Two techniques have been applied in the literature to 
evaluate bank efficiency: the parametric and the non-parametric technique. 
The commonly used parametric approaches are the stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA)5 and the Distribution Free Approach (DFA).  
Unlike the parametric approaches, the non-parametric approaches do not use 
a specific functional form on the production frontier and allow for the rate of 
technological change to be obtained directly from the production structure 
rather than from its cost structure. This removes the need to input price data 
in the equation. There are two non-parametric approaches used in literature, 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the free disposal hull (FDH).6 The DEA, 
which is most commonly used non-parametric approach, is a linear 
programming algorithm developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
This approach offers the merit of simple application and restrictive 
assumptions are not required in advance regarding the functional form. The 
DEA has been widely used in numerous studies on bank efficiency (see 
studies by Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Sufian & Abdul Majid, 2007; Simar 
and Wilson, 2007; Fukuyama & Weber 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Holod & Lewis, 
2011; Sufian, 2010; Kumar, 2013; Alhassan et al., 2016). These studies focus 
mainly on North America as well as various European countries and not on 
banks in developing countries with specific emphasis on the African 
continent. This study will therefore contribute to the scanty literature on 
Africa.  
Studies on bank efficiency are important especially in this context because 
most countries in Africa possess similar macroeconomic and regulatory 
                                                          
5 The SFA was developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den 
Broeck (1977). The SFA specifies a functional form for the cost or profit production frontier 
and allows for random error. Further, the predicted standard cost function is assumed to 
characterise the frontier while any inefficiency is captured in the error term, which is by 
structure orthogonal to the predicted frontier (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). 
6 This approach was conceptualised, formulated and developed by Deprins, Simar and 
Tulkens (1984) and extended by Lovell et al. (1994). 
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conditions as the sample of Frontier African countries that we look at. 
Therefore, these studies will help place our study in context. 
A study by Kiyota (2009) provides a comprehensive banking sector efficiency 
analysis of SSA countries. He uses a two-stage analysis to examine profit 
efficiency and cost efficiency of commercial banks: using the SFA and Tobit 
regression. The results of this study indicate that foreign banks outperform 
domestic banks and banks with higher leverage or lower equity were found to 
be associated with higher profit efficiency, however in regard to bank size, 
smaller banks were found to be more profit-efficient whereas medium size and 
large sized banks were cost-efficient. However, the study fails to account for 
the impact of scale and resource utilisation on bank efficiency. Kiyota (2009) 
builds this study on a similar study done by Kirkpatrick, Murinde and Tefula 
(2008) who suggest that on average banks are 67% profit efficient and 80% 
cost efficient, according to both the DFA and SFA metrics. Their study also 
finds that an increase in the degree of foreign bank penetration, is associated 
with a reduction in profit and cost x-inefficiency. Both studies however do not 
consider the issue of scale of operation and input (resource) utilisation as a 
source of bank inefficiency.  
Musonda (2008) uses a single stage maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure applied to a stochastic frontier cost function on commercial bank 
data from Zambia. This study reveals that Zambian banks were on average 
inefficient in the order of 11.4%, and that foreign banks were more efficient 
than domestic banks, especially state banks. 
Kamau (2011) and Aikaeli (2008) both employ the DEA approach to obtain 
estimated bank efficiency in Kenya and Tanzania respectively. The study by 
Kamau (2011) found that most banks performed fairly with more chance of 
improvement, the estimated scores were not less than 40% during the year of 
study, and large banks were relatively more efficient than small and medium 
sized banks. Aikaeli (2008) investigated the technical, scale and cost efficiency 
of commercial banks in Tanzania, also using the DEA model to derive 
efficiency estimates of the banks. This study finds that commercial banks in 
Tanzania over the period of study operated on the decreasing part of their 
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average cost curves and this gave them room to expand with increasing 
returns to scale. 
A study by Frimpong et al. (2014) used the DEA to test the efficiency of the 
banking industry in Ghana over the period 2001–2010. The results suggest 
that Ghanaian banks in general are inefficient. In addition, they find that 
bank size has no influence on bank cost efficiency, suggesting that larger 
banks in Ghana have no cost advantages over smaller banks. In a study of 
banking efficiency in Namibia, Ikhide (2008) used operating ratios and the 
parametric approach (SFA) to measure efficiency for the period 1993–1998. 
He finds substantial evidence of economies of scale in Namibian banks, but 
they do not operate at the minimum point of average cost curve. 
Further, Aboagye et al. (2012) studied technical efficiency in the Ghanaian 
banking sector over the period 2000 to 2008. Their study used DEA and a 
Tobit regression on the explanatory variables of bank efficiency. Their findings 
suggest that efficiency of domestic banks has been positively affected by the 
entry of foreign banks and a reduction in the overall concentration of the 
banking sector. A similar study by Isshaq and Bokpin (2012) on banking 
efficiency in Ghana uses the SFA and the findings of this study indicate a 
decline in profit efficiency of the Ghanaian banking sector, the results however 
show a positive level of cost efficiency over the period of the study.  
Alhassan (2015) also analysed banking efficiency in Ghana using the SFA 
approach and, like Isshaq and Bokpin (2012), the results from his study also 
indicate high levels of efficiency in cost as opposed to profit to reflect high 
inefficiencies on the revenue side. An analysis of efficiency scores categorized 
by bank size also show that large banks have a higher cost and profit 
efficiency compared to small banks. To best of my knowledge, efficiency 
studies on banking markets in Africa by authors such as Alhassan (2015), 
Isshaq and Bopkin (2012), Musonda (2008), Kamau (2011), Ikhide (2008), 
Frimpong et al. (2014) and Aikaeli (2008) consider individual country studies 
without offering a comprehensive comparative study on Africa. This study 
attempts to address such a gap in the empirical literature as well as looking 
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at the source of bank efficiency by considering the issue of scale of operation 
and input (resource) utilisation. 
4.3 Data and estimation methodology 
The data used in the study was obtained from the Bankscope database. The 
sample is drawn from ten African Frontier Market countries over the period 
2008-20127. All the variables are obtained from the various countries balance 
sheets and income statement information on the Bankscope database. The 
data excludes banks which have fewer than five years of operation during the 
study period.  
4.3.1 Definition of inputs and outputs  
A major challenge in the study of bank efficiency is the classification of bank 
inputs and outputs. There is a long-standing disagreement among 
researchers and academics over the choice of inputs and outputs. The most 
contentious issue, however, is the role of deposits and, more specifically, 
whether they should be treated as inputs or outputs. Lang and Welzel (1996) 
treat deposits as inputs, however Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Ferrier 
and Lovell (1990) treat them as outputs. Other studies by Humphrey (1990) 
and Aly et al. (1990) treat them simultaneously as inputs and outputs. 
However, it is worth noting that there is no consensus on what constitutes 
inputs and outputs of a bank (Casu and Giradone, 2002). The choice of input 
and output variables thus constitutes a major challenge, which must be 
addressed carefully. Such choice will be influenced by a number of factors, 
such as the selected concept of the banking firm and the questions under 
consideration.  
Four approaches are used to determine the choice of inputs and outputs: 
production approach, intermediation approach, modern approach and 
operations approach. Banking efficiency studies generally tend to focus on 
the first two approaches: the production approach (value added approach) 
and the intermediation approach (asset approach). Under the production 
                                                          
7 The number of banks per each of the sample countries is presented in Appendix B. Data 
was not available to cover the period up to 2015. 
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approach, banks produce accounts of numerous sizes by processing deposits 
and loans, and incurring capital and labour costs. In this approach, outputs 
are measured by the number of deposits and loan accounts or the number of 
transactions performed on each type of service provided, and costs are the 
operating costs needed to produce these products.  
Under the intermediation approach, banks are treated as financial 
intermediaries that combine inputs (deposits, labour and capital) to produce 
outputs (total assets). The values of loans and investments are treated as 
output measures: labour, deposits and capital are inputs, and operating costs 
and financial expenses comprise total cost. We use the intermediation 
approach because it is more appropriate for evaluating entire financial 
institutions as it is inclusive of interest expense, which often accounts for half 
to two-thirds of total costs. Last, the intermediation approach may be better 
for evaluating the importance of frontier efficiency to the profitability of the 
financial institution, since minimisation of total costs, not just production 
costs, is needed to maximise profits (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
This study employs input variables in deposits (customer’s deposits) and 
labour (personnel expenses of bank staff such as salariesand wages) while 
total assets are used as the output variables. The prices for the input variables 
are defined as the ratio of interest expense to total deposits as proxy for price 
of deposits, p1; price of labour (Beccalli et al., 2006); p2 is the ratio of personal 
expenses to total assets. Lack of sufficient data limits us from using operating 
income in our input variables.  
4.3.2 Technical, pure technical and scale efficiency 
This section considers the definition of Technical Efficiency (TE) as well as its 
different derivations. TE, also termed x-inefficiency, is measured as the ratio 
between the observed output and the maximum output, under the 
assumption of fixed inputs. Alternatively, TE can also be measured as the 
ratio between the observed input and the minimum input under the 
assumption of fixed output. Technical efficiency is derived under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS).  
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Koopmans (1951) stated that a firm is technically efficient if an increase in 
one output requires a reduction in at least one other output or an increase in 
at least one input, and if a reduction in any input requires an increase in at 
least one other input or a reduction in at least one output. In DEA, the TE 
measure has been decomposed into two mutually exclusive and non-additive 
components: pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). This 
decomposition allows an insight into the source of inefficiencies (Gulati, 
2008). 
PTE is a measure of TE that is derived under the assumption of variable 
returns to scale (VRS). As seen above the efficiency measure corresponding to 
CRS represents TE which measures inefficiencies due to the input/output 
configurations as well as size of operations. The PTE measure of efficiency 
corresponds to VRS and this measure considers inefficiencies due to 
managerial underperformance. Aly et al. (1990) suggest that from the 
measures of TE and PTE, it is possible to derive a measure of scale efficiency: 





where TE is technical efficiency, PTE is pure technical efficiency and SE is scale 
efficiency, and 0≤ SE ≤ 1 since CR ≤ VR. 
In addition, if the value of S equals 1, the bank is scale efficient and all values 
less than 1 reflect scale inefficiency. If scale inefficiency exists (SE < 1), the 
source of inefficiency is the result of operating at either increasing (NI < VR) 
or decreasing (NI = VR) returns to scale. 
SE measures the ability of management to choose the optimum scale of 
production that will attain the expected production level. Inappropriate bank 
size (too large or too small) may sometimes be a cause of technical inefficiency. 
This is referred as scale inefficiency and takes three forms: constant returns 
to scale (CRS), decreasing returns to scale (DRS) and increasing returns to 
scale (IRS). Decreasing returns to scale is also referred to as diseconomies of 
scale and implies that a bank is too large to take full advantage of scale. In 
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contrast, a bank experiencing increasing returns to scale (also known as 
economies of scale) is too small for its scale of operations and, thus, operates 
at sub-optimum scale size. A bank is scale-efficient if it operates at CRS. The 
decomposition of TE gives us an insight into the source of inefficiencies. 
Section 4.3.3 looks at the methodology that employed in the study and 
explains the banking determinants used. 
4.3.3 Estimating banking efficiency: DEA 
The DEA is a nonparametric method for generating a piecewise smooth linear 
convex frontier which is formed by enveloping the DMUs. It was first developed 
by Charnes et al. (1978) under the CRS assumption, and it provides a 
measure of TE. This study uses the DEA model because it allows comparison 
of banking markets of varied sizes with respect to a common frontier without 
imposing any specific parametric functional form. As a consequece the DEA 
does not pre-specify a production technology. The advantage of this is that we 
do not have to deal with any possible misspecifications due to inappropriate 
functional form (Pasiouras, 2008; Maghyereh & Awartani, 2011). In addition, 
the DEA does not need a longer time series data to carry out estimation 
compared to other parametric frontier methods such as SFA and DFA. For 
more clarity, see Berger and Humphrey (1997), Bauer et al. (1998) and 
Maudos et al. (2002). This makes the DEA a good model to use given the 
limited number of Frontier African banks with available and complete data. 
Further, the DEA has no restrictions on the functional form of the frontier 
and does not impose any specific assumption on the firm specific efficiency. 
It can accommodate multiple inputs ans outputs but is sensitive to variable 
selection and errors. 
Further, the DEA can be implemented using an input or an output orientation 
as explained above. In the input orientation approach, the goal is to estimate 
the degree of potential input savings for a given realised output level of the 
unit (Bougnol et al., 2010). DEA assigns a score of 1 to a unit only when 
comparisons with other relevant units do not provide evidence of inefficiency 
in the use of any input or output. It assigns an efficiency score of less than 1 
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to (relatively) inefficient units. A score less than 1 indicates that a linear 
combination of other units from the sample could produce the same vector of 
outputs using a smaller vector of inputs. The score reveals the radial distance 
from the estimated production frontier to the DMU under consideration 
(Mwega, 2011). It is also important to highlight other versions of the DEA 
model that do not take into consideration bank inputs or outputs. In 
extending earlier contributions by Daraio and Simar (2005), Daraio and Simar 
(2007) introduce a conditional DEA estimator that is an estimator of 
production frontier of DEA type which is conditioned to some external-
environmental variables. These are neither inputs nor outputs under the 
control of the producer. 
A simplified way is to think of the DEA as providing a price on each of the 
inputs and a value for each of the outputs. The efficiency of a DMU is the ratio 
of the inputs to the outputs and is constrained to be no more than 1. The 
prices and values have nothing to do with real prices and values: they are an 
artificial construct. The goal is to find a set of prices and values that puts the 
target DMU in the best possible light (Mwega, 2011). 







 ≤ 1, 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝑛 
 𝑢𝑇 ≥ 0, 𝑣𝑇 ≥ 0  … (4.1) 
Where u and v are vectors of prices and values respectively 
The basic form of the Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) DEA model inferred 
the assumption of constant returns to scale; this assumption was later 
relaxed to allow for the evaluation of variable returns to scale and scale 
economies. The CCR DEA model assumes that input prices are the same 
across all DMUs. However, actual markets do not necessarily function under 
perfect competition and unit input prices might not be identical across all 
DMUs. Thus, as articulated by Tone (2002), the traditional DEA cost efficiency 
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model does not take account of the fact that costs can obviously be reduced 
by reducing the input factor prices. 
For instance, if two banks have the same inputs and outputs while the unit 
input prices for one bank are twice those of the other bank, then the total 
costs of the bank with the higher unit input prices will be greater than those 
of the bank with the lower unit input prices. However, under the traditional 
DEA model the cost function is homogenous of degree one in input prices and 
the scaling factor cancels out in the cost efficiency ratio, and thus the two 
banks will be assigned the same measure of cost efficiency irrespective of the 
fact that they have significantly different input prices. This represents a 
serious disadvantage for assessing relative efficiency levels under the 
traditional DEA model. This is caused by the unusual structure of the DEA 
model which focuses exclusively on the technical efficiency of the two banks 
and cannot take account of variations in unit input prices between the banks. 
To avoid this inadequacy, Tone (2002) suggests a new approach of estimating 
cost efficiency under which the production technology is homogeneous of 
degree one in the total costs as distinct from being homogeneous of degree 
one in the input prices under the traditional DEA model. This indicates that 
under the improved DEA model banks with different input prices will return 
different measures of cost efficiency.  
To identify the returns to scale under which these Frontier African banks 
operate, a bank which is efficient under the assumption of VRS is considered 
technologically efficient (the VRS score represents pure technical efficiency), 
whereas a bank that is efficient under the assumption of constant returns to 
scale is technologically efficient and uses the most efficient scale of operation. 
4.3.4 DEA bootstrap 
The bootstrap method was first introduced and used in a study by Efron 
(1979) while Efron and Tibshirani (1993) further provide a detailed description 
of various issues associated with bootstrapping. The bootstrap method is a 
process of drawing with replacement from a sample, mimicking the data 
generating process of the underlying true model and producing multiple 
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estimates that can be used for statistical inference. One of its key advantages 
is to test hypotheses, specially in cases where statistical inference is otherwise 
impossible. The resampling procedure within the framework of the bootstrap 
relates to redistributing the assumed randomness of the model among the 
observations. The randomness is reflected in the deviations of the model’s 
variables from their expected values, as estimated by the model. The higher 
the variance of the residuals, the wider the constructed bootstrap confidence 
intervals will be in hypothesis testing. 
In the regression framework, the deviations are the model’s residuals. There 
are two approaches to bootstrap: to bootstrap pairs (also called “case 
resampling”) and to bootstrap residuals (or “fixed resampling”). For case 
sampling, we resample pairs of observations and apply the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) model each time. In the second approach, we resample 
residuals and then sum them to the expected value of the dependent variable, 
and we apply OLS each time on the new pseudo-variable and the original 
independent variables. In each case, we obtain a distribution for the estimated 
coefficients (betas) of the model which, in the limit, should be equal under 
both procedures.  
The resampling of residuals is found to be more sensitive to model 
assumptions (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993), mainly since it assumes that the 
distribution of residuals does not depend on the observed sample: it is the 
same no matter the independent variable. On the other hand, resampling 
residuals might be more intuitive and suitable to be used in some cases (Efron 
& Tibshirani, 1993). The accuracy of the bootstrap estimates is dependent on 
two factors: the variance of the model residuals and the inherent bias of the 
bootstrap process. These vary with sample size. Residual variance causes 
variability for bootstrapping and the resulting bootstrap distributions should 
be similar to the residual distribution. In addition, the centre of the bootstrap 
distribution of an estimator is expected to be equal to the value of the 
estimator computed by the model. Any deviation from that value is known as 




In this chapter, I use the Simar and Wilson (2007) model of complete double 
bootstrapping algorithm under the DEA model. This model will produce a set 
of bias-corrected estimates for all selected explanatory variables in a 
truncated regression model.  
In the first step, I use the DEA model to acquire estimates of the TE scores, 
after which the scores for efficiency are regressed against a set of explanatory 
variables as follows: 
𝜃𝑚 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑧𝑚 +  𝑚                                                                     …(4.2)  
where (𝜃𝑚) represents the TE scores, and 𝑧𝑚 is the vector of variables that 
influence the TE of a commercial bank. The TE of banks can be affected by 
macroeconomic factors as well as firm-specific characteristics. However, this 
study primarily used bank-specific variables to assess the determinants of 
bank efficiency. The variables used were bank size, risk (calculated as a ratio 
of loan loss provision to total loans), liquidity risk, financial leverage, bank 
diversification and ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The choice of 
determinants of bank efficiency is reinforced by various studies (Chen & Lin, 
2007; Gupta et al., 2008; San et al., 2011; Sufian, 2008 and Delis & 
Papanikolaou, 2009).  
In addition, β is a vector of the parameters to be estimated, a is a constant 
term and εm is an error term where the value of εm is greater than or equal to 
the sum of 1 - 𝛼 −  𝛽𝑧𝑚. Conversely, Simar and Wilson (2007) and Banker and 
Natarajan (2008) find that the DEA results are serially correlated and 
therefore cannot be used in second-stage regression as this would violate the 
basic model assumption of the regression models. 
Simar and Wilson (2007) then propose a double bootstrapping algorithm 
under the DEA model. This algorithm produces a set of bias-corrected 
estimates for all selected explanatory variables in a truncated regression 
model. Simar and Wilson (2007) demonstrate that a double bootstrap DEA 
approach can be a better choice 




Step 1: Conduct a DEA analysis and transform the variable vectors using the 
estimated TE scores (𝜃𝑚). All the data points are then efficient and generated. 
Step 2: Regress θm on the explanatory variables zm using the truncated 
regression model to obtain estimates ?̂? and ?̂?𝜀  of the parameters  and σε 
respectively. 







a) For each i =1,,n, draw 𝑖
∗  from the 𝑁(0, ?̂?𝜀
2)  distribution with left 
truncation at (1 − 𝑧𝑖?̂?). 
b) For each i =1…, n compute 𝜃𝑖




∗  , by regressing 𝜃𝑖
∗ on 𝑧𝑖 again using the truncated 
regression model. 
Step 4: Construct the confidence intervals [3] or [4] as described above. 
4.3.5 Bank efficiency determinants 
Bank efficiency is expressed as a function of internal and external 
determinants. The internal determinants originate from the bank accounts 
that are balance sheets and/or profit and loss accounts and therefore could 
be termed bank-specific determinants of efficiency. The external determinants 
are not related to bank management but reflect the economic and legal 
enviroment that affects the operation of financial institutions (Delis and 
Papanikolaou, 2009). Various studies have come up with various explanatory 
variables for both categories, according to the nature and purpose of each 
study. This study uses the variables below. 
The variable size was used because a major question underlying bank policy 
is determining the optimal bank size that boosts bank efficiency. The effect of 
                                                          
8 The actual coverage probabilities of these bootstrap confidence interval methods may 
however not coincide with their nominal coverage probabilities. The difference between the 




an increase in size on efficiency has been proved to be positive to a certain 
extent. However, for banks that become extremely large, the effect of size 
could be negative especially due to issues of bureaucracy and other reasons. 
As a result, the size-efficiency relationship may be expected to be non-linear. 
The study uses the banks’ real assets (logarithm) and their square to capture 
this possible non-linear relationship. 
Risk is another variable that is used. It is calculated as the loan loss provision 
to total loans. The need for risk management in the banking sector is essential 
in the banking business. Deviations in credit risk may indicate changes in the 
health of a bank’s loan portfolio (Cooper et al., 2003), which may affect the 
performance of the institution, since poor asset quality is the single most key 
cause of bank failures. During periods of uncertainty, financial institutions 
may decide to diversify their portfolios to reduce their risk. Risk is expected 
to have a negative coefficient because bad loans are expected to reduce 
profitability. Miller and Noulas (1997) suggest that the greater the exposure 
of the financial institutions to high-risk loans, the higher would be the 
accumulation of unpaid loans and profits would be much lower (Sufian et al., 
2010). 
Another variable used is liquidity risk, which is calculated as the ratio of total 
loans to total assets (LOTA). This variable expresses the long-term liquidity 
degree of the bank, as well as giving information about the relative weight of 
several activities (Dell’atti & Pacelli, 2015). It arises from the possible inability 
of banks to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund increases on the 
assets side of the balance sheet, it is therefore considered an important 
determinant of bank efficiency. The loans market, especially credit to 
households and firms, is risky but also has a greater expected return than 
other bank assets, such as government securities. Thus, one would expect a 
positive relationship between liquidity and efficiency (Bourke, 1989; Sufian et 
al., 2010). 
We also used a proxy for bank diversification into non-traditional activities as 
another variable: the ratio of noninterest (NII) expenses to total assets (NITA). 
The NII is made up of commission, service charges and fees, guarantee fees, 
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net profit from sale of investment securities, and foreign exchange profit. We 
expect that an increase in bank diversification should lead to improved bank 
efficiency following the conglomeration hypothesis which asserts that multiple 
business segments can take more advantage in improving bank performance 
(Berger, 1999).  
Financial leverage (LEV) is another variable that was used, and this is proxied 
by the ratio of debt to total assets. A major decision that banks must take is 
to decide the proportion of debt and equity that will constitute their capital 
structure. LEV measures the ability of the bank to pay off its debt with its 
total assets.  
Last, the study used the ratio of fixed asset to total assets ratio (TANG). This 
variable estimates the extent to which management uses funds for 
unproductive uses.9 The higher the value of TANG, the lower the levels of bank 
efficiency that can be expected. 
In the second stage of the analysis, the studys investigate how the explanatory 
variables impact the bank’s level of efficiency by regressing the first stage 
estimates on the financial ratios described above. Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression equation:  
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 +
 𝑖𝑡  …(4.3) 
where i is the observation; t is the time period; α is the constant term; β is the 
coefficient of each variable; ε is the error term; and EFFit is the technical 
efficiency score (TE). Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
determinants of banking efficiency.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables for bank 
inefficiency 
 Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max N 
SIZE 10.275 11.129 2.881 3.714 14.946 533 
LOTA 0.543 0.546 0.168 0.024 0.987 529 
RISK 0.025 0.011 0.082 -0.875 0.955 520 
                                                          
9 Appendix 4.B shows the financial ratios used as explanatory variables. 
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LEV 0.868 0.890 0.107 0.217 1.600 528 
NITA 0.687 0.673 0.166 0.167 1.000 491 
TANG 0.025 0.020 0.021 0.000 0.186 533 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bankscope database 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Evaluating the efficiency of Frontier African banks 
An input-oriented DEA methodology was used to measure bank efficiency and  
yielded TE, PTE and SE DEA estimates. The efficiency scores are obtained by 
calculating the average score for each country. Table 4.2 reports the average 
efficiency scores of banks in the selection of Frontier African countries from 
2008 to 2012. A value of 1 specifies an efficient use of inputs: the existing 
inputs are at the minimum achievable level to produce the actual outputs. 
Overall, the results show relatively high average TE, PTE and SE scores in all 
the countries analysed over the period. These results are consistent with 
efficiency results from studies by Alhassan (2015) and Isshaq and Bokpin 
(2012). 
We also observe that across the years of study for the majority of the 
countries, there is a marked decline in 2009 and 2010, however this trend 
picks over the preriod 2011 to 2012. These results are consistent with Kablan 
(2007), Chen (2009) and Gwahula (2013) with slight variations in the 
efficiency scores of the countries under study. We detect interesting 
differences in the different average efficiency scores and their evolution over 
the years between countries. On average, over the entire period, Botswana 
banks were the most technically efficient (0.72), followed by South Africa 
(0.67) and Tanzania (0.66). The countries exhibiting the lowest average rates 
of TE over the period of study are Uganda (0.54), Nigeria (0.53) and Ghana 
(0.46). Looking at the evolution of the overall TE, we observe a slight 
deterioration in the average performance of the banks of our sample over the 
period of study. 
In regard to PTE estimates, South African and Mauritian banks were the most 
efficient (both with 0.89) followed by Tunisian banks (0.82). Over the entire 
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period, in regard to SE, Tanzanian banks exhibited the highest efficiency 
(0.88), followed by Botswana (0.83) and Morocco (0.79). The countries with 
the lowest levels of PTE were Ghana (0.67) and Nigeria (0.61). The evolution 
of the average PTE for all the countries over the period under study indicates 
a declining trend. This indicates that the increase in bank inefficiency over 
the period could be because of inefficient use of labour, fixed assets and 
equipment. 
The results for SE estimates indicate that over the period of study, the 
countries with the highest levels of bank efficiency were Tanzania (0.88) and 
Botswana (0.83). The countries that exhibited the lowest levels of SE were 
Ghana (0.70) and Mauritius (0.65). The evolution in bank efficiency shows a 
declining trend for SE, as does TE and PTE. This shows that the banks are 
not fully utilising their scale of production in the countries under study. 
The results indicate that on average the banking sectors in the countries 
under study have a higher rate of SE than of PTE. This should tell us that 
banks are more efficient at utilising their appropriate scale of production as 
opposed to labour, fixed assets and equipment.  
The analysis in the first stage is carried out for each country separately and 
therefore the mean efficiency scores presented in Table 4.2 only reflect the 
dispersion of efficiency within each country, we however include summary 
statistics on bank efficiency (see Table 4.2) that indicates the variability across 
the sample looking at the different country observations. Overall, we observe 
an average of 55 observations per country across the sample. We also observe 
a homogenous trend across the sample. Tanzania is the country with the 
highest number of observations (80), and Nigeria and Morocco are the 
countries with the lowest number of observations (40).  
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Table 4.2: Average efficiency results for ten Frontier African countries 
 
 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE 
BOTSWANA 0.826 0.887 0.933 0.716 0.777 0.923 0.535 0.473 0.771 0.678 0.488 0.638 0.850 0.778 0.900 
GHANA 0.293 0.456 0.718 0.417 0.845 0.500 0.745 0.852 0.875 0.506 0.724 0.695 0.361 0.474 0.750 
KENYA 0.457 0.564 0.801 0.866 0.886 0.966 0.827 0.837 0.969 0.394 0.756 0.507 0.239 0.602 0.395 
MAURITIUS 0.780 0.944 0.828 0.577 0.985 0.585 0.512 0.935 0.550 0.626 0.829 0.754 0.448 0.801 0.562 
MOROCCO 0.799 0.797 0.982 0.511 0.715 0.710 0.707 0.728 0.952 0.287 0.682 0.414 0.666 0.712 0.919 
NIGERIA 0.680 0.795 0.861 0.893 0.878 0.968 0.527 0.638 0.793 0.194 0.307 0.532 0.383 0.480 0.676 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.792 0.910 0.869 0.701 0.814 0.845 0.711 0.835 0.834 0.623 0.969 0.642 0.568 0.971 0.584 
TANZANIA 0.702 0.793 0.882 0.755 0.819 0.920 0.655 0.723 0.908 0.572 0.668 0.849 0.621 0.700 0.889 
TUNISIA 0.661 0.863 0.767 0.599 0.810 0.744 0.725 0.817 0.878 0.710 0.828 0.849 0.534 0.827 0.653 
UGANDA - - - 0.499 0.711 0.702 0.416 0.652 0.646 0.688 0.757 0.898 0.585 0.743 0.772 
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4.4.2 Source of bank inefficiency 
When we look at the results of PTE and SE measures for the banking industry 
of the frontier African countries under study we observed that TE is due to 
both poor input utilisation (i.e. PTE) and failure to operate at the most 
productive scale size (i.e. SE).  
Most the countries under study (six) attributed the source of bank inefficiency 
to PTE or poor input utilisation. This poor input utilisation is chiefly 
attributed to managerial inefficiency. The results for the remaining four 
countries indicate that the source of bank inefficiency is caused by scale 
inefficiency. This means that the banks in these countries are operating at an 
inappropriate productive scale size. 
Table 4.3: Source of bank inefficiency 
 
 TE PTE SE Source of Inefficiency 
Botswana 0.7209 0.6805 0.8573  PTE*** 
Ghana 0.4641 0.6701 0.7075  PTE 
Kenya 0.5566 0.7290 0.7274  SE 
Mauritius 0.5886 0.8986 0.6556  SE*** 
Morocco 0.5940 0.7267 0.7955  PTE** 
Nigeria 0.5352 0.6195 0.7660  PTE*** 
South Africa 0.6790 0.8999 0.7548  SE*** 
Tanzania 0.6611 0.7409 0.8896  PTE*** 
Tunisia 0.6457 0.8292 0.7782  SE** 
Uganda 0.5469 0.7158 0.7547  PTE 
Kruskal-Wallis Test  
𝜒2 55.562*** 155.882*** 98.836***  
Prob > 𝜒2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bankscope database.  
Note: **, *** significant at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
A t-test was carried out to examine whether there are significant differences 
in the mean between PTE and SE for the Frontier African banks over the 
period of study. The results revealed that most countries in the sample (seven) 
were statistically significant, indicating that there were differences between 
the PTE and SE for Frontier African countries. The study however observes 
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that the differences between PTE and SE are not significant for Ghana, Kenya 
and Uganda. 
4.4.3 Results of the determinants of efficiency 
TE scores were regressed against five explanatory variables comprising size, 
risk, leverage or the incentive to work proxy, assets quality, bank size and the 
excess liquidity, and country dummy variables were included as well to 
control for the country specific effects of the banks in the sample (equation 
3). Table 4.4 indicates the results of the second stage DEA bootstrap 
regression. 
Table 4.4: Second stage DEA bootstrap regression results 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
SIZE -0.002 0.005 -0.33 0.741 
LOTA -0.021 0.055 -0.38 0.707 
RISK 0.184 0.095 1.94 0.053* 
LEV -0.227 0.109 -2.08 0.037** 
NITA 0.005 0.093 0.06 0.956 
TANG 1.833 0.717 2.56 0.011** 
R-squared 0.7572       
Wald 𝜒2(16) 141.45       
Prob > 𝜒2 0.0000       
Country Dummy Yes       
Year Dummy Yes       
Countries 10       
Observations 474       
Note: * Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level. 
The results indicate a negative but significant correlation between TE and all 
the individual country dummies. The same result is also observed for the year 
dummy in the sample. The estimated results of the truncated bootstrapping 
are presented in Table 4.5. The results show that the size of bank (SIZE) is 
not statistically significant and is negatively related to TE. This suggests that 
the smaller the bank is, the more efficient it will be. Nevertheless, these results 
are not conclusive due to the statistical significance of this relationship. 
The results indicate that the ratio of loans to total assets (LOTA) is negatively 
related to TE. The obtained results are also not statistically significant.  
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RISK, which is proxied by loan loss provision to total assets, reveals a positive 
and statistically significant (at the 10% level) relationship with technical bank 
efficiency. The findings of the study seem to suggest that banks with high 
levels of credit risk are more efficient. A plausible explanation for this could 
be if the loan loss provision is directly related to the credit generated from the 
loans produced. According to Berger (1999) this positive relationship could be 
because of the “skimping hypothesis”, which states that there could be a 
positive relationship between efficiency and credit risk when banks decide not 
to spend sufficient resources on analysing loan applications. In this way, they 
would appear to be efficient but with a high level of bad loans (Pastor, 1999).  
The results also show a negative and statistically significant (at the 5% level) 
link between LEV and technical efficiency. This indicates that an increase in 
LEV will lead to a decline in technical bank efficiency. This could be because 
a higher level of financial risk will lead to a reduction in bank profitability. 
This explanation is in line with studies that indicate a significant and negative 
relationship between financial leverage and firms’ performance (Mumtaz et 
al., 2013; Chinaemerem & Anthony, 2012; Gleason et al., 2000; Majumdar & 
Chhibber, 1999).  
The level of diversification (NITA) has a positive relationship with TE. This 
follows from and is in line with literature that points out that diversification 
should increase risk-adjusted bank performance (Gurbuz et al., 2013). We 
also note, however, that this relationship is statistically insignificant.  
Finally, the results highlight a positive and significant relationship between 
TANG and TE. As mentioned above this variable estimates the extent to which 
management uses funds for unproductive uses. The result supports the 
agency cost hypothesis and implies that higher values of TANG will increase 
TE of commercial banks. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The study investigates bank efficiency in a sample of ten Frontier African 
countries and estimates the determinants of bank efficiency over the period 
from 2008 to 2012. The bank efficiency estimates of individual banks are 
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measured using the DEA approach as well as a second stage truncated 
bootstrap procedure to compute bias corrected TE scores and to investigate 
the determinants of TE in the banks under study. The study uses financial 
ratios to act as proxies for the determinants of bank efficiency. In addition, 
this study used the intermediation approach that employs labour costs, 
deposits and assets as inputs and loans as well as other investments as 
outputs.  
The findings suggest that TE has been above average for all the countries 
under study from 2008 to 2012. The highest average result of 0.65 was 
achieved in 2008, with the lowest estimate of 0.52 in 2012. The empirical 
findings clearly show a degree of increasing inefficiency in the Frontier African 
banking sector, especially from 2008 onwards to 2012. 
Regarding the source of overall technical inefficiency for commercial banks in 
the Frontier African countries under study, we observe that TE is due to 
managerial inefficiency and failure to operate at the most productive scale size 
(scale inefficiency). For many of the countries, however, TE is mainly 
attributed to pure technical inefficiency as opposed to scale inefficiency. This 
indicates that managerial inefficiency is still a challenge in most of the African 
countries under the study. Hence, Frontier Market African banks are more 
successful in selecting optimal levels of output than adopting best practice.  
An important outcome of this analysis lies with the results provided by the 
second stage DEA bootstrap regression. We gain insight into the fact that the 
banks in the Frontier African countries have high levels of SE, meaning that 
they adequately utilise their scale of production. Further, the Frontier African 
banking system has reached a level of diversification that is required to 
increase banking efficiency. In addition, the results also support the previous 
studies (see Mumtaz et al., 2013; Chinaemerem & Anthony, 2012; Gleason et 
al., 2000), which suggests that there is a significant and negative relationship 
between financial leverage and firms’ performance.  
The study has several limitations, and due to these, the study can be extended 
in the following ways. First, the scope of this study can be extended to 
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examine the efficiency of local banks vs foreign banks in the frontier African 
countries. Second, the present study can also be extended to analyse 
efficiency according to bank size (small, medium and large). Lastly, another 
extension to this study could be the examination of changes in productivity 
because of technological progress or decline by employing the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI). 
Nonetheless, the results of this study have important implications for the 
management of banks, for policy makers and bank regulators in Africa, as 
well as academics and others studying trends in bank performance in Frontier 
African countries. Primary among these policy implications is the increasing 
bank inefficiency across the sample of Frontier African countries over the 
years of study. Policy makers and regulators could put in place policies that 
foster bank efficiency, by instituting efficiency measures and restructuring 
the banking system to reduce the number of less efficient banks. In addition, 
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Deposits Customers’ deposits 
Labour Personnel expenses of bank staff such as salaries and wages 
Outputs:  
Total Assets Sum of gross investments, cash and equivalents, receivables 
and other assets 
Input prices:  
Price of deposits Interest expenses divided by total deposits 
Price of labour Personnel expenses divided by the total assets 
 
 
Appendix 4.B: Financial ratios used as explanatory variables 
Variable Description 
LOTA total loans over total assets 
NITA noninterest expenses over total assets 
LEV debt/total assets 
TANG fixed assets/total assets 
SIZE log of total assets 






QUIET-LIFE IN BANKING: EVIDENCE FROM TEN FRONTIER MARKETS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The recent liberalisation of the banking sector in Africa has precipitated 
several key reforms, for instance deregulation of interest rates and the entry 
of foreign competitors. These reforms have impacted the structure of the 
banking sector as well as influenced competition which has, in turn, 
significant implications on the efficiency and overall stability of the banking 
sector. Competition is of key importance to the banking sector, and as it 
increases, we expect to see a reduction or removal of cost inefficiencies to 
promote welfare gains and foster economic growth (Jayaratne & Strahan, 
1996). Policymakers are particularly interested in banking competition, and 
central banks take measures to amend competitive levels for the greater good 
of the economy (Kapsis, 2012). In the Frontier African countries, bank credit 
is a major source of finance (Moyo et al, 2014) and, therefore, expected gains 
due to improving competitive conditions are of importance. Theory suggests 
that an increase in competition encourages banks to decrease managerial 
inefficiencies and hence reduce on the operating costs. This comes from two 
channels of transmission. On the one hand, an increased degree of banking 
competition will result in a lower monopoly power for banks, and therefore a 
decrease of banking prices. On the other hand, heightened competition 
should encourage banks to reduce their costs so that their cost efficiency, 
meaning their ability to produce with the minimal costs, would improve (Weil, 
2003). Subsequently, the combined improvements in competition and 
efficiency in the financial sector can also contribute to greater financial 
stability, product innovation, and access by households and firms to financial 
services, which in turn can improve prospects for economic growth (Hauner 
& Peiris, 2005; Mwega, 2008).  
The nexus between banking competition and efficiency has not been 
extensively studied and empirical studies have predominately focused on 
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developed countries (see Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Chen & Zhao, 2008; 
Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; Qiu & Yu, 2009; and Coccorese & 
Pellecchia, 2010). The perceived relationship between competition and 
efficiency has been explained by the ‘quiet-life' hypothesis of Hicks (1935). 
The theory suggests that firms with market power incur inefficiencies through 
the enjoyment of monopolistic rents. Early empirical studies on the ‘quiet life' 
hypothesis in banking found compelling evidence that banks in more 
concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency levels. However, more 
recent studies have re-examined the issue in different contexts with mixed 
results. This study, therefore, seeks to examine the relationship between 
banking competition and efficiency in ten frontier African countries.  
The objective of this paper is achieved in a three-stage analysis. The first stage 
estimates a translog function model using the SFA approach to calculate cost 
and profit efficiency measures for the selection of frontier African countries 
over the period 2005 to 2012. SFA has been used in several empirical studies 
on banking efficiency in Africa (e.g. Okeahalam, 2006; Mlambo & Ncube, 
2011; Poshakwale & Qian, 2011; Alhassan, 2015). The Lerner Index is 
employed to measure bank competition (market power). In the third stage, the 
paper employs the Random Effects technique to estimate a panel regression 
model which is used to examine the relationship between competition and 
efficiency in the banking sectors of the Frontier African countries.  
This paper contributes to the empirical literature by extending on an earlier 
study by Léon (2014) by estimating both the profit and cost efficiency for ten 
Frontier African countries. Léon (2014) employed only the cost efficiency 
measure to investigate the Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) in a sample of ten 
African countries. This study incorporates profit efficiency which is a broader 
concept than cost efficiency as it considers the effects of the choice of a vector 
of production on both costs and revenues (Maudos et al., 2000).  
The results from the empirical estimation show that there was a variation in 
competitive conditions across the sample from 2005 to 2012. Our results 
reject the prediction of the QLH, as banks’ market power looks to positively 
affect both cost and profit efficiency, even if the overall impact is not 
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particularly significant in scale. This means that the ‘quiet life' behaviour of 
Frontier African banks, although existing, leads to a noteworthy loss of 
efficiency. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides a review 
of the existing literature on the relationship between competition and 
efficiency in the banking sector. Section 5.3 describes the sources of data and 
the variables and approaches that are used for the measurement of banking 
competition and efficiency, as well as the specification used to analyse the 
relationship between the two. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical results and 
Section 5.5 concludes the study.  
5.2 Review of literature 
This literature review examines the theoretical underpinnings behind the 
Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH). It further delves into empirical studies, with a 
specific focus on Africa that will help situate the contribution of this study in 
the broader literature. 
The QLH advanced from the Efficient Structure (ES) hypothesis,10 and asserts 
that firms in monopolistic markets may forego excess profits in favour of 
enjoying discretionary expenses or less effort. This was first expressed by 
Hicks (1935) who said that the best of all monopoly profits is a “quiet-life”. 
Applied to banking markets, the QLH postulates that banks trade-off higher 
profits for less risk. Because of this, bank managers in a monopolistic market 
may be particularly sensitive about showing abnormally high profits. 
However, the quest for cost efficiency is less intense at the expense of lower 
                                                          
10 The ES theory hypothesises that under the weight of market competition, efficient firms 
overcome the competition and grow, and as they become larger, they obtain greater market 
share, and thereby earn higher profits. Under this hypothesis, a market becomes inefficient 
as it becomes more concentrated. This hypothesis was first proposed by Demsetz (1973). 
The theory suggests a reverse causality between competition and efficiency. Further, per the 
ES hypothesis, more efficient firms have lower costs, which in turn lead to higher profits. 
Therefore, the most efficient firms can increase their market share, resulting in higher 
concentration. Many empirical studies have tested this hypothesis extensively, with the 




profits. Because of this ‘slack’ in management, firms with greater market 
power are more inefficient (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
Leibenstein (1966) suggests that inefficiencies may result from the existence 
of imperfections in the internal organisation of firms, for instance due to 
informational asymmetries. These inefficiencies could be lowered through 
market competition, which provides an incentive for managers to work harder 
and firm owners to make a better assessment of firm (and managerial) 
performance relative to other companies (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
Previous theoretical studies have looked at management discretion and its 
impact on business decisions. For instance, Williamson (1963) suggested that 
managers, after reaching a certain obligatory profit level, followed objectives 
other than pure profit-maximisation. Hart (1983) developed a formal model 
that shows the relationship between competition and management behaviour. 
The study showed that managerially run firms face the problem of operational 
slack even if they have optimal incentive structures in place because the 
owner is unable to observe the real cost of production, thus they cannot 
observe whether high or increasing total costs are due to mismanagement.  
Schmidt (1997) further shows that an increase in competition has two effects 
on managerial incentives. First, it raises the probability of liquidation, which 
positively affects managerial effort, but it also reduces firm’s profits, which 
may make the provision of high effort less attractive. Hence, the total effect is 
ambiguous. Empirical evidence of a ‘quiet life’ preference of managers, when 
they are protected from takeover threats, is found by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003), Chen and Zhao (2008), Giroud and Mueller (2010) and 
Qiu and Yu (2009). 
Using a sample of 5,000 banks in the US over a period from 1980 to 1989, 
Berger and Hannan (1989), starting from the original standpoint of the ‘quiet 
life’ theory, were the first to investigate whether banks operating in more 
concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency because of slack 
management. This behaviour, if valid, might result in lower cost efficiency 
because of shirking by managers, the pursuit of objectives other than profit 
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maximisation, political or other activities to defend or gain market power, or 
simple incompetence that is obscured by the extra profits made available by 
the exercise of market power (Berger & Hannan, 1989). Berger and Hannan 
(1998) further find that credit institutions operating in more concentrated 
markets (in terms of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index) are characterised by a 
lower cost efficiency. 
Casu and Girardone (2006) studied the relationship between competition and 
efficiency and their findings do not support the QLH. They indicate that an 
increase in banks’ monopoly power does not translate into a decrease in cost 
efficiency. On the other hand, results of the reverse causality tests provide no 
evidence that increases in efficiency precede increases in market power as 
argued in the ES hypothesis. 
Podpiera et al. (2008) used the Lerner index as a proxy for competition in the 
Czech banking system and found no improvement in competition during the 
period 1994-2005, and the causality test showed a negative relationship 
between competition and efficiency. Thus, the QLH was rejected, as was the 
case in an earlier study by Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007).  
(Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010) used data on the Italian banking industry for 
the period 1992–2007 to investigate the QLH. They apply a two-step 
procedure by first estimating bank-level cost efficiency scores and Lerner 
indices. They then used the estimated market power measures, as well as a 
vector of control variables, to explain cost efficiency. Their study supports the 
QLH, although the impact of market power on efficiency is not particularly 
remarkable in magnitude. 
Some studies have analysed the relationship between market power and 
efficiency in banking from developing countries with ambiguous results (see 
Turk Ariss, 2010; Williams, 2012). However, few studies have examined the 
impact of market power on efficiency in Africa (Hauner & Peiris, 2008; Mwega, 
2011). These studies did, however, specifically consider the direct relationship 
between market power and efficiency. For instance, Hauner and Peiris (2008) 
consider the impact of the banking sector reforms undertaken in Uganda to 
120 
 
improve competition and efficiency. The study by Mwega (2011) on Kenya 
investigates the factors that promote financial development in a reforming 
low-income African country and also analyses ways in which financial 
markets and policies influence growth and development. However, fewer 
studies on the determinants of efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa include a 
measure of bank concentration (Ndiaye, 2008; Kirkpatrick et al., 2008; 
Kablan, 2010, 2009). Chen (2009) and Zhao and Murinde (2011) include non-
structural measures of competition in the determinants of bank efficiency in 
Africa (Léon, 2015).  
The studies by Chen (2009) and Zhao et al (2013) both support the QLH but 
both studies suffer from two inadequacies. First, they both presume that the 
extent of bank competition is exogenous which is not in line with the efficient 
structure hypothesis. Second, both studies employ structural (market-based) 
measures of competition and thus implicitly assume that all banks have the 
same degree of market power (Léon, 2015). In line with Léon (2014), we employ 
the non-structural measure of competition in the Lerner Index to test the 
QLH. The Lerner Index has a benefit of being bank-specific and represents 
the individual power exhibited by each bank in the market. It also controls for 
endogeneity due to reverse causation. This study contributes to the literature 
on Africa by considering the effect of not just cost efficiency but profit 
efficiency on market concentration (proxied by the Lerner Index). 
5.3 Data and estimation methodology 
The data for the analysis is sourced from Bankscope and uses balance sheets 
and income statement banks from ten Frontier African countries over the 
period 2005-2012. After checking the data for errors and multiple erroneous 
entries, our sample is reduced to 123 banks operating in ten countries (see 
Appendix 5.A). Complete data for the study was only available from 2005-
2012. 
To ascertain the most suitable panel data estimation approach between fixed 
and random effects, I use the results of the Hausman specification test. In 
addition, consistent with studies by Hoechle (2007) and Green (2003), all the 
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regression equations are estimated using robust standard errors to correct for 
groupwise heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation in panels 
(Simpasa, 2011). 
5.3.1 Estimating cost and profit efficiency using Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis 
The definitions of cost and profit efficiency correspond, respectively, to two 
significant economic objectives: cost minimisation and profit maximisation. 
Cost efficiency is the ratio between the minimum cost at which it is possible 
to attain a given volume of production and the realised cost. Profit efficiency 
measures the ability of banks to produce the maximum possible profit for a 
given level of input and output prices. Profit efficiency is a much broader 
concept than cost efficiency since it considers the effects of the choice of vector 
of production on both costs and revenues (Maudos et al., 2000). 
To estimate the cost and profit efficiency of the Frontier African banks we 
employ the SFA developed by Aigner et al. (1977). Given the panel structure 
of the data, we employ the stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli 
(1992), because it allows us to estimate time varying cost and profit efficiency 
scores (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). The SFA specifies a functional form for 
cost and profit equations, usually in a trans logarithmic form, and allows for 
random error. It assumes that these errors consist of inefficiencies, which 
follow an asymmetric distribution (usually a truncated or half normal 
distribution), and random errors that follow a symmetric distribution (usually 
standard normal distribution). The reason for this structure of the composite 
error term is that inefficiencies cannot be negative. Both the inefficiencies and 
random errors are assumed to be orthogonal to input prices, outputs and 
country-level or bank-specific variables specified in the estimating equation. 
For detail on the SFA methodology, see Battese and Corra (1977), Battese and 
Coelli (1993) and Coelli et al. (1998). 
Based on the model of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), the cost function of 
a firm is defined as follows: 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑖,𝑡)                                                                         …(5.1) 
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The costs, as defined below, are a function of the output vector (y), the price 
of inputs (w), and a set of random factors (ε) which incorporate the effect of 
errors in the measurement of variables. 
Assuming that, for firm i at time t, production costs are function of output Q, 
input prices W, inefficiency u and random error ν, and that the last two terms 
are independent, we can write the logarithmic specification of the cost 
function as 
ln𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑄𝑖,𝑡, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  …(5.2) 
where vit is the usual error term that is independent and identically 
distributed N(0,σ v2) – although the non-negative inefficiency term uit is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed as a truncated normal 
distribution with mean μ and variance σu 2. 
The standard profit function assumes that markets for outputs and inputs 
are perfectly competitive. Given the input and output price vectors (q) and (w), 
the bank maximises profits by adjusting the amounts of inputs and outputs. 
Thus, the profit function can be expressed as: 
Π = Π(𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑣, 𝑢)  …(5.3) 
 And in logarithmic terms it is expressed as: 
ln(Π + 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑞) + ln𝑣 − ln𝑢  …(5.4) 
where θ is a constant added to the profits of each firm in order to attain 
positive values, thus able to take logarithms. 
We estimate the efficiency levels by specifying the commonly used translog 
functional form for the cost and profit functions. The cost function is 
presented as follows: 
ln𝑇𝐶𝑛 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
2



















𝑖=1 ln𝑄𝑗ln𝑃𝑖 + ln𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝑛  …(5.5) 
where TC is the measure of the total costs of production which comprise of 
operating costs and interest paid on deposits; Qi (i =1, 2) are output quantities 
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where 𝑄1 is total loans; 𝑄2 is other earning assets; Pj (j =1, 2) are input prices 
where 𝑃1  is the price of labour; 𝑃2  is the price of deposits; εi is a two 
component stochastic error term; and α, β, δ and γ, are parameters to be 
estimated and YEAR is included to take into account the time trend. 
5.3.2  Definition of inputs and outputs  
In the banking efficiency literature, there is a nuanced divergence among 
researchers about what should constitute inputs and outputs of banking 
sector (Sathye, 2003). However, the production and intermediation methods 
are the two most common approaches that are used in the literature regarding 
the measurement of inputs and outputs of a bank.  
The intermediation approach views the banks as using deposits together with 
purchased inputs to produce various categories of bank assets (outputs). In 
contrast, the production approach views banks as using purchased inputs to 
produce deposits and various categories of bank assets (outputs). Both loans 
and deposits are, therefore, treated as outputs and measured in terms of the 
number of accounts. This approach considers only operating costs and 
excludes the interest expenses paid on deposits since deposits are viewed as 
outputs. 
This study uses the intermediation approach because it is best suited for 
analysing bank level efficiency (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). To define inputs 
and outputs in this study we use a variation of the intermediation approach, 
which was originally developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) and has been 
widely adopted. The approach suggests that total loans and securities are 
outputs, whereas deposits, along with labour and capital, are inputs. Cost 
figures corresponding to these inputs are interest expenses, personnel 
expenses, and other operating costs, respectively. The last variable has been 
computed by subtracting labour costs from all operating costs (which are net 
of financial expenses). 
This study employs input variables in deposits (customer’s deposits) and 
labour (personnel expenses of bank staff such as salaries and wages). In 
addition, and in line with Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), the output (Q) is 
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proxied by the value of the total assets as the output variables. The prices for 
the input variables are defined as the ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits as proxy for price of deposits, 𝑃1 price of labour (Beccalli et al., 2006); 
𝑃2 is the ratio of personal expenses to total assets. Appendix 5.B provides a 
summary of the inputs and outputs employed. 
5.3.3 Estimating bank concentration using the Lerner Index 
We employ the non-structural Lerner Index to measure bank market 
competition. The Lerner index usually employed in empirical work to capture 
the degree to which banks maintain a price level over their marginal costs of 
production. Lerner (1943) defined his “index of the degree of monopoly power” 





where Pi and mci are firm i’s price and marginal cost respectively. The index 
ranges between 0 and 1, with zero corresponding to perfect competition and 
larger values reflecting more market power and one corresponding to 
monopoly. The key attractiveness of the Lerner Index lies in (a) simplicity, (b) 
an intuitive understanding, and (c) relatively mild data requirements. It also 
allows market power to be proxied at a bank level and its evolution analysed 
over time. When data on prices and marginal cost are available, the Lerner 
Index can be computed as a simple ratio. 
For each bank, average revenues proxied by price and marginal costs are 
obtained from the approximation of cost function with three inputs: labour, 
physical capital and deposits (for more details on the Lerner Index see Angelini 
& Cetorelli (2003); Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004)). The Lerner 
Index for country c is the weighted (by bank size) average of individual Lerner 
indices of all banks in country c as follows: 
𝐿𝑐 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖∈𝑐 𝐿𝑖𝑐 …(5.7) 
where sic is the market share of bank i in country c and Lic si the value of the 
Lerner Index for this bank. Greater values of the Lerner Index are linked to 
greater levels of market power. Lc is bounded between 0 and 1 with 
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intermediate values denoting monopolistic competition. However, it is not 
uncommon for the Lerner Index to take on negative values. According to the 
literature, a negative value of the Lerner Index denotes ‘super competition’ 
and may occur when banks price their output below their marginal cost. This 
could arise because of using accounting data to estimate the unobserved 
prices (Daglish et al., 2015). 
5.3.4 Testing the Quiet Life Hypothesis 
In the last step of the analysis, we implement the test of the QLH for Frontier 
African countries by regressing the cost and profit efficiency scores on the 
estimated Lerner Index as well as a set of bank-level control variables.  
We run a regression with the SFA efficiency (profit and cost) estimates on the 
left-hand side: 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                     …(5.8) 
The dependent variable here is the measure of firm efficiency, Zi,t is a vector 
of bank level control variables, and εi,t is an ordinary error term. The main 
independent variable is LIi,t , which is a measure for market concentration and 
we use the Lerner Index to estimate this. The QLH postulates that there is a 
positive relationship between market concentration and firm inefficiency, 
because of insufficient managerial effort, lack of profit-maximisation 
behaviour, wasteful expenditures to obtain and maintain monopoly power, 
and/or survival of inefficient managers, in a more concentrated market 
(Berger & Hannan, 1998).  
Bank-specific variables are constructed using information from the 
Bankscope database. The bank level control variables used in this study are: 
(a) The ratio of the loan loss provision to total loans (RISK). The need for risk 
management in the banking sector is inherent in banking business. 
Changes in credit risk may reflect changes in the health of a bank’s loan 
portfolio (Cooper et al., 2004), which may affect the performance of the 
institution, since poor asset quality is the single most important cause of 
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bank failures. Risk is expected to have a negative coefficient because bad 
loans are expected to reduce profitability of the bank. 
(b) The natural Log of total asset (SIZE). The effect of increase in size on 
efficiency has been proved to be positive to a certain extent. However, for 
banks that become extremely large, the effect of size could be negative due 
among other things to issues of bureaucracy that stifle efficiency. Because 
of this, the size-efficiency relationship may be expected to be non-linear in 
nature. 
(c) The equity to assets ratio11 (EQUITY). The ratio measures the number of 
assets that are financed by owners’ investments by comparing the total 
equity in the company to the total assets. If banks with high equity ratios 
experience lower bankruptcy costs and thus lower funding costs, a positive 
influence of this variable on relative margins (Lerner Index) is expected 
(Maudos & Nagore, 2005). 
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Profit efficiency 
The estimates of profit inefficiency scores are obtained from the Battese and 
Coelli (1995) SFA model that estimates simultaneously efficiency scores as 
defined in Equation 5.7, which includes output levels, input prices and bank-
specific control variables. The average estimated scores of profit inefficiency 
across the sample are reported in Table 5.1. The estimated average profit 
efficiency for the whole sample is 0.38: this suggests that an average bank in 
the sample operates at 62% below the efficient frontier. This average is lower 
than some past studies carried out on Africa which suggested that banks are 
on average 67% profit efficient (Kirkpatrick, et al, 2008). The low profit 
efficiency scores could suggest that the banks in the Frontier African 
countries are unable to maximise their revenue potential. 
                                                          
11 Equity capital is measured using the Basel Committee definition of bank capital by 
summing the TIER I (i.e. total equity, retained earnings and other disclosed equity reserves) 
and TIER II (i.e. undisclosed equity reserves, general provisions, hybrid capital instruments, 
and subordinated debts) components of bank capital. 
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From the sample, we observe that on average banks in Ghana (39.6%), 
Botswana (39.4%), Nigeria (39.4%) and Tunisia (39.4%) have the highest level 
of profit efficiency in the sample. Banks in Uganda (31.8%) have the lowest 
profit efficiency across the sample for the period under study.  
In regard to the evolution of profit efficiency, we observe that profit efficiency 
scores remained somewhat stable with slight variation over the period of 
study. This could indicate that banks’ revenues have not changed 
considerably in these years under study. We also observe that the profit 
efficiency values are more homogeneous across countries than cost efficiency. 
5.4.2 Cost efficiency estimates 
Table 5.1 shows the estimated cost efficiency results for the Frontier African 
countries. We observe the estimated average cost inefficiency across the 
sample is 0.39: this suggests that an average bank in the sample operates at 
61% below the efficient frontier. This indicates that the banks on average have 
higher cost efficiency than profit efficiency, albeit marginally. These values are 
in line with the literature in the sense that banks appear to manage their 
costs better than their profits. However, the estimates we get are lower than 
what is evidenced in past studies on cost efficiency in Africa. For instance, 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2008) in a study on SSA banks find the cost efficiency of 
banks at around 80%. 
Our results indicate that on average banks in Tunisia (41.6%), Morocco 
(41.4%) and Kenya (40.6%) have the highest cost efficiency across the sample, 
while banks in Uganda (32.3%) and Tanzania (37.9%) have the lowest levels 
of cost efficiency across the sample. Like the results of profit efficiency, in 
regard to evolution of the cost efficiency, similar to the profit efficiency 
estimates, we observe stable with slight variation trend over the period of 
study. This could imply that bank’s ability to manage their cost has not 
changed to a large degree over the period of study.  
The results we get from the revenue side (profit efficiency) support the 
necessity to consider the cost side as well when evaluating banking efficiency. 
Profit efficient banks seem to be cost efficient, but the inverse does not 
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necessarily hold (Maudos et al., 2002; Tabak et al., 2011). An exception to 
this rule was found by Srari (2009), who concluded that banks from countries 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are more efficiency in profits than in 
costs. Bos and Kool (2006) state that in a perfect competitive market, profit 
efficient banks are also cost efficient (Tabak et al., 2011).  
Table 5.1: Profit and cost efficiency estimates 
 Uganda Ghana Tunisia Kenya Mauritius Morocco Nigeria SA Botswana TZ 
Profit Efficiency 
2005 - 0.391 0.393 0.387 0.392 0.381 0.393 0.37 0.394 0.386 
2006 - 0.395 0.395 0.39 0.393 0.372 0.391 0.375 0.39 0.383 
2007 0.343 0.397 0.396 0.389 0.393 0.37 0.392 0.37 0.39 0.382 
2008 0.341 0.398 0.396 0.39 0.395 0.372 0.394 0.36 0.396 0.384 
2009 0.342 0.399 0.394 0.391 0.394 0.374 0.397 0.359 0.395 0.382 
2010 0.33 0.399 0.393 0.389 0.391 0.374 0.396 0.362 0.393 0.378 
2011 0.32 0.396 0.393 0.389 0.39 0.374 0.393 0.365 0.391 0.383 
2012 0.229 0.395 0.394 0.393 0.392 0.37 0.396 0.372 0.401 0.39 
Average 0.318 0.396 0.394 0.390 0.393 0.373 0.394 0.367 0.394 0.384 
Cost Efficiency 
2005 0.336 0.407 0.416 0.386 0.402 0.405 0.414 0.392 0.38 0.381 
2006 - 0.416 0.419 0.396 0.384 0.401 0.398 0.392 0.383 0.379 
2007 0.322 0.39 0.415 0.404 0.38 0.408 0.404 0.385 0.376 0.378 
2008 0.333 0.386 0.413 0.403 0.379 0.407 0.397 0.369 0.377 0.385 
2009 0.331 0.394 0.415 0.404 0.382 0.425 0.389 0.371 0.38 0.38 
2010 0.326 0.395 0.415 0.406 0.389 0.423 0.385 0.381 0.398 0.375 
2011 0.316 0.394 0.418 0.404 0.391 0.421 0.385 0.386 0.395 0.378 
2012 0.305 0.39 0.4 0.396 0.395 0.413 0.386 0.391 0.4 0.378 
Average 0.323 0.393 0.416 0.401 0.388 0.414 0.394 0.383 0.385 0.379 
Source: Authors estimations from Research Data 
5.4.3 Lerner Index results 
Table 5.2 presents annual averages of the Lerner Index for the ten frontier 
African countries under study. The trend of the Lerner Index is one of marked 
variation over the period of study, and this indicates that the market power 
of the Frontier African banks has fluctuated during the time interval under 
study. To be more precise, the yearly average of the Lerner Index ranges 
between 0.26 (in 2005) and 0.21 (in 2012). Banks in Uganda on average 
experienced the highest levels of competition across the sample (-0.046). On 
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average, banks in Tunisia had the lowest levels of competition across the 
sample (0.625). 
Table 5.2: Lerner Index estimates 
 Uganda Ghana Tunisia Kenya Mauritius Morocco Nigeria SA Botswana TZ 
2005 -0.232 0.659 0.549 0.505 -0.153 0.451 0.316 0.1 0.095 0.313 
2006 -0.124 0.58 0.552 0.468 -0.357 0.473 0.3 0.046 0.045 0.332 
2007 0.339 0.434 0.624 0.473 -0.418 0.338 0.435 0.062 -0.205 0.277 
2008 0.558 0.318 0.634 0.425 -0.356 0.304 0.478 0.234 0.066 0.378 
2009 0.539 0.234 0.669 0.434 -0.176 0.376 0.304 0.181 0.077 0.351 
2010 -0.56 0.213 0.67 0.476 0.045 0.408 0.312 0.073 0.012 0.41 
2011 -0.435 0.265 0.668 0.479 0.036 0.413 0.301 0.129 0.104 0.387 
2012 -0.454 0.144 0.705 0.315 0.098 0.397 0.309 0.155 0.248 0.219 
Total -0.046 0.304 0.625 0.451 -0.16 0.384 0.348 0.098 0.055 0.336 
Source: Authors estimations  
5.4.4 Regression results 
To further analyse this issue, which represents the core of our paper, we use 
the cost and profit efficiency estimates, bank specific variables and the Lerner 
indices, as calculated in the first step from the SFA Battese Coelli (BC) model 
and run a random effects regression (Table 5.3). Our main objective is to 
examine whether bank competition has a positive or negative effect on both 
cost and profit efficiency. 
Following from (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010), we carry out the Wald test 
which rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the Lerner Index, confirming 
that our measure of market power is endogenous. 
Table 5.3: Results for Random Effects estimation 
 Profit Efficiency   Cost Efficiency  
 Coef. z P>z  Coef. Z P>z 
Constant 0.380*** 29.2 0.000  0.359*** 22.77 0.000 
Lerner 0.004 1.44 0.151  0.033*** 11.14 0.000 
Size -0.005*** -5.94 0.000  -0.004*** -4.89 0.000 
Equity -0.005 -1.43 0.154  0.00 0.03 0.973 
Risk -0.003 -0.34 0.736  -0.006 -0.74 0.459 
Wald 𝜒2(13) 210.34    350.68   
Prob > 𝜒2 0.000    0.000   
R-squared 0.4933    0.5804   
Country Dummy YES    YES   
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Banks 109    109   
Observations 723    723   
Source: Authors estimations 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%.  
The coefficient of LERNER is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all specifications for both profit and cost efficiency. This indicates 
that bank market power (competition) increases (reduces) cost and profit 
efficiency scores. These finding rejects the QLH because, for the Frontier 
African banks, higher Lerner indices are associated with cost and profit 
efficiencies and increased market power seems to increase the incentive to 
minimise costs and maximise profits. This may be because bank managers 
apply more effort in their working activities. The elasticity associated with 
the Lerner Index shows that a 1% increase in the Lerner Index determines 
an increase in the profit efficiency score, on average, by 0.004%.  
In the same way, a 1% increase in the Lerner Index generates a statistically 
significant increase in the cost efficiency score, on average, by 0.033%. The 
biggest percentage increase is observed in cost efficiency as opposed to 
profit efficiency for the Frontier African countries. The existence of lower 
levels of profit efficiency than of cost efficiency are similar to those obtained 
in other studies (Berger & Mester (1997) and Rogers (1998) for the US 
banking system, and Lozano (1997) for the Spanish savings banks). The 
results are in line with Léon (2014) whose study identifies a positive 
relationship between the cost efficiency estimates and the measure of bank 
competition using a sample from 7 countries from West Africa. 
Looking at the bank-level variables, the coefficient of the natural log of total 
asset (SIZE) is negative for both profit and cost efficiency. This could mean 
that the larger the bank, the better it manages its cost and profit. There is 
also empirical evidence to suggest that an increase in the size of banks will 
result in lower cost and profit efficiency. The reason for this could be that 
as banks increase in size, they could be less pressured to control their 
expenses and become less cost efficient (Maudos et al., 2002). Similarly, 
the negative effect of bank size on profit efficiency shows that as banks get 
bigger in size, they cannot exploit additional profits by relying on their 
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market power, because of intense competition in the markets (Xiang et al., 
2011). However, it is important to note that the influence is not statistically 
significant for both profit and cost efficiency. 
For the coefficient of the ratio of the loan loss provision to total loans 
(RISK), we observe a negative relation for both profit and cost efficiency for 
the Frontier African countries. This goes to show that as bank risks 
increase, both profit and cost efficiency reduce. This could mean that 
banks with risk taking behaviour are, ceteris paribus, more distant from 
the profit and cost frontier (Tabak et al., 2011). These conclusions stem 
from among others, the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung 
(1997), which states that an increase in a bank’s risk, which is translated 
into an increase in the bank’s probability of default, will cause managers 
to operate less efficiently.  
A reason for this is that bank managers when faced with increased risk, 
should take additional precautions and incur additional risk-monitoring 
costs. These extra operating costs result from various sources, for instance 
monitoring of delinquent borrowers and the value of collateral, as well as 
the costs of seizing and disposing of collateral in cases of default (Podpiera 
& Weill, 2007). In addition, in attempting to mitigate the risk, bank 
managers also divert their attention away from solving day-to-day 
operational problems and pursuing efficiency improving strategies. 
Consequently, we expect that an increased risk could cause reduced cost 
and profit efficiency. 
The coefficient of equity to assets ratio (EQUITY) is negative and not 
significant for profit efficiency and zero for cost efficiency. This could mean 
that the higher the shareholders’ capital in relation to a bank’s assets, the 
more cost efficient the bank is. This may be a sign that a higher 
shareholders’ leverage forces banks to become more cost efficient as a way 






The main thrust of this paper is to empirically test the so-called ‘Quiet Life’ 
Hypothesis, which states that banks with higher market power are less 
efficient due to slack managerial behaviour. To this end, first we used the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis to compute cost and profit bank efficiency on a 
sample of ten Frontier Market African countries. Second, we calculated the 
Lerner Index as an estimate for bank competition, and finally we ran a random 
effects regression to investigate the relationship between bank efficiency and 
competition.  
The analysis has highlighted that the banking sectors in the Frontier market 
African countries have low levels of both cost and profit efficiency. In addition, 
we observe a marked variability in bank competition across the years of study. 
On average, banks in the Frontier Market African countries seem to have 
reduced their marginal costs faster than price falls, which has caused an 
increase in the Lerner index, and consequently proposed greater market 
power. 
Further, our results indicate the existence of a positive and significant 
relationship between market power and both cost and profit efficiency. These 
findings, however, reject the QLH because, for the Frontier market African 
banks, higher Lerner indices are associated with cost and profit efficiencies 
and increased market power seems to increase the incentive to minimise costs 
and maximise profits. Hence increased bank competition may impede cost 
and profit efficiency of banks, and this could result in increased loan rates.  
These results have implications for policymakers and regulators as the 
findings highlight the uncertainty of the view that promotion of bank 
competition would lead to a reduction in the prices of financial services. Policy 
makers could, therefore, pursue strategies that regulate the pricing of 
banking services in competitive environments to check for managerial 
inefficiency.  
A limitation that arose from this study was the short time period of the data, 
and this could impact on the robustness of some of the estimates derived  as 
133 
 
well as influencing the choice of methodology that was used to measure the 
relationship between bank efficiency and bank competition. The faliure to 
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Appendix 5.A: Number of banks per country 













Appendix 5.B: Variables used in the computation of bank efficiency 
Variable Description 
Inputs:  
Deposits Customers deposits 
Labour Personnel expenses of bank staff such as salaries and wages 
Outputs:  
Total Assets 
Sum of gross investments, cash and equivalents, receivables 
& other assets  
Input prices:  
Price of 
deposits Interest expenses divided by total deposits 







INCOME DIVERSIFICATION IN FRONTIER AFRICAN COUNTRIES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR BANK EFFICIENCY 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The banking sector the world over has undergone several reforms over the last 
couple of decades. Increased competition, deregulation and productivity have 
led banking institutions to expand their activities and develop new lines of 
business in addition to the traditional interest-generating activities. The 
significance of banking deregulation has been shaped by a global trend 
towards diversification in banks’ revenues and an expansion into non-interest 
sources of revenue. This has been in line with the universal banking model 
which has become widely adopted. The model of a universal banking consists 
of a spectrum of financial activities, including traditional commercial banking, 
investment banking as well as insurance services. Benefits of bank 
diversification include improvement in bank efficiency and profitability; 
hedging for insolvency risk; increase in a bank’s intermediation function; and 
increase in competitiveness and innovation from the banking industry (Sanya 
and Wolfe, 2011). However, diversification has raised considerable concerns 
about a desirable structure and appropriate regulation for financial 
institutions among regulators and central bankers (Biggar & Heimler, 2005). 
The effects of diversification on bank performance, profitability and risk, have 
been widely studied for most developed countries. This stems from the fact 
that the banking sectors in most developed economies have diversified into 
non-interest income generating activities over a longer duration of time, 
especially after the beginning of the financial liberalisation era (Gurbuz et al., 
2013). Notwithstanding the propotion of non-interest income in banks as well 
as net operating income has increased around the world, with banking sectors 
in developing countries also diversifying their activities over the last three 
decades (Gurbuz et al., 2013). 
Diversification in the banking sector has different scopes per a classification 
by Mercieca et al. (2007). There is diversification according to financial 
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products and services and geographic diversification, as well as a combination 
of geographic and business diversification (Mercieca et al., 2007). This study 
focuses on the former classification of diversification. Financial products and 
services diversification in the banking sector means an increase in share of 
fees, net trading profits and other non-interest income inside the net 
operating income of a bank. According to the theory, diversification of income 
sources in a bank has the potential to result in low risk and higher risk-
adjusted performance (Gurbuz et al., 2013). In addition, since service fees, 
net trading profits and other non-interest income are not correlated or 
imperfectly correlated with net interest income, diversification of income 
sources ought to make net operating income of a bank more stable (Gurbuz 
et al., 2013). 
Most studies however find that non-interest activities are often associated 
with profitability gains but also with higher risk because of their unstable 
nature (Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh & Rumble, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008). Other 
studies that examine the impact of income diversification on bank 
performance however indicate that diversification could increase the 
unpredictability of bank operating income.  
A large majority of developing countries have less advanced financial systems 
and different banking market structures as well as institutional and 
regulatory backgrounds than most developed economies. A result of this, the 
impact on bank performance from the creation of new business lines could be 
inconsistent with the evidence from the developed markets. Few studies focus 
on developing countries, especially in Africa, with a few exceptions (Sanya & 
Wolfe, 2011; Pennathur et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2012; Alhassan, 2015 and 
Alhassan & Tetteh, 2016) and these find varying results on the diversification 
of banks into other business lines. The fact that we see varying results from 
the different studies provides more impetus to study the relationship between 
income diversification and banking competition for banks in Africa. It is 
important to understand whether income diversification is beneficial for bank 
productivity or not. The objective of this study therefore is to contribute to the 
143 
 
scanty literature from Africa dedicated to the impact of diversification on bank 
efficiency using a sample of ten Frontier African countries.  
This paper builds on an empirical investigation on study on Ghanaian 
universal banks by Alhassan (2015) and Alhassan and Tetteh (2016). To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first cross-sectional study on income 
diversification and its implications for bank efficiency in a sample of ten 
Frontier African countries. A question of interest is whether the relationship 
between bank activity diversification and efficiency is non-linear among the 
sample of Frontier African banks.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 6.2 provides a review of 
the existing literature. Section 6.3 describes the sources of data and the 
variables used, as well as the specification and methodology employed for the 
measurement of banking efficiency and its determinants. Section 6.4 
discusses the empirical results and Section 6.5 concludes the study, drawing 
several practical implications based on the findings for policy makers. 
6.2  Review of literature 
6.2.1 Strategic focus and conglomeration hypotheses 
The relationship between income diversification and bank efficiency can be 
analysed through the lenses of two opposing hypotheses. First, the strategic 
focus hypothesis which states that banks can maximise their profitability by 
concentrating on their core business. Second, the conglomeration hypothesis, 
which asserts that multiple business segments can be more advantageous in 
improving bank performance (Berger, 1999). Income diversification arises 
from the conglomeration hypothesis that sees banks seeking to diversify their 
sources of income and in so doing, helping to foster bank performance and 
stability (Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez, 2011).  
The conglomeration hypothesis further postulates that operating a range of 
financial activities, and diversifying bank income away from only interest-
earning assets and towards non-interest earning services may improve 
efficiency and add value from taking advantage of revenues, or from exploiting 
cost scope economies by sharing inputs in joint production (Gallo et al., 1996; 
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Calomiris, 1998; Meador et al., 2000). In addition, conglomeration into 
different activities may diversify risks, allowing higher financial leverage, 
permitting financial institutions to earn greater revenue from risk-sensitive 
clients, thereby increasing market value and boosting bank performance 
(Papanikolaou, 2009; Sawada, 2013). The theory also indicates that 
diversification of income sources can reduce total risk and increase 
productivity, as diversification can stabilise operating income if income 
sources are negatively correlated.  
Studies of the opposing strategic focus hypothesis tend to challenge the 
conglomeration hypothesis by asserting that financial institutions can 
maximise their profitability by concentrating on their core competencies and 
core business. They argue that conglomeration may lead to agency problems 
as managers attempt to add new business lines. In addition, because costs of 
diversification may outweigh the benefits, it is in the best interest of banks to 
focus on a single line of business to reduce these agency problems and 
maximise on management’s expertise (Denis et al., 1997). 
6.2.2 Effect of income diversification on bank efficiency 
Several studies lend support to the conglomeration hypothesis that banks 
should be as diversified as possible. Diversification in banks is done by 
combining into what is called a conglomerate such activities as commercial 
banking, securities trading, insurance and other financial services (Baele et 
al., 2007). The diversification across different products may enable banks to 
reduce their expected costs of financial distress/bankruptcy (Boot & 
Schmeits, 2000). 
A further study by Baele et al. (2007) analyses if income diversification can 
lead to a better performance or risk profile in European banks from 1989 to 
2004. Their study finds a positive relationship between income diversification 
and the market’s expectation of predicted bank profits. The study also finds 
that diversification can reduce risk for most banks, however banks with 
increased non-interest income propotion have a more systematic risk (Baele 
et al, 2007). 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) analyse the impact of the bank activities 
and the short-term funding strategy on the bank risk and return, using a 
sample of 1,334 banks in over 101 countries. They conclude that the 
diversification of the non-interest income activities has increased the asset 
return, and significantly reduced the risk to a very low level. Elsas et al. (2010) 
investigates the impact of income diversification on bank performance and 
market value using data of nine countries from 1996 to 2008. This study 
found that income diversification could improve bank profitability and market 
value (Gurbuz et al., 2013). 
A study by Apergis (2014) explains that both profitability and risk profiles of 
banking activities are impacted positively by a shift to non-interest activities. 
This has also been proved in emerging countries by Sanya and Wolfe (2011). 
They find that both interest activities and non-interest activities can decrease 
insolvency risk and enhance profitability. Elsas et al. (2010) also explain that 
in the condition of inevitable crisis, diversification is better suited to resist 
shocks. However, Baele et al. (2007) contend that while diversification can 
decrease the total risk of the bank, it could also increase the systemic risk of 
the bank itself.  
Although diversification plays a significant role in the required efficiency for a 
bank, the costs of diversification may be associated with higher income 
volatility, implying higher risk. This argument is put forward by some 
empirical studies: DeYoung and Roland (2001) and Goddard et al. (2008) 
conclude that a move toward non-interest income is related to higher leverage 
and increased revenue volatility, which may increase bank earnings’ volatility.  
De Young and Roland (2001) further advance reasons as to why non-interest 
income may increase volatility and therefore negatively affect productivity of 
the sector. First, they state that revenues from fee-based activities may be 
more volatile than interest income because the customer-bank relationship is 
stronger in the traditional lending business, for instance for many of the new 
fee-based activities, it is easier for customers to switch to another bank. In 
addition, expansion into fee-based services can considerably increase fixed 
costs (for instance investments in technology and human resources). Third, 
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in contrast to the lending business, fee-based activities require less regulatory 
capital, and this suggests a higher degree of financial leverage which 
ultimately leads to higher earnings volatility.  
Stiroh (2004) looked at the potential benefit of income diversification for banks 
in the United States of America. The study finds that since the growth of net 
interest and net non-interest income in the period 1984-2001 is increasingly 
correlated, diversification benefits decreased during the period in question. 
The study further indicates that at the bank level, risk-adjusted returns are 
negatively associated with non-interest income shares.  
In addition, Chiorazzo et al. (2008) analysed the relation between income 
diversification and profitability for Italian banks using annual bank data over 
the period 1993–2003. Their study finds that income diversification can 
increase risk-adjusted returns for Italian banks and this relation is stronger 
in larger banks. Busch and Kick (2009) also analysed the impact of fee-based 
income activities on risk-adjusted performance measures of German 
universal banks between 1995 and 2007. They empirically found that higher 
fee-based income could increase risk-adjusted returns of German universal 
banks (Gurbuz et al., 2013). 
Income diversification of the banking sector seems to be negatively associated 
with its performance if the costs of diversification exceed its benefits. A study 
by Goddard et al. (2008) used a sample of small US credit unions and found 
a negative association between diversification and both the unadjusted and 
risk-adjusted profitability. This is true particularly in terms of cost and profit 
efficiency according to the study of Berger et al. (2010), who show that 
diversified banks are less profitable than non-diversified Chinese banks. 
Regarding the cost of diversification, Rajan et al. (2000) in their study on US 
banks, show that average misallocation of capital across divisions is increased 
by more diversity between segments, leading to higher costs of inefficient 
investment. This evidence is confirmed by Stiroh and Rumble (2006), who 
suggest that the increased switching costs are associated with product-line 
expansion, worsening the diversification discount. Studies by Mercieca et al. 
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(2007) and Trujillo-Ponce (2013) found no direct benefits of income 
diversification on bank performance. Other studies, such as Baele et al. 
(2007), Lepetit et al. (2008), Berger et al. (2000), De Jonghe (2010) and 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011), have indicated the negative effect of revenue 
diversification 
As mentioned earlier, studies from developing countries on income 
diversification and bank performance are few. For instance, Sanya and Wolfe 
(2011) carried out a study on income diversification of banks in emerging 
countries. Their analysis found evidence that income diversification has a 
positive effect on risk-adjusted performance of banks in these emerging 
markets. The model that they used also shows that the System GMM 
estimators used are a better approach to overcome the endogeneity problem 
in panel-data regression model estimations.  
A study by Alhassan (2015) analysed income diversification of banks and the 
impact on bank efficiency in Ghana. The findings reveal higher levels of cost 
efficiency as opposed to profit efficency to reflect high revenue inefficiency. An 
examination of efficiency scores by bank size indicates that bigger banks 
possess higher cost and profit efficiency as opposed to smaller sized banks. 
The study by Alhassan (2015) further finds that non-linear connection is 
found between income diversification and efficiency, while size is found to be 
significant in enabling banks to take advantage of the benefits of income 
diversification. To the best of my knowledge this is the first comparative study 
looking at the relationship between income diversification and bank efficiency 
using ten Frontier African countries. The study seeks to address this gap in 
the literature and uses cost and profit efficiency as a proxy for bank 
performance. 
6.3 Data and estimation methodology 
6.3.1 Data, output variables and input prices 
The study used yearly bank-level data from 2005 to 2012 for 123 banks over 
the period. The bank-level data was sourced from Bankscope. Specifically, the 
data was got from financial statements of the banks in the sample. The time 
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frame used was primarily because of data availability with an emphasis on 
banks’ non-interest generation. Also, considering the statistical technique 
employed, banks with fewer than five years of complete data available were 
eliminated from the sample12.  
There has been a long-standing disagreement amongst researchers regarding 
what should constitute inputs and outputs in the banking sector (Sathye, 
2003). Four different approaches are commonly used in literature to measure 
the inputs and outputs of banks: the production approach, the intermediation 
approach, the modern approach and the operations approach. However, 
banking efficiency studies tend to generally focus on the first two approaches: 
the production approach (value added approach) and the intermediation 
approach (asset approach).  
The intermediation approach views the banks as utilising their deposits 
together with purchased inputs to produce various categories of bank 
outputs, while the production approach considers that banks use procured 
inputs to produce deposits and various categories of bank outputs. In this 
approach, both loans and deposits are, therefore, treated as outputs and 
measured in terms of the number of accounts. This approach considers only 
operating costs and excludes the interest expenses paid on deposits since 
deposits are viewed as outputs (Kumar & Gulati, 2009). 
This study uses the intermediation approach because it is best suited for 
analysing bank level efficiency (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). To define inputs 
and outputs, we use a variation of the intermediation approach, which was 
originally developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) and has been widely 
adopted: it suggests that total loans are outputs, whereas deposits along with 
labour and capital are inputs. Cost figures corresponding to these inputs are 
interest expenses, personnel expenses, and other operating costs.  
This study employs inputs variables in deposits (customer’s deposits) and 
labour (personnel expenses of bank staff such as salaries and wages). In line 
with Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), the output (Q) is proxied by the value of 
                                                          
12 Number of banks per country is presented in Appendix 6.A. 
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the total assets as the output variable. The prices for the input variables are 
defined as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits as proxy for price of 
deposits, 𝑝1 price of labour (Beccalli et al., 2006); 𝑝2 is the ratio of personal 
expenses to total assets. In accordance with the assumed constraint of linear 
homogeneity in prices, TC and p1 are normalised by the price of labour, p2 
(Berger & Mester, 1997), and the approximation of input portion equations 
using Shepherd’s Lemma constraint is avoided. Appendix B provides a 
summary of the inputs and outputs employed. 
6.3.2 Estimation of bank efficiency 
To measure the cost and profit efficiency frontier, we build on the study by 
Maudos et al. (2002) and employ the SFA approach used by Aigner et al. 
(1977) as well as Meeusen and van der Broeck (1977). 
In the SFA, the specification of the functional form of the frontier is assumed 
to contain an error term with two components: a non-negative random 
variable representing production inefficiencies, and a random error term. The 
random error considers the measurement error and other random factors 
together with the total effects of unspecified input variables in the production 
function. Further we also employ the BC (1995) model of a stochastic frontier 
function for panel data. This model is a one-step procedure in which the 
stochastic frontier is quantified using the Fourier flexible functional form, 
while the level of firm inefficiency is determined by a vector of country-specific 
factors that are hypothesised to affect inefficiency. The key reason for 
specifying variables is to avoid bias in efficiency models which has been 
identified in the banking literature (Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-
Vivas et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002). 
The BC model has several other methodological advantages. First, it controls 
for environmental differences across the countries and examines the effects 
of these variables on estimated efficiency scores. Second, it decreases several 
of the variances present in the two-step approach. The BC methodology 
essentially allows for a firm-specific and time-varying intercept shift in the 
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distribution of the inefficiency term, and this intercept shift is itself a function 
of the exogenous environmental variables that vary across countries.  
Panel data condition of a translog function is specified by: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶(𝑦𝑖, 𝑡; 𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝑖,𝑡  …(6.1) 
Where TC represents the total operating cost and yi and wi are vectors of 
outputs and input prices and: 
𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  …(6.2) 
Where vi,t is the variable that captures the errors in approximation and ui,t 
captures inefficiency. The multivariable cost function in its translog form 
























+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡






𝛽10𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 …(6.3)  
Where TC represents the total cost of a bank, comprised of, wi (i = 1, 2) where 
w1 is price of labour and w2 is the price of deposit funds; yi (i=1) is the output 
quantity where y1 is total assets; vi,t and μi,t are the error terms presumed to 
have a normal distribution and truncated distribution. In addition, consistent 
with Maudos et al. (2002), the study includes (equity) proxied by financial 
capital, E as a control for banks’ degree of risk. A year dummy, year, is 
included to control the effect of technological improvements of efficiency. The 
study also uses the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification under a postulation 
of a truncated normal random distribution when estimating the translog 
models. 
6.3.3 Estimation of income diversification 
To measure income diversification levels, we assume that there are two 
elements of a bank’s net operating income, that is: net interest income (net) 
and non-interest income (non). The net variable is calculated as total interest 
revenue minus total interest expenses, and the non-interest income variable 
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is calculated as the sum of net commission fees, net trading profit/loss and 
other non-interest income (Gurbuz et al., 2013). The sum of the net interest 
and non-interest income is the net operating income of a bank. To diversify 
its income, a bank must diversify its sources of net operating income among 
net interest income and non-interest income components. When the values of 
net interest income and non-interest income are equal to each other in a bank, 
this bank is accepted as fully diversified (Gurbuz et al., 2013). To measure 
the income diversification level of each bank, we calculate the widely used 
HHI for all banks,13 calculated as follows: 











  A higher value of the hhi reflects concentration while a lower value reflects 
diversification. The specification in Equation 6.4 indicates that increased 
values of hhidiv indicate very diversified bank income and vice versa (Alhassan, 
2015). 
6.3.4 Model estimation 
To estimate the hypothesised relationship between bank efficiency and 
income diversification the study uses the efficiency cost and profit estimates 
as the dependent variable in a second stage regression analysis employing a 
fixed effects regression model. The advantage of using the fixed effects panel 
estimator is that it allows us to analyse the impact of variables that vary over 
time. Another merit of the model is that it allows us to remove the effect of 
time-invariant characteristics, so we can assess the net effect of the predictors 
on the outcome variable. Lastly, the fixed effects model allows us to deal with 
unobserved heterogeneity when heterogeneity is persistent over time and 
correlated with independent variables. 
This empirical association between cost and profit efficiency and bank income 
diversification is in consistent with studies Gaganis et al. (2013) as well as 
Alhassan (2015): 
                                                          
13 HHI is measured as the sum of the squared market share of each bank in each country 
for each year. Market shares are measured in percentages.  
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𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎℎ𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2ℎℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8ℎℎ𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 …(6.5) 
where hhidiv is used as a proxy for bank income diversification described above 
in Equation 6.4, and hhi2div is a quadratic measure for bank income 
diversification.  
In the quadratic model, a high correlation between hhidiv and hhi2div proposes 
that the results could indicate multicollinearity biases (Alhassan, 2015). To 
solve this challenge, the study undertakes centring of the hhidiv. This 
conversion is done by using the difference between the hhidiv and its average 
values to generate new hhidiv. The bank-specific variables used are 
constructed by use of data from the Bankscope database. The bank-level 
control variables used in this study are as follows: 
Bank size (size) is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Studies 
by Hauner (2005) and Chen et al. (2005), Isik and Hassan (2003), Girardone 
et al. (2004) and Weill (2004) have however found indecisive evidence on the 
relationship between bank size and efficiency. 
Asset quality, which is calculated as a ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
loans: this study expects that banks with low asset quality indicated by a high 
lp will have a high level of inefficiency (Alhassan, 2015).  
Eq is the variable used to control for regulatory conditions of the bank. A 
higher ratio of equity/total assets refers to risk aversion and protection to 
bank default risk (Gurbuz et al., 2013). This variable is also used in most of 
the recent studies in income diversification literature (Sanya & Wolfe, 2011; 
Chiorazzo et al., 2008). 
Another variable used is the liquidity risk (Lota), which is calculated as the 
ratio of total loans to total assets. This arises from the possible inability of 
banks to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund increases on the 
assets side of the balance sheet and is considered an important determinant 
of bank efficiency. The loans market, especially credit to households and 
firms, is risky but also has a greater expected return than other bank assets, 
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such as government securities, thus one would expect a positive relationship 
between liquidity and efficiency (Bourke, 1989; Sufian et al., 2010).  
Lastly, we use the fixed asset to total assets ratio (Tang) as a measure of the 
extent to which fixed assets are financed by owners’ equity (capital). 
6.4 Results and discussion 
6.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 6.1 indicates the summary statistics of the potential correlates of bank 
efficiency that are used in this study. The mean value of HHI variable in our 
sample (0.401) specifies that banks in the Frontier Market African countries 
are not as concentrated in the interest income generating activities over the 
sample period. The mean value of eq variable (equity/total assets) is fairly 
high (0.144). The lota variable has an average that is greater than 50% (0.531) 
this may indicate a greater risk appetite for bank managers. The mean value 
of bank asset quality in Frontier African banks over the period 2005–2012 is 
relatively low (0.02) and this could also be a reason for the high level of risk 
in most of these banking systems. 
Table 6.1: Potential correlates of bank efficiency 
  Mean SD Min Max n 
Hhidiv 0.401 0.238 -3.75 0.500 1084 
Lnta 10.082 2.787 1.194 15.253 1081 
Asset quality 0.02 0.03 -0.143 0.343 1035 
Eq 0.144 0.122 -0.152 0.991 1073 
Lota 0.531 0.185 0 0.987 1078 
 
Notes:  hhidiv, 1-Herfindahl index for income 
lnta, log of total assets 
asset quality, loan loss provisions to total loans 
eq, equity to total assets  
lota, loans to total assets  
 
In line with Alhassan (2015), before the estimation of the regression models, 
the study tests for collinearity amongst the independent variables. The 
correlation analysis results show a weak collinearity among the independent 
variables. The analysis uses a threshold of 0.70 as proposed by Kennedy 
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(2008), which indicates that estimation of the regression models would not be 
biased by multicollinearity. The correlation matrix is shown in Appendix 6C. 
The cost and profit efficiency estimates are presented in Table 6.2. Generally, 
the study shows that there are relatively higher cost efficiency values for 
Frontier African banks over the study period. 
An average cost effieciency (CE) of 84.77% specifies that the average Frontier 
African bank in the sample functions at about 15% below the efficient frontier. 
This also indicates the capacity of banks to display higher levels of technical 
and allocative efficiency. The CE estimates are also in line with what Das and 
Ghosh (2006) found in the Indian banks between 1992 and 2004, and 
Alhassan (2015) found for Ghanaian banks. 
The average profit efficiency (PE) indicates that on average Frontier African 
banks are able to attain 79.7% of their potential revenue as opposed to banks 
on the efficient frontier. The diffusion in CE is lower as opposed to the 
diffusion in the PE in the period of study. This result is in line with other 
studies that find higher levels of CE than profit efficiency in the banking 
industry (see Berger & Mester, 1997; Maudos et al., 2002; Kasman & Yildirim, 
2006; Das & Ghosh, 2006; Pasiouras et al., 2008 and Alhassan, 2015). 
In addition, we observe that both profit and cost efficiency scores remained 
stable with slight variation over the period of study. This could indicate that 




Table 6.2: Profit and cost efficiency estimates 
 Uganda Ghana Tunisia Kenya Mauritius Morocco Nigeria SA Botswana TZ 
 Profit Efficiency 
2005 . 0.861 0.856 0.828 0.789 0.780 0.557 0.674 0.857 0.793 
2006 . 0.787 0.858 0.828 0.796 0.790 0.798 0.856 0.857 0.809 
2007 0.768 0.758 0.856 0.780 0.796 0.793 0.829 0.853 0.860 0.776 
2008 0.774 0.783 0.858 0.775 0.813 0.796 0.801 0.833 0.857 0.754 
2009 0.738 0.855 0.859 0.767 0.811 0.789 0.804 0.796 0.858 0.747 
2010 0.752 0.863 0.857 0.754 0.804 0.786 0.778 0.777 0.854 0.737 
2011 0.878 0.868 0.857 0.769 0.798 0.762 0.799 0.749 0.759 0.696 
2012 0.914 0.873 0.856 0.748 0.800 0.741 0.787 0.729 0.817 0.640 
Average 0.801 0.838 0.856 0.763 0.799 0.762 0.793 0.791 0.824 0.743 
 Uganda Ghana Tunisia Kenya Mauritius Morocco Nigeria SA Botswana TZ 
 Cost Efficiency 
2005 . 0.904 0.778 0.862 0.821 0.786 0.715 0.912 0.923 0.907 
2006 . 0.854 0.781 0.846 0.769 0.849 0.920 0.896 0.897 0.896 
2007 0.935 0.844 0.772 0.793 0.833 0.845 0.889 0.877 0.913 0.892 
2008 0.933 0.844 0.737 0.806 0.807 0.860 0.876 0.869 0.886 0.867 
2009 0.923 0.859 0.724 0.794 0.848 0.852 0.855 0.865 0.858 0.851 
2010 0.910 0.828 0.683 0.742 0.829 0.845 0.851 0.842 0.827 0.826 
2011 0.906 0.747 0.631 0.739 0.790 0.819 0.822 0.782 0.806 0.804 
2012 0.894 0.798 0.869 0.804 0.778 0.864 0.833 0.745 0.860 0.797 
Average 0.902 0.843 0.774 0.816 0.830 0.857 0.862 0.862 0.874 0.857 
Source: Authors estimations  
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6.4.2 Income diversification and bank efficiency 
In this second stage of the analysis, we look at the effects of income 
diversification on both cost and profit bank efficiency using the fixed effect 
regression model, while controlling for the effects of other relevant bank-
specific variables. In order to determine the most suitable panel data 
estimation approach between fixed and random effects, the study uses the 
results of the Hausman specification test.  
The estimation results presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 indicate both the 
random effects and fixed effects results. We include the random effects results 
as a check for robustness. 
Table 6.3: Income diversification and cost efficiency 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 Coeff. Z P>z Coeff. z P>z 
Constant 0.853*** 15.87 0.000 0.826*** 31.17 0.000 
hhidiv 0.244*** 5.56 0.000 0.194*** 4.95 0.000 
hhi2div 0.064*** 5.53 0.000 0.051*** 4.81 0.000 
Asset Quality -0.109 -0.77 0.443 0.030 0.24 0.808 
Equity -0.057 -0.76 0.447 0.022*** 0.41 0.000 
Lota 0.062*** 3.69 0.000 -0.071* -2.59 0.01 
Tang 0.076 0.56 0.578 0.045 0.49 0.623 




52.4   43.89   
Prob > X2 0.000   0.000   
R-Squared 0.468   0.436   
Year Dummy Yes   Yes   
Countries 10   10   
Observations 958   958   
Notes: CE, cost efficiency scores from SFA; hhidiv, 1-Herfindahl index for income; equity = equity to total 
assets; lota, loans to total assets; tang, fixed assets to total assets; 
 *, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively 
 
In Table 6.3, we observe a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the linear term of hhidiv and Cost Efficiency at 1%. The result 
highlights that increasingly diversified banks possess a high cost efficiency. 
The study also looked at the non-linear relation between bank efficiency and 
diversification, and presented a quadratic term of diversification, hhi2 div to 
157 
 
study this effect. The quadratic term, hhi2div is also positively related to Cost 
Efficiency (CE) and is significant at the 1% level. This specifies that hhidiv has 
a cumulative marginal effect on CE. It also shows that banks can take 
advantage of economies of scope and operate at lower unit cost. In addition, 
efficiency improvements also increase at higher levels of diversification. The 
result proposes that increased diversification into non-interest generating 
activities is efficiency-enhancing. These results are consistent with the 
conglomeration hypothesis. 
Table 6.4: Income diversification and profit efficiency 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 Coeff. Z P>z Coeff. Z P>z 
Constant 0.844*** 14.27 0.000 0.863*** 20.2 0.000 
hhidiv 0.078* 1.54 0.012 0.082* 1.69 0.010 
hhi2div 0.021* 1.59 0.011 0.022* 1.73 0.083 
Asset Quality 0.294* 1.69 0.010 0.174 1.06 0.289 
Equity 0.052 0.62 0.447 0.011 0.15 0.880 
Lota 0.025 0.64 0.524 0.036 1.02 0.310 
Tang 0.076 0.56 0.578 0.045 0.49 0.623 
Size -0.007 0.91 0.204 
-




17.3   18.8   
Prob > X2 0.000   0.000   
R-Squared 0.634   0.612   
Year Dummy Yes   Yes   
Countries 10   10   
Observations 799   799   
 
Notes:  PE, profit efficiency scores from SFA  
 hhidiv, 1-Herfindahl index for income  
 equity = equity to total assets  
 lota, loans to total assets  
 tang, fixed assets to total assets  
 *, **, *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively 
 
Relating to profit efficiency (Table 6.4), the linear value sustains the positive 
sign at 10% and the quadratic term is positive and significant at 10%. This 
may suggest that banks benefit from revenue side efficiencies at reduced 
levels of diversification into non-interest generation actions. In addition, at 
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higher levels of diversification, we see that Frontier African banks can further 
improve their income creation to counterbalance any extra cost linked to the 
increase in non-interest generating activities. 
In addition, the study indicates a positive but insignificant relationship 
between bank size and CE. The result highlights the economies of scale and 
scope benefits linked to large banking scale and this is consistent with the 
studies by Vu and Turnell (2011) as well as Alhassan (2015). We however 
observe a negative and insignificant relationship between size and profit 
efficiency. 
Bank equity exhibits an insignificant and negative relationship with cost 
efficiency. The result specifies that banks with increased equity capital are 
more cost inefficient. Conversely, we observe an insignificant and positive 
relation between equity and profit efficiency. This indicates that banks with 
high equity capital are more profit efficient. This is clarified by the importance 
played by bank equity capital as a cover for future losses. As a result, very 
capitalised banks most likely would operate on the profit frontier (Alhassan, 
2015). 
However, a positive and significant relationship between lota and cost 
efficiency, and a positive insignificant relationship with profit efficiency shows 
that improved intermediation actions cause an increase in both cost and profit 
efficiency. A reason for this could be that banks with a higher intermediation 
ratio have significantly lower costs and hence cost efficiency. This also be 
could be explained by an increase in the credit created. This in turn results 
in reduced loan defaults and an increase in interest income leading to 
increased profits.  
In addition, asset tangibility, has a negative relation to CE but has a positive 
relation to PE.  
Lastly, we observe a positive and significant relationship between asset quality 
and profit efficiency and a negative insignificant relationship with CE. 
6.5 Conclusion and recommendations 
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The financial reform and liberalisation over the past three decades in Africa 
has led to an increase in non-interest generating activities in commercial 
banks. This chapter studied the impact of bank income diversification on cost 
and profit efficiency of ten Frontier African countries from 2005 to 2012. SFA 
was used to measure cost and profit efficiency and the Herfindahl index 
employed to measure the diversification of bank income. The results indicate 
high revenue inefficiency, and this is evidenced by the high efficiency in cost 
as opposed to profit. Explicitly, across the sample we observe average 
efficiency in cost of 84.77% and average profit efficiency of 79.7%. These 
results tell us that Frontier African banks earn 20.3% less of possible revenue 
as opposed to more efficient banks and operate 15.23% below the efficient 
cost frontier. 
In the second stage, the fixed and random effects estimations were employed 
to examine the effect of income diversification and other bank specific 
variables on cost and profit efficiency. The outcome indicates an inverted U-
shaped relation between cost efficiency and income diversification. This infers 
that income diversification is efficiency-enhancing up to a point and after, the 
benefits are diminished. The same result is also observed for profit efficiency. 
This strongly proposes that diversification into non-interest generation can 
allow banks to increase their income. 
In line with Alhassan (2015), the results further propose that while 
intermediation activities improve Frontier African banks’ cost efficiency, they 
don’t assist banks to improve their revenue potential. We also observe that 
asset quality improves the banks’ PE with no significant effect on the CE. In 
addition, related bank factors are found to have no significant effect in aiding 
banks to take advantage of the advantages of income diversification. 
In conclusion, the results of this study propose that diversification into non-
interest generating activities enhances bank efficiency. The study also 
observes that the bank efficiency is attained at increased levels of 
diversification. This study gives useful insight to regulatory and bank 
authorities in Frontier market countries. Policymakers could for instance 
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focus on formulating strategies to maximise the probable benefit from non-
interest generating revenue streams. 
A major limitation of the study was the inability to collapse non-interest 
income into its different components as a result of missing data across the 
sample. This however presents a stimulating path for future research. The 
effect of foreign banks entry into the domestic market on bank efficiency is 
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Appendix 6A: Number of banks per country 













Appendix 6B: Variables used in the computation of bank competition 
Variable Description 
Inputs:  
Deposits Customers deposits 
Labour Personnel expenses of bank staff such as salaries and wages 
Outputs:  
Total Assets 
Sum of gross investments, cash and equivalents, receivables 
& other assets  
Input prices:  
Price of 
deposits Interest expenses divided by total deposits 
Price of labour Personnel expenses divided by the total assets 
 
Appendix 6C: Correlation matrix 
 hhidiv hhi2div eq lota inter assetqty 
       
hhidiv 1      
hhi2div -0.8807 1     
eq -0.1041 -0.002 1    
lota -0.0564 -0.032 0.1947 1   
inter -0.02 -0.0014 0.2116 0.0849 1  





IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON BANKING COMPETITION: 
EVIDENCE FROM FRONTIER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The banking sector plays a significant role in directing capital from savings to 
investment (Demirgüc-Kunt & Levine, 2001). The role performed by banks is 
however not just to mobilise and utilise savings, but also to certify the quality 
of borrowers and increase their probability of successful innovation to 
enhance productivity, and to monetise liabilities which otherwise would fail 
to find purchasers in the markets (Fama, 1985; Minsky, 1986; Moore, 1988; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1988; Lucchetti et al. 2001). With this background in mind, 
banking competitiveness is therefore of utmost importance as it fosters the 
relative ability of banks to efficiently utilise their resources to generate 
outputs. Studies on banking competitiveness help to yield important 
implications for financial institutions in areas of government policy, research, 
and managerial performance (see survey by Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The 
financial reform and development that has taken place in Africa over the past 
three decades has had a considerable effect on banking sector 
competitiveness. The results of this reform however vary across countries. 
One key reason for this variation could be the difference in the quality of 
institutions in the different countries. Marcelin and Mathur (2014) state that 
cross-country variations in institutional quality and their effect on financing 
options can have an impact on banking system performance.  
The idea of an institution is a complex concept that is understood differently 
by various scholars, and its definition has been an area of debate. Some 
scholars define institutions as rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and 
norms of behaviour that structure human interaction (North, 1990). For 
others, they are simply a set of constraints which govern the behavioural 
relations among individuals or groups (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). The World 
Bank defines institutions as “sets of formal and informal rules governing the 
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actions of individuals and organisations and the interactions of participants 
in the development process” (World Bank, 1999, pp 22,23). Through formal 
rules and informal norms and traditions, institutions determine what is 
acceptable and unacceptable to a society. This in turn enables the society to 
run in a smooth and efficient manner. Accordingly, the institutional 
environment may well affect the way in which banks conduct business and 
could ultimately be a determinant of banking competition. In many countries, 
political institutions for instance may be a catalyst to external finance by 
easing market tensions and facilitating greater access to finance, while in 
others, they may contribute to erecting barriers to finance (Marcelin &Mathur, 
2014).  
There have been several cross-country empirical studies on the determinants 
of banking competition (see Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Claessens & Laeven, 2004; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004; Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005; Fernández 
de Guevara & Maudos, 2007; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007; and Bikker et al., 
2007). These studies have identified various factors that positively or 
negatively determine bank competition. However, despite institutional quality 
having been found to have an impact on bank performance in reference to 
varying levels of bank competition, few studies have analysed this significant 
relation (see Abuzayed & Al-Fayoumi, 2016; Léon, 2015; Amidu & Wilson, 
2014; and Chen, 2008). All these studies are built largely on the institutional 
theories which highlight the importance of quality institutions in financial and 
economic development (North, 1990). These studies have furnished both 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the differences in institutional quality, 
however there remains a lack of comprehensive study on Frontier African 
countries. 
The study measures the relationship between institutional quality and bank 
competition in ten Frontier African countries over the period 2005-2012. The 
empirical analysis is executed in two stages. First, we calculate a measure of 
bank competition that is the H statistic derived from the Panzar–Rosse model. 
In the second stage, we carry out a simultaneous quantile regression to test 
the determinants of bank competition. Our contribution is twofold: (a) this 
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chapter seeks to contribute to the limited literature from Africa on the cross-
country determinants of banking competition, and (b) it creates a better 
understanding of the role of institutional quality in the financial and economic 
development of African economies. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 gives a brief 
overview of institutional quality in the Frontier African countries. Section 7.3 
provides a review of related literature. Section 7.4 gives a description of the 
data and the various measures employed in the study. The empirical results 
are presented in Section 7.5, and Section 7.6 concludes and gives policy 
recommendations. 
7.2  Overview of institutional quality in Frontier Africa 
Many African countries gained independence from their colonial masters in 
the late 1950s through to the 1960s. This period also saw increased 
development of social and economic institutions in these various countries. 
Most African countries underwent development of policies and reforms to 
accelerate their economic development. Because of these reforms most of 
these countries experienced a brief period of economic growth from the mid-
1960s to early 1970s. However, during this period, the financial sectors in 
most African countries operated under tight controls and investment was 
often directed into state-owned enterprises. The state’s growing role in the 
economy was enhanced by expansion of social services in the various African 
countries (Osman et al., 2011). However, during this period, many African 
countries also witnessed periods of bad governance, civil wars and rampant 
corruption. This led to a breakdown and failure in most of the reforms and 
policies that had been put in place post-independence. Under these 
conditions, important institutions in the countries, including the civil service 
and the judiciary, did not have the expected impact on economic development 
of the countries.  
The period from the 1990s saw a marked improvement in governance 
practices, liberalisation of the various economies and a reduced state role, 
and this coincided with reform in institutional quality in most African 
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countries. This period was also marked by a period of resurgence in economic 
growth in Africa (Fosu, 2015). However, despite the apparent reform of the 
institutional frameworks in most African countries, we still observe them 
scoring low across a series of institutional quality variables. The subject of 
poor institutional quality in most African countries has remained a concern 
for their development process, with a view that poor institutional quality is 
one of the main factors responsible for economic stagnation of sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
This overview looks at three estimates for institutional quality: control of 
corruption estimates, governance effectiveness estimates and regulatory 
quality estimates across the Frontier African countries under study for the 
period 2005-2012. 
Table 7.1: Control of corruption estimates 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Ghana -0.36 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.10 
Kenya -0.97 -0.87 -0.91 -1.03 -1.08 -0.94 -0.95 -1.09 
Nigeria -1.16 -1.07 -0.98 -0.81 -0.98 -1.00 -1.13 -1.15 
South Africa 0.58 0.43 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.03 -0.17 
Uganda -0.85 -0.75 -0.80 -0.83 -0.89 -0.90 -0.89 -0.98 
Tanzania -0.65 -0.22 -0.34 -0.42 -0.44 -0.54 -0.63 -0.80 
Botswana 1.14 0.90 0.94 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.98 0.92 
Morocco -0.30 -0.40 -0.32 -0.38 -0.31 -0.18 -0.40 -0.44 
Tunisia -0.09 -0.07 -0.11 -0.18 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 
Source: World Bank, 2016 
The control of corruption estimates capture perceptions of the level to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, comprising both small and large 
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private 
interests. The indicator is an index combining up to 23 different assessments 
and surveys, depending on availability, each of which receives a different 
weight, depending on its estimated precision and country coverage (WGI, 
2013).  The index ranges from −2.5 to 2.5 with a higher score meaning better 
control of corruption. Corruption is perceived as one of the principal 
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impediments to the development of an efficient government system, since it is 
conceived as a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management 
of the state (Rose-Ankerman, 1999). In Table 7.1, we observe that the country 
with the highest average control of corruption estimate is Botswana (0.97). 
Nigeria has the lowest average control of corruption across the sample (-1.04). 
The apparent high level of corruption in Nigeria has hindered the development 
of well-functioning transparent institutions in the country (Ogbewere, 2015). 
Apart from Botswana and South Africa, we observe that all the other countries 
in the study have a negative score on average across the years of study. This 
indicates that corruption is still a challenge for most of the Frontier African 
countries. 
Government effectiveness measures public perception on the quality of public 
services, civil service as well as its degree of independence from political 
pressure. This indicator also measures how the public perceives the quality 
of policy design, its implementation, and how credible the government's 
commitment to such policies is. The index ranges from −2.5 to 2.5 with a 
higher score meaning better government effectiveness. 
Effective governance implies smaller central government, greater devolution 
of power to local regional entities, and more rights to individuals and 
local/regional communities in deciding about resource utilisation and 
allocation. Effective governance helps to foster inclusive and well-organised 
institutions that encourage sustainable social and economic development. 
Table 7.2 below indicates government effectiveness estimates for the countries 
under study. Botswana (0.53) has the highest average estimate of effective 
governance across the sample, and Nigeria (-1.04) has the lowest average 
estimate of government effectiveness across the sample. The low governance 
effectiveness in Nigeria is reflected through a smaller tax base as well as 
inefficient government expenditure (PWC, 2016). 
Table 7.2: Government effectiveness estimates 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Ghana -0.16 0.11 0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 
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Kenya -0.67 -0.58 -0.50 -0.59 -0.60 -0.54 -0.56 -0.54 
Nigeria -0.88 -0.96 -1.04 -0.97 -1.20 -1.15 -1.08 -1.00 
South Africa 0.64 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.48 0.39 0.41 0.33 
Uganda -0.54 -0.48 -0.41 -0.57 -0.62 -0.52 -0.51 -0.57 
Tanzania -0.39 -0.34 -0.38 -0.48 -0.59 -0.58 -0.63 -0.69 
Botswana 0.66 0.52 0.59 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.45 
Morocco -0.26 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.15 -0.07 
Tunisia 0.42 0.58 0.47 0.31 0.40 0.24 0.03 -0.05 
Source: World Bank, 2016 
The regulatory quality estimates insights of the ability of the government to 
put in place and implement sound policies and regulations that allow for and 
promote development. The quality of regulation in African countries is of 
utmost importance and of key significance to the efficient operation of 
institutions. The index ranges from −2.5 to 2.5 with a higher score meaning 
better regulatory quality. Regulations provide an enabling environment for 
institutions to work smoothly. Some studies have indicated that financial 
institutions do not thrive in an institutional vacuum but need a regulatory 
environment where contracts are enforced, and bankers are given strong 
incentives to behave honestly (see Kaufmann et al., 1999; Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Levine, 1999; and Demetriades & Andrianova, 2004). Table 7.3 shows the 
regulatory quality in the Frontier countries under study. We observe the 
highest average estimate in regulatory quality from Botswana (0.53), followed 
by South Africa (0.49). The lowest regulatory quality estimates are observed 
in Nigeria (-0.77).  
Table 7.3: Regulatory quality estimates 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Ghana -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Kenya -0.23 -0.17 -0.23 -0.20 -0.13 -0.07 -0.21 -0.31 
Nigeria -0.77 -0.89 -0.86 -0.78 -0.73 -0.71 -0.67 -0.72 
South Africa 0.67 0.71 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.37 
Uganda -0.18 -0.20 -0.20 -0.22 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.24 
Tanzania -0.45 -0.37 -0.40 -0.50 -0.42 -0.41 -0.40 -0.40 
Botswana 0.67 0.50 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.69 
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Morocco -0.40 -0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 
Tunisia -0.11 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.19 -0.21 
Source: World Bank, 2016 
 
 
7.3  Literature review 
7.3.1 Institutional quality hypothesis 
The institutional quality hypothesis states that economic development is 
impacted by the institutional framework within which the economic agents 
interact with each other in an economy (Alexiou et al., 2014). The hypothesis 
further states that what matters most are the “rules of the game” in a society 
which is predefined by the prevailing explicit and implicit behavioural norms 
and their ability to create appropriate incentives for desirable economic 
behaviour (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003). Adam Smith (1776) in his seminal 
work emphasised that nations will prosper once they create the institutions 
that encourage entrepreneurship and savings. Most of the recent research on 
“institutional quality hypothesis” has been associated with North’s (1990) 
study to explore the relationship between economic performance and 
institutional factors. 
One of the basic institutional characteristics addressed in the relevant 
literature has been “economic freedom”. Studies by Scully (1988) and Dawson 
(2003) conclude that countries with economic freedom and policies that 
provide security of property, non-confiscatory taxes and enforcement of 
contracts promote development and experience better economic performance. 
Adkins and Savvides (2002), use data from 73 developed and developing 
countries for the period 1975-1990, and show that institutions that promote 
economic freedom have a positive effect on economic performance. In specific 
reference to the financial sector, the empirical literature that links economic 
freedom and banking performance is relatively recent with only a few studies 
available (Sufian & Habibullah, 2010; Sufian & Abdul Majid 2012; Chortareas 
et al., 2012). Sufian (2010) finds that overall economic freedom and business 
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freedom exerts positive impacts, implying that higher (lower) freedom on the 
activities that banks can undertake and entrepreneurs to start businesses 
increases (reduces) banks’ profitability.  
Political freedom is another characteristic that has been considered in the 
literature. One strand of the empirical research has looked at the extent to 
which more political freedom has led to less income inequality and to 
economic prosperity. For instance, studies by Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Sylwester (2002), Easterly (2001), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and 
Granato et al. (1996) report that countries with greater civil liberties have 
lower levels of income inequality and as such better economic development. 
Engerman et al. (2000) argue that high inequality provides a high level of 
unbalanced access to economic opportunities, and that the route of causality 
flows from inequality to democracy and, in turn, to other institutions, without 
ruling out the reverse relation. Political freedom can then offer an enabling 
environment for the financial sector to grow. 
The study on institutions has also looked at aspects such as corruption, 
quality of bureaucracy and rule of law to mention but a few. With respect to 
corruption, early works by Huntington (1968) and Leff (1964) supported the 
view that corruption may aid bureaucracy and positively affect the economy, 
whereas De Soto (1989) and Krueger (1974) argued the opposite. Although 
these models gained some credibility in the 1980s, they suffered from a lack 
of empirical justification. Using survey data from the World Economic Forum 
and World Bank, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) and Wei (2000) found that 
corruption increases the degree of regulatory burden on economic agents. In 
the financial sector, corruption can be a proxy for several exogenous 
influences including institutional quality and riskiness. However, the 
literature has paid relatively little attention to the nexus between corruption 
and financial performance (see Beck et al., 2006 and Huang & Wei, 2006). 
Overall, the literature shows that various institutional characteristics have 
had an influence on the economic development of countries. We also see that 
they can directly impact the financial sector in various ways. This evidence 
further suggests that to understand why some banks are more competitive 
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than others, we should understand the impact that the various institutional 
characteristics have on bank productivity.  
 
 
7.3.2 Banking competition 
In theory, the causes of bank competition stem from two contrasting theories; 
the contestability theory and the efficiency hypothesis. The efficiency 
hypothesis says that well managed and more efficient firms can attain the 
largest market share, thus leading to higher concentration and more market 
power (Demsetz, 1974; Peltzman, 1977). The contestability theory, on the 
other hand, states that a concentrated banking market can still behave 
competitively if the entry barriers for potential newcomers are limited (see 
Baumol, 1982 and Bikker & Finnie, 2007). This section of the literature review 
looks at the determinants of bank competition in particular market structure, 
macroeconomic variables and quality of institutions. 
The degree of bank competition has been linked to productive efficiency 
(Maudos & Fernandez de Guavara, 2007), and this study indicates that 
productive efficiency is gained when outputs are produced at the lowest cost. 
Schure and Wagenvoort (1999) use results from Italian banks to show that 
these banks achieved productive efficiency post 1993, and this was a time 
where Angelini and Cetorelli (2000) describe the banks in Italy as competitive. 
In addition, Evenoff and Ors (2002) link bank competition in the United States 
of America with increased productive efficiency. The market structure has 
been considered as a major determinant of competition.  
The SCP suggests a positive relation between bank concentration and profit 
(Weiss, 1989). There is also indication that increased concentration boosts 
profits and leads to broader spreads between lending and deposit rates 
(Clarke et al., 2003). Bikker et al. (2007) infer this to mean that concentration 
can impair bank competition. However, Yeyati and Micco (2007) argue that 
more concentrated banking markets are not necessarily less competitive, and 
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this is because mergers often reduce duplication of activities and increase 
efficiency.  
Bank competition is also influenced by bank ownership (Micco et al., 2007; 
Angelini & Cetorelli, 2003; Maudos & Nagore, 2005; Fernandez de Guevara et 
al., 2005). Claessens et al. (2001) highlights that there is an indirect and 
positive effect of the contribution made by foreign banks in concentrated 
domestic banks from eighty countries. The entry of foreign banks into a 
domestic market puts pressure on domestic bank profitability and encourages 
competition. A study by Simpasa (2013) provides evidence of increased 
competitive behaviour because of foreign bank entrance in Zambia. 
Banking competition is also contingent on convenience of substitute-financial 
products and services (Corvoisier & Gropp, 2002), bank regulation, 
diversification into other non-interest activities (Winton, 1997) and bank size 
(Bikker et al., 2006). Bikker et al. (2006) contend that large banks tend to 
have a bigger market share: this means that markets with large banks have 
high concentration rates. Further, the relative market power proposition says 
that small banks only serve as a competitive frontier (Skully & Perera, 2012).  
In addition, banking competition is linked to macroeconomic variables such 
inflation (Claessens & Laeven, 2005). Revell (1979) suggests that inflation 
could significantly affect bank performance by increasing the industry’s 
operational expenses. Perry (1992) suggests that the effect of inflation on bank 
performance depends on the degree of precision of the industry in estimating 
its inflationary expectations. 
7.4  Data and methodology 
The data used in the study was obtained from the Bankscope database and 
the World Bank. The sample is drawn from ten African Frontier Market 
countries over the period 2008-2012. All the variables are obtained from the 
various countries’ balance sheet and income statement information on the 
Bankscope database. The data on institutional quality was obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicator database. The indicators measure 
various dimensions of governance such as voice and accountability, 
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government effectiveness, political instability, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption. We used three of the six governance indicators: 
voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and control of corruption. This is 
after we ran the test of correlation, where we checked the correlations among 
the banking variables and firm-characteristic variables for possible 
multicollinearity issues. Most of the correlation coefficients are minimal and 
below 0.8, making it possible to include these variables in the models. 
Appendix 7.A presents the correlation matrix and Appendix 7.B presents a 
description for all variables used. 
The first step in this study is to measure the level of banking competition in 
the Frontier African countries. With regard to empirical measurement of 
banking competition one can consider three types of approaches: market 
structure and associated indicators; contestability and regulatory indicators 
to gauge contestability; and formal competition measures (Claessens, 2009). 
In this study, we consider the market structure approach and we implement 
the Panzar-Rosse (PR) methodology to estimate banking competition. The 
second step of the analysis involves breaking down the different distributions 
of institutional quality by the use of a simultaneous quantile regression. 
7.4.1 The PR model 
We use the PR technique because of its sound theoretical foundations and 
empirical appeal. The H-statistic is an indicator of the degree of market 
competition developed in the context of the NEIO (Panzar & Rosse, 1987). It 
is based on the premise that monopolistic theory implies that the revenue of 
a monopolist falls as marginal cost rises and the H-statistic is interpreted as 
follows:  
The H-statistic is equal to zero or negative when the competitive structure is 
a monopoly or a perfectly colluding oligopoly.  
When H-statistic is equal to 1, this indicates perfect competition:  
0 < H < 1 indicates monopolistic competition.  
178 
 
H can be interpreted as a continuous measure of the level of competition, 
between 0 and 1, in the sense that higher values of the H-statistic indicate 
stronger competition than lower values. 
The advantage of using the PR technique is that it allows for bank specific 
differences in the reduced form revenue function, and the derivation of the PR 
H-statistic in this study is based upon the work of Bikker and Haaf (2002). It 
also assumes that banks have revenue and cost functions, respectively given 
as:  
𝑅𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑛, 𝑧𝑖) and 𝐶𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑤𝑖, 𝑡𝑖)  
where Ri and Ci are the revenue and cost of bank i, n is the number of banks, 
and zi and ti are vectors of exogenous variables relevant respectively to the 
revenue and cost functions. Following a profit maximisation path requires 
that marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. That is: 
𝑅𝑖
′(𝑦𝑖, 𝑛, 𝑧𝑖) = 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑦𝑖, 𝑤𝑖, 𝑡𝑖)  …(7.1)  
where Ri’ and Ci’ are respectively the marginal revenue and marginal costs of 




∗, 𝑛∗, 𝑧𝑖) = 𝐶𝑖
∗(𝑦𝑖
∗, 𝑤𝑖, 𝑡𝑖)  …(7.2)  
where the variables with asterisks are the equilibrium values of the previously 
defined variables in Equation 7.1. 














 is the derivative of total revenue with respect to the price of the kth 
input. 
7.4.2 Quantile regression approach 
Koenker and Basset (1978) first developed the conditional quantile regression 
approach. The study employs this approach because of the heterogeneous 
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distribution of diverse levels of bank competition across the countries in the 
sample. Further, the approach is useful in tracking the whole spread of bank 
competition and is provisional upon against a choice of explanatory variables 
for institutional quality and the macroeconomy. Further, since the sample 
comprises large outliers and the distribution of the disturbances is not 
normal, applying conditional mean estimators to the equation would not be 
suitable since these estimators are not robust to departures from normality 
or long tail error distributions, and therefore OLS is likely to lead to inefficient 
and biased estimates. By contrast, quantile regression is robust to departures 
from normality and skewed tails (Mata & Machado, 1996). 
In addition, the QR technique is particularly useful because it is a robust 
method, but also because it is able to compute several regression curves 
corresponding to different conditional quantiles in the distribution. It 
robustness comes from the fact that the QR method fits hyperplanes among 
the observations so that a certain proportion θ of the observations will be 
below of the hyperplane and the rest above it 
In the equation (𝑐𝑖, 𝑧𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛 is a sample from a population where xi is a 
(k x 1) vector of regressors. The study assumes that the λth quantile of the 
conditional distribution of 𝑐𝑖  is linear in 𝑧𝑖 , we can therefore present the 
conditional quantile regression model as follows: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽𝜆 + 𝜇𝜆𝑖 
𝑄𝜆(𝑐𝑖|𝑧𝑖) = 0 
And 𝑄𝜆(𝑐𝑖│𝑧𝑖) represents the λth conditional quantile of 𝑐𝑖  in the vector of 
regressors 𝑧𝑖;  𝛽𝜆  is the unknown vector of parameters to be measured for 
different values of λ in (0, 1); and 𝜇𝜆𝑖  is the error term. The error term is 
presumed to have a differentiable c.d.f. Γ𝜇𝜆(· │𝑧), and a density function 𝑘𝜇𝜆(·
│𝑧). Further Γ𝑖(· │𝑧 ) signifies the conditional distribution function of c. In 
changing the value of h from 0 to 1, the study tracks the whole distribution 
of c conditional upon z. 








Where 𝛤𝜆(μ) is the ‘verifying’ function that is defined as 
𝛤𝜆(𝜇) {
𝜆𝜇      𝑖𝑓 𝜇 ≥ 0
(𝜆 − 1)𝜇 𝑖𝑓 𝜇 < 0
 
The estimator does not have an explicit form; however, the subsequent 
minimisation problem can be described by use of linear programming 
methods. Two approaches are used for the approximation of the covariance 
matrix of the regression parameter vector: the first generates the asymptotic 
standard error of the estimator while the second uses bootstrap methods to 
calculate these standard errors and construct confidence intervals, as 
suggested by Amstrong et al. (1979). 
Following an approach used by Chen (2008), this paper employs the design 
matrix bootstrap approach to produce measures of the standard errors for the 
coefficients in the quantile regression14. The approach is good because it can 
be used with small samples and is robust to changes in the bootstrap sample 
size relative to the data sample size (Buchinsky, 1995). However, significantly, 
the design matrix bootstrap method is effective under different cases of 
heterogeneity. 
We also employ the percentile method constructed by Koenker and Hallock 
(2001). The technique permits for the construction of confidence intervals for 
each parameter in 𝛽𝛾, when the intervals are calculated from the empirical 
distribution of the bootstrapped𝛽𝛾’s. The advantage of using the bootstrap 
percentile confidence intervals is that they are not symmetric around the 
basic parameter estimate.  
7.4.3 Empirical specification 
The empirical model is detailed and measured using the quantile regression 
approach below: 
                                                          
14 See Buchinsky, 1995 and 1998. 
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𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘
6
𝑘=1
X 𝐼𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆1 𝑋 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃) + 𝜆2 𝑋 log(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝜇𝑗,𝑡 
The equation is employed to examine if institutional quality, proxied by 
IQuality, has an impact on bank competition, which is estimated by comp or 
otherwise proxied by the H-statistic. A comprehensive description of the 
definitions used is provided in Appendix 7.B 
 
7.5  Results 
This section presents the estimation results of the PR model for the Frontier 
African countries as well as results from the simultaneous regression model 
to determine the effect of institutional quality on banking competition.  
7.5.1 H-statistic 
The PR model stipulates that banks should be studied whilst in long-run 
equilibrium. Thus, a Wald test is carried out to find out if the E-statistic is 
statistically significant from zero. The H-statistic estimates are all statistically 
significantly different from both zero and unity. The existence of long-run 
equilibrium is thus not rejected, as indicated in Appendix 7. C. 
Table 7.4 shows that the H-statistics are positive and statistically significant 
for all the Frontier African countries banking markets. The average H-statistic 
for all the Frontier market countries is 0.613. The highest levels of competition 
on average are observed in South Africa (0.902), and the lowest average levels 
in Tanzania (0.243). 
The findings suggest that the banking markets in the Frontier African 
countries are characterised by monopolistic competitive behaviour. Thus, 
competition coexists with high levels of banking market concentration, 
suggesting contestable market behaviour. This is in line with Fosu (2013) and 
Motelle (2013) who find that the banking market in selected SSA countries 
are monopolistically competitive. Given that most of the studies on banking 
competition (See section 7.3.2) report results that are consistent with 
monopolistic competition, the findings of this study suggest that recent 
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financial sector reforms in Africa may have had some beneficial effects in 
terms of market discipline.
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The trend in competition is stable most of the countries, with significant 
reduction in competition across the whole sample over 2007 to 2008. This 
could for instance imply that the Frontier African banking industry 
experienced structural transformation over this period. 
Table 7.4: Panzer Rosse H-Statistic: panel fixed effect estimation 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Uganda 0.686 0.726 0.784 0.709 0.685 0.755 0.794 0.816 
Ghana 0.346 0.315 0.526 0.363 0.457 0.387 0.502 0.498 
Tunisia 0.666 0.787 0.841 0.690 0.640 0.674 0.788 0.768 
Kenya 0.341 0.343 0.445 0.333 0.344 0.379 0.471 0.483 
Mauritius 0.625 0.649 0.766 0.635 0.580 0.638 0.691 0.708 
Morocco 0.604 0.756 0.792 0.632 0.640 0.730 0.866 0.898 
Nigeria 0.447 0.475 0.637 0.510 0.503 0.528 0.691 0.706 
South Africa 0.844 0.887 0.973 0.831 0.833 0.890 0.916 0.913 
Botswana 0.453 0.565 0.677 0.547 0.565 0.579 0.697 0.718 
Tanzania 0.127 0.163 0.324 0.184 0.211 0.190 0.303 0.272 
Source: Authors estimations from Research Data 
7.5.2 Simultaneous quantile regression 
Table 7.5 presents the simultaneous quantile regression estimates in five 
different quantiles (10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90%) corresponding to 
competition measures of H-statistic. The coefficients of the regulatory quality 
variable are positive and significant with bank competition proxied by H-
statistic as the dependent variable in both the OLS as well as the quantile 
regression model. Specifically, the estimates highlight that the scale of the 
estimated positive effects of regulatory quality progressively increases from 
the 10th quantile to the 75th quantile of the distribution in bank competition, 
suggesting that better regulatory quality will boost competition in the banking 
industry across the different Frontier Africa countries. For example, the 
regulatory quality coefficient as the dependent variable of the H-statistic is 
0.309, 0.343 and 0.459 at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles, respectively. 
As the quantiles increase, the magnitude of the regulatory quality coefficient 
also increases. The results could suggest that countries with high regulatory 
quality derive more value from more banking competition than countries with 
lower levels of regulatory quality for the same degree of bank competition. A 
similar study by Chen (2008) indicates that the availability of a positive result 
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for regulatory quality indicates that high regulatory quality provides better 
operating flexibility in response to financial stability. 
We also observe that control of corruption has a positive effect on bank 
competition up until the 50th quantile and thereafter has a negative effect on 
bank competition. This means that at a higher quantile control of corruption, 
regulations have a negative effect on bank competition. This may occur 
because government rules and procedures in this regard may delay 
transactions and thus reduce overall efficiency and consequently affect bank 
competition (Batabyal & Yoo, 2007). Voice and accountability are observed to 
impact bank competition negatively across all the quantiles but a positive 
relationship with bank competition at the 90th quantile for the Frontier African 
countries under study. These results could indicate that countries that have 
high levels of control of corruption and voice and accountability derive less 
value from more banking competition.  
The results also indicate an increasing negative effect of bank inflation on 
bank competition (-0.002, -0.033, -0.043, -0.046 and -0.076) at the 10th, 25th, 
50th, 75th and 90th quantiles. We observe an increasing positive relationship 
between GDP and bank competition across the 10th to the 90th quantiles.  
Table 7.5: Simultaneous Quantile Regression 
      
Dependant Variable: Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic 












Constant  -3,066 -2,342 -2,193 -0,416 -0,046 
Control of Corruption 0,046 0,068 0,043 -0,193 -0,145 
Regulatory Quality 0,403 0,309 0,343 0,459 0,203 
Voice and Accountability -0,159 -0,102 -0,127 -0,063 0,038 
Log(inflation) -0,002 -0,033 -0,043 -0,046 -0,076 
Log(GDP) 0,143 0,120 0,117 0,048 0,040 
      
Number of Observations 98 98 98 98 98 





7.6  Conclusion and recommendations 
The liberalisation policies carried out in the 1990s led to the development and 
reform of institutions in most African countries. Against this background, this 
chapter examined the impact of institutional quality on bank completion in 
Frontier African banking. A two-stage approach was employed: in stage one, 
the H-statistic was used to measure the extent of competition, and in the 
second stage, the quantile regression was used to estimate the variances in 
bank competition caused by the impact of institutional quality in the sample 
of Frontier African countries.  
The empirical findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
regulatory quality and bank competition. The study highlights that the scale 
of the estimated positive effects of regulatory quality progressively rises from 
the 10th quantile to the 75th quantile of the distribution in bank competition, 
signifying that improved regulatory quality will boost competition in banking. 
However, we observe a negative relationship between control of corruption, 
voice and accountability, and bank competition.  
This study makes the following policy recommendations. First, we observe a 
negative relationship between control of corruption, voice and accountability 
and bank competition. Policy makers need to formulate policies that remove 
or modify the inefficient rules that lead to the negative impact of control of 
corruption measures as well as issues around voice and accountability. In 
addition, policy makers should design policies that consider the capacity of 
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Appendix 7.A: Correlation matrix  
 
 Corruption Voice & Acc Reg qty GDP Inflation 
Corruption 1     
Voice & Acc 0,6548 1    
Reg qty 0,7361 0,7327 1   
GDP -0,359 -0,2655 -0,341 1  
Inflation -0,118 0,2001 -0,181 -0,063 1 
 
 
Appendix 7B: Description of variables used 
Variable Definition Source  
H-statistic Measured as the sum of the elasticities of 
a bank's total revenue in respect to that 
bank’s input prices 




Sum of the squares of the bank sizes 
measured as market shares 
Bankscope and Author’s 
calculation  
    
Voice and 
Accountability 
Index for voice and accountability, for 
2005-2012 
World Governance 
Indicators (2016)  
Political Stability Index for political stability, for 2005-2012 
World Governance 
Indicators (2016)  
Government 
Effectiveness  
 Index for government effectiveness, for 
2005-2012 
World Governance 
Indicators (2016)  
Regulatory Quality 
Index for regulatory quality, for 2005-
2012 
World Governance 
Indicators (2016)  
Rule of Law Index for the rule of law, for 2005-2012 
World Governance 
Indicators (2016)  
Control of 
Corruption 
Index for the control of corruption, for 
2005- 2012 
World Governance 
Indicators (2016)  
    




Logarithm of gross domestic product in 








Appendix 7C: Results from Wald test  
 
Uganda 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,686 45,15 0,000 9,44 0,0021 
2006 0,726 41,08 0,000 5,85 0,0156 
2007 0,784 70,78 0,000 5,39 0,0203 
2008 0,709 70,51 0,000 11,9 0,0006 
2009 0,685 62,83 0,000 13,24 0,0003 
2010 0,755 60,45 0,000 6,37 0,0116 
2011 0,794 81,98 0,000 5,5 0,019 
2012 0,816 83,32 0,000 4,24 0,0395 
 
Ghana 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,3463 18,82 0,0000 67,08 0,0000 
2006 0,3155 11,93 0,0006 56,17 0,0000 
2007 0,5258 39,66 0,0000 32,26 0,0000 
2008 0,3633 19,68 0,0000 60,45 0,0000 
2009 0,4574 35,71 0,0000 50,24 0,0000 
2010 0,3868 22,17 0,0000 55,72 0,0000 
2011 0,5017 38,33 0,0000 37,82 0,0000 
2012 0,4985 38,35 0,0000 38,82 0,0000 
 
Tunisia 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,6663 46,38 0,0000 11,63 0,0006 
2006 0,7873 57,48 0,0000 4,2 0,0405 
2007 0,8409 126,25 0,0000 4,52 0,0336 
2008 0,6899 72,98 0,0000 14,74 0,0001 
2009 0,6404 68,65 0,0000 21,65 0,0000 
2010 0,6737 53,29 0,0000 12,5 0,0004 
2011 0,7882 85,49 0,0000 6,17 0,0130 








  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,3415 21,75 0,0000 80,87 0,0000 
2006 0,3432 19,34 0,0000 70,86 0,0000 
2007 0,4450 41,96 0,0000 65,26 0,0000 
2008 0,3334 24,28 0,0000 97,03 0,0000 
2009 0,3443 26,89 0,0000 97,54 0,0000 
2010 0,3786 28,68 0,0000 77,26 0,0000 
2011 0,4707 40,47 0,0000 51,19 0,0000 
2012 0,4832 38,79 0,0000 44,39 0,0000 
 
Mauritius 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,624842 67,59 0,0000 24,36 0,0000 
2006 0,648759 78,41 0,0000 22,98 0,0000 
2007 0,766366 145,54 0,0000 13,53 0,0002 
2008 0,63539 90,85 0,0000 29,92 0,0000 
2009 0,57998 78,65 0,0000 41,25 0,0000 
2010 0,637858 75,16 0,0000 24,23 0,0000 
2011 0,690627 90,53 0,0000 18,17 0,0000 
2012 0,708252 97,81 0,0000 16,6 0,0000 
 
Morocco 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,6041 47,5 0,0000 20,4 0,0000 
2006 0,7559 51,46 0,0000 5,36 0,0206 
2007 0,7924 89,26 0,0000 6,13 0,0133 
2008 0,6320 48,54 0,0000 16,45 0,0000 
2009 0,6396 58,69 0,0000 18,63 0,0000 
2010 0,7302 57,96 0,0000 7,92 0,0049 
2011 0,8661 93,37 0,0000 2,23 0,1352 
2012 0,8976 94,65 0,0000 1,23 0,2669 
 
Nigeria 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,4475 20,59 0,0000 31,39 0,0000 
2006 0,4746 17,84 0,0000 21,85 0,0000 
2007 0,6365 57,28 0,0000 18,68 0,0000 
2008 0,5096 34,54 0,0000 32 0,0000 
2009 0,5030 39,89 0,0000 38,95 0,0000 
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2010 0,5281 34,18 0,0000 27,3 0,0000 
2011 0,6914 59,06 0,0000 11,77 0,0006 
2012 0,7064 56,16 0,0000 9,7 0,0018 
 
South Africa 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,8444 64,23 0,0000 2,18 0,1396 
2006 0,8866 50,63 0,0000 0,83 0,3627 
2007 0,9727 100,96 0,0000 0,08 0,7778 
2008 0,8314 68,7 0,0000 2,82 0,0928 
2009 0,8326 77,72 0,0000 3,14 0,0764 
2010 0,8903 71,62 0,0000 1,09 0,2972 
2011 0,9163 107 0,0000 0,05 0,8298 
2012 0,9131 106,29 0,0000 0,05 0,8269 
 
Botswana 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,4525 23,41 0,0000 34,27 0,0000 
2006 0,5653 28,33 0,0000 16,74 0,0000 
2007 0,6772 69,62 0,0000 15,82 0,0001 
2008 0,5468 45,36 0,0000 31,15 0,0000 
2009 0,5653 58,11 0,0000 34,36 0,0000 
2010 0,5789 52,06 0,0000 27,55 0,0000 
2011 0,6972 71,39 0,0000 13,46 0,0002 
2012 0,7176 68,14 0,0000 10,56 0,0012 
 
Tanzania 
  H=0 H=1 
 H-stat Chi Prob > chi Chi Prob > chi 
2005 0,1267 2,89 0,0894 137,11 0,0000 
2006 0,1628 3,47 0,0624 91,85 0,0000 
2007 0,3237 17,74 0,0000 77,46 0,0000 
2008 0,1844 5,75 0,0165 112,48 0,0000 
2009 0,2111 7,88 0,0050 110,14 0,0000 
2010 0,1900 5,47 0,0194 99,4 0,0000 
2011 0,3035 13,36 0,0003 70,38 0,0000 






CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1  Introduction 
The thesis is a group of related empirical research papers around themes of 
bank competition, and efficiency and economic growth in ten Frontier African 
countries. Theory says that financial institutions, specifically the banking 
sector, are a channel for financial resources to move from excess to deprived 
sectors of the economy and thus leading to economic growth. It is for this 
reason that development of this sector is very important and a necessary 
condition for growth of the economy. This study has highlighted based on 
empirical inference that the level of bank competition, degree of bank 
efficiency, degree of income diversification and quality of institutions can act 
to boost or diminish the level of economic growth.  
The thesis is comprised of seven chapters, five of which are empirical studies. 
A key caveat is that the study used different methodologies to measure the 
various key concepts and this would be evidenced in the disparities in the 
results that are derived.  Chapters one and two provide an introduction and 
background of the banking sector in Frontier African countries. The first 
empirical subject in Chapter three presents estimations of banking 
competition and impact on economic growth by estimation of the Boone 
Indicator in the first stage and using the BI as the explanatory variable in a 
growth model with GDP growth as the dependent variable. 
In Chapter four, the study empirically analyses banking efficiency using Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Chapter five examines the ‘Quiet-Life’ hypothesis. The 
study uses the stochastic frontier analysis approach to estimate the Cost and 
profit efficiency. Chapter six proceeds to measure the theorized relationship 
between income diversification and bank effieicency using the SFA estimates 
in the first stage and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of 
income diversification into non-interest generating activities in the second 
stage. The next chapter explore the effect of quality of institutions on banking 
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competition. We estimate the H statistic as a measure of banking competition 
and in the second stage, we carry out a simultaneous quantile regression to 
test the determinants of bank competition. The last chapter of the thesis 
synthesizes the outcomes of the empirical chapters and analyses the 
implications that follow. The last chapter also outlines the key benefits made 
to empirical literature on banking competition and efficiency in the Frontier 
African Countries and unpacks the limitations as well as areas for future 
research. 
8.2  Summary of key findings and policy recommendations 
8.2.1 Synthesis of key findings 
The study first measured banking competition in the Frontier African market 
countries using the Boone Indicator. The findings indicate that the banking 
industry in the Frontier Market African countries is defined by monopolistic 
competition. The outcomes also show that competition has grown/reduced 
differently across the various Frontier African countries. This is due to the 
heterogeneous nature of the different economies. While in some countries 
(Tanzania, Kenya, Tunisia and Mauritius) competition has decreased through 
the years, in other countries (Ghana) competition has increased. For other 
countries (Botswana and South Africa), there are years where the BI is not 
statistically different from 0 (zero) or significantly positive.  
Next, the study investigated the relationship of bank competition on economic 
growth. The estimation results show that banking competition measures, 
proxied by the Boone Indicator, is significant with a correct sign in our 
preferred specification. The increase of 1 point in banking competition, as 
proxied by the BI, results in 0.013 percentage point rise in per capita real 
GDP growth over the 8-year period. An increase of competitiveness of the 
banking sector exerts a significant positive effect on real growth. In addition, 
the proxies used for inflation and trade openness are positive and negative 
respectively and insignificant. We also observe a positive and significant co-
efficient for gross fixed capital formation. 
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Efficiency and determinants: This study also investigated the degree of bank 
efficiency and analysed the determinants of banking efficiency in ten frontier 
African countries. The efficiency estimates of individual banks were evaluated 
by the DEA approach as well as a second stage truncated bootstrap procedure 
to compute bias corrected TE scores as well investigating the determinants of 
TE in the Frontier African Banks. Financial ratios were used as proxies for 
the determinants. The study used the intermediation approach that employs 
labour costs, deposits and assets as inputs and loans and other investments 
as outputs. The results suggest that TE has been above average for all the 
countries under study from 2008 to 2012. The highest average result of 0.65 
was achieved in 2008, with the lowest of 0.52 being evidenced in 2012. The 
empirical findings clearly show a degree of increasing inefficiency in the 
Frontier African banking sector especially from 2008 onwards to 2012. 
Competition-efficiency nexus: The study examined the empirical relationship 
between banking competition and efficiency using bank-level data for a 
selection of ten Frontier African countries. We used another measure of 
market power, the Lerner Index. The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
technique was applied as another approach to measure cost and profit 
efficiency, and a test for random effects was used to examine the relationship 
between bank competition and efficiency. Our findings indicate the existence 
of a positive and significant relationship between market power and both cost 
and profit efficiency. However, we reject the Quiet Life Hypothesis because, 
for the Frontier market African banks, higher Lerner indices are associated 
with cost and profit efficiencies and increased market power seems to increase 
the incentive to minimise costs and maximise profits. 
Efficiency and income diversification nexus: Income diversification has been in 
line with the theory of universal banking. In theory, diversification of income 
sources in a bank has the potential to lower risk level and higher risk-adjusted 
performance. The study looked at the impact of bank income diversification 
on cost and profit efficiency in a sample of ten Frontier African countries from 
2005 to 2012. SFA was used to measure both cost and profit efficiency, and 
the HHI was employed to measure the diversification of bank income. The 
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results indicate the existence of high revenue inefficiency. This was indicated 
by the high efficiency in cost as opposed to profit. 
Quality of institutions and bank competition nexus: The results of banking 
sector reforms carried out in Frontier African countries vary from country to 
country. One key reason for this variation could be the difference in quality of 
the institutions in the different countries. Marcelin and Mathur (2014) study 
state that cross-country variations in institutional quality and their effect on 
financing options can have an impact on banking system performance. Our 
empirical findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
regulatory quality and bank competition. The study observes that the scale of 
the estimated effects of regulatory quality are positive and progressively rise 
from the 10th quantile to the 75th quantile of the distribution in banking 
competition, signifying that better regulatory quality boosts competition in the 
banking. However, we observe a negative relationship between control of 
corruption, voice and accountability and bank competition.  
8.3  Policy implications and recommendations 
The results of the study have numerous policy implications that are resultant 
from the key themes examined in this study. First, the results propose that 
bank competition can be advantageous for economic growth. As bank 
competition increases via the efficiency channel, this would ultimately 
increase economic growth. This is because a competitive banking system 
allocates resources more efficiently, as such economic growth is likely to 
improve. In addition, a set of appropriate polices can be put in place and 
effectively carried out to grow bank competition. This could be accompanied 
with policies intended to remove barriers to entry and exit and increase 
competition. These policies would create a virtuous cycle with benefits from 
the banking efficiency, which in turn would cause real growth. 
Second, there is evidence of high levels of bank inefficiency in the sample, 
policy makers and regulators could put in place regulations that enable bank 
efficiency. In addition, they could also institute efficiency measures as well as 
restructuring the banking system to reduce the number of less efficient 
200 
 
banks. Furthermore, capacity building and incentive schemes could be 
introduced to improve managerial efficiency. This means that human 
resource development coupled with the appropriate policies can play a 
significant role in improving banking competition and efficiency.  
Third, policy makers could also pursue strategies that regulate the pricing of 
banking services in competitive environments to check for managerial 
inefficiency.  
Fourth, we observe from the results that diversification into non-interest 
generation improves bank efficiency. We also observe that efficiency benefits 
are realized at increased stages of diversification. This gives useful insight to 
regulatory and bank authorities in Frontier market countries. Policy makers 
could for instance place emphasis on formulating strategies to maximise the 
probable benefit of non-interest generating actions. Most of the Frontier 
countries have adopted universal banking, which is a first step, policies that 
encourage diversification in banking should be encouraged. 
Lastly, the study indicates that whereas there is a positive relationship 
between regulatory quality and bank competition, there is a negative relation 
between control of corruption and voice and accountability. Instinctively 
control of corruption as well as voice and accountability should have a positive 
relation with bank competition. The negative relationship in this case 
indicates that the policies in place hamper bank competition. Therefore, there 
is a need to formulate policies that remove or modify the inefficient rules that 
lead to the negative impact of control of corruption measures as well as issues 
around voice and accountability. In addition, policy makers should design 
policies that consider the capacity of bureaucrats and the quality of the 
judiciary to adjudicate rules and regulations.  
8.4  Proposed agenda for future research 
The analysis carried out in this thesis extends the limited research that has 
already been carried out on the African continent with a specific focus on 
Frontier African countries. More study could be undertaken on aspects of the 
research gaps below, that were not examined in the thesis. 
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The results of the study have shown that the banking industry in Frontier 
Africa is defined by increasing levels of bank inefficiency. Future study can 
examine the efficiency of the local banks vs foreign banks in the frontier 
African countries. Furthermore, an additional extension to this study could 
be the examination of changes in productivity because of technological 
progress or decline by employing the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI). 
Future studies can also examine the real cost of an increase in pricing power 
aas well as monopolistic inclinations on bank efficiency as well as social 
welfare. This would quantify the social welfare loss related to pricing power 
and efficiency loss related to the ‘quiet life’ that is enjoyed by banks.  
In addition, future studies on the impact of income diversification on bank 
competition should look at disintegrating the non-interest income into its 
various components that this study failed to address due to data 
unavailability across the sample.  
Finally, another area for future research is a study into different causal 
relationships between bank competition and economic growth. The thesis 
assumes a simplistic unidirectional connection from bank competition to 
economic growth, however there is also evidence of inverse causality from 
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